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INTRODUCTION TO NEW MEDIA AND OLD METAPHORS
2015 NOVA LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
JON M. GARON*
The medium, or process, of our time—electric technology is
reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every
aspect of our personal life.
It is forcing us to reconsider and re-evaluate practically every
thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for granted.
Everything is changing: you, your family, your education, your
neighborhood, your job, your government, your relation to the others. And
they’re changing dramatically.1
On February 12 and 13 of 2015, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, in conjunction with the Nova Law Review and
NSU Sports and Entertainment Law Society (SELS) presented the 2015
annual Nova Law Symposium. The program brought together seventeen
voices in media and entertainment to provide an interdisciplinary review of
issues involving business and industry responses to the transformative impact
of new media on traditional entertainment and media, including journalism,
sports, film, broadcast, gaming, music, and similar areas.
In 1967, Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore published a cultural
wake-up call regarding the intersection of media and culture.2 They
discussed the influence of modern media on the restructuring of society.3 As
they noted, “[t]oday’s child is growing up absurd, because he lives in two
worlds, and neither of them inclines to grow up. . . . Mere instruction will not
suffice.”4
The book noted the cultural as well as economic shifts underway by
the rise of media as the organizing principle for society. In doing so,
McLuhan and Fiore also noted common practice that defines legal
jurisprudence, the tendency to use precedent and past as the framing
principle for understanding new phenomenon. “When faced with a totally

*
Dean and Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center.
1.
MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE:
AN INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 8 (1967).
2.
See id.
3.
See id. at 18.
4.
Id.
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new situation, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavor
of the most recent past.”5
The tendency to look back was aptly captured by noted scholar
Arthur Miller. In 1993, Miller used the parable of “old wine in new bottles”
to frame what has become the central intellectual property debate of the past
twenty years, namely the question whether the existing legal framework can
adequately adjust to the information age.6
Rarely, however, does media define law. Instead “metaphors
express analogies.”7 Metaphors to help us shape our understanding and
relate abstract structures to our own, shared experiences.
The Nova Law Review symposium and the articles captured in this
edition address these changes. The speakers and authors have gamely
endeavored to look forward, peering back to the minimum extent necessary
to identify the trajectory of their paths.
The articles enable scholars to address the technological changes
required of artists, industry, courts, and legislatures. Nonetheless, the
historical perspective remains essential to update the law itself. The articles
address how laws once designed for daily print newspapers and burlesque
houses apply in the modern age. Under pre-Internet laws, for example, a
republisher of a libel was as liable for the statement as the original
publisher.8 Special laws were enacted to immunize Internet Service
Providers and others from responsibility for republishing such content. That
leads to questions beyond libel such as revenge porn,9 social media

5.
Id. at 73–74. (“We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We
march backwards into the future.”).
6.
“To some, these issues were nothing more than the same old wine, and
they fit nicely into the old doctrinal bottles. Others, although regarding computer technologies
as a new wine, nonetheless found satisfactory answers in the old bottles. The controversy . . .
was generated by those who believe that we really are dealing with a sufficiently new wine
that it requires new conceptual bottles.” Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?,
106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 979 (1993).
The reference is to Matthew 9:17, “Neither do men put new wine into old bottles:
else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine
into new bottles, and both are preserved.” King James Ed.
7.
Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, [reference in journal] citing Dedre
Gentner et. al, METAPHOR IS LIKE ANALOGY, IN THE ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, at 199 (2001), available at http://groups.psych.northwestern.edu/
gentner/papers/GentnerA2K01.pdf.
8.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977) (“Except as to those who
only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).
9.
See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App.
2014), review denied (Nov. 21, 2014) (“[P]laintiffs allege[d] that these revenge [porn]
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harassment,10 and other new issues in communications for which neither the
common law rules of the republisher nor the blanket immunity serve well.
The old bottles break when filled with these new issues, just as MeLuhan
anticipated they would.
New examples abound. The FCC has introduced efforts to regulate
the Internet under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 as a “common
carrier,”11 an ancient common law concept once used to assure equitable
prices from the rail and shipping industries.12 Common carrier laws were
incorporated into telecommunications to manage broadcast and telephony.
Now we must consider whether the regulation of data packets can be done in
the same manner we once regulated crates and goods.
In copyright and patent, even the concept of property has come
under attack in academic and in Congress.13 The conversations held during
the symposium and the papers that follow, however, focus on the creation
and dissemination of new inventions and creative works. These articles
provide an effective path toward the future.
In Professor Michael Epstein’s article, Reclaiming the Promise of
Free Local Broadcasting: Spectrum Reallocation and Public Interest in the
Post-Aereo Age, Professor Epstein highlights the Twenty-First century trend
away from over-the-air broadcast to Multi-channel Video Programming
Distributors (MVPDs) such as cable or internet service providers. Even
cable and satellite are at risk of disintermediation from mobile and wireless
devices. Professor Epstein identifies the societal consequence of these shifts
as a diminution on the “free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution
enshrined in the Communications Act of 1934 and enforced by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) through regulation.”
The work highlights that this debate is far more than a discussion of
which conglomerate should control the profits derived from content
distribution, but rather the policy decision affects which content is created
websites “engage[d] in the publication of obscenity and child pornography” in violation of
Texas Penal Code.”).
10.
See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation As Profit Center: The Monetization
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 383 (2009).
11.
In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 14-28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order Adopted: Feb. 26,
2015, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC15-24A1.pdf.
12.
See Phil Nichols, Redefining “Common Carrier”: The FCC’s Attempt at
Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501 (1987).
13.
See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 (2003); Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic
Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted
Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 481 (2007); Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on
Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006).
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and how the public is served with free and openly accessible content. The
benefit to the public is discussed through the consequence of broadcast
spectrum allocation. “If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers and the
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan.”
The importance, however, remains for the broader public. “[M]ost
importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “public
interest, convenience and necessity.”“
Professor Jason Zenor focused on a different aspect of media
regulation—that of journalist shield laws. In his article, Shielding Acts of
Journalism: Open Leaks Sites, National Security, and the Free Flow of
Information, Professor Zenor proposes “a model shield law that protects the
publishing of national security information which serves the public interest
and does not create an immediate, irreparable harm.” Professor Zenor
explains the modern challenge posed by WikiLeaks, bloggers, and the
blurring of professional and non-professional journalists. Unlike bloggers
and non-traditional media websites, “the traditional media are exempt from
prosecution under the Espionage Act and cannot be punished for publishing
truthful information that is legally obtained.”
Professor Zenor sets his debate for effective journalistic shield laws
against the backdrop of websites and organizations dedicated to public
dissemination of any and all leaked information. These sites bear both
similarities and differences to traditional media and the old laws simply
cannot operate to make nuanced distinctions between those sites essential to
a free press and those harmful of a civil society. Professor Zenor provides a
new model to rationalize these competing demands and provide a new set of
metaphors to frame the next iteration of the Fourth Estate.
In Christina Scelsi’s article, Care and Feeding of Privacy Policies
and Keeping the Big Data Monster At Bay: Legal Concerns in the Age of
the Internet of Things, attorney Scelsi introduced the Internet of Things to
the fields of entertainment and media privacy, noting that the Internet of
Things “will affect nearly every industry, whether in terms of better planning
as a result of the analysis of data collected by smart devices, or in the
increased efficiencies created by the ability for people to use devices to
communicate data to people located remotely.”
Attorney Scelsi moves her analysis to the health law sector where the
implications of data security are perhaps the most profound for most
individuals. In doing so, she illustrates the porous nature of the distinctions
between media communications and the communications integral to personal
autonomy as well as those of business and industry. As the metaphors shift
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and the analogies expand, the entire world becomes the stage upon which the
new media takes shape.
Professor Brian Frye utilizes metaphor directly. In his article,
Copyright as Charity, Professor Frye uses the lessons of copyright and the
lessons of the nonprofit sector to suggest regulatory approaches to update
copyright law itself. As he explains, “[c]opyright and charity law
complement each other by solving market and government failures in works
of authorship in different ways.”
He points out that “new technologies like crowdfunding and the
open-source movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market
and government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law,
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors.” Reflecting on
Professor Frye’s article, it seems logical to extrapolate that when the market
failure is solved through new technology and more efficient communications
strategies, the market no longer fails and the subsidy may no longer be
needed. Lessons from copyright law policy and social welfare policy help
illustrate their strengths and weaknesses to highlight policy suggestions.
This issue also features a student comment by Dylan Fulop, titled
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer: A ‘Stairway’ to Countless Copyright
Claims. Mr. Fulop discusses the role that latches has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.14 In this interesting
copyright dispute, the Court emphasized the statutory authority of Congress
over the common law traditions of copyright, while retaining the equitable
nature of the latches doctrine.
Laches, we hold, cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a
claim for damages brought within the three-year window. As to equitable
relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar at the very threshold
the particular relief requested by the plaintiff. And a plaintiff’s delay can
always be brought to bear at the remedial stage, in determining appropriate
injunctive relief, and in assessing the “profits of the infringer . . . attributable
to the infringement.”15
Mr. Fulop builds on the Petrella analysis involving the motion
picture, Raging Bull, to address the potential claims in music litigation,
specifically the Led Zeppelin classic, Stairway to Heaven. The extension of
Petrella will continue to be a contentious one, as the three-year window for
copyright damages often does not coincide with the creation or primarily
popularity of the infringement actions.

14.
15.
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These articles and the seventeen discussants at the symposium
illustrate that society is only at the cusp of the true transformation.
Interactive glasses from Google and Microsoft will marry a wearer’s
perception of the world with real sight and virtual sight. Digitally connected
devices can communicate with each other and monitor the speed of our
moving car, the steps we walk, the media we watch, and the company we
keep. Tomorrow’s laws regulating these devices may bear little relationship
to the regulations currently on our books. Yet the hindsight with which we
view the world will continue to shape society’s perception of the law and
human relations, even if it does not provide an adequate guide for particular
jurisprudence.
Although the symposium focused on the field of entertainment and
media, conversations, presentations, and published articles highlight much
more. The technology affects constitutional issues of privacy, criminal
search, publicity rights, consumer rights and many related areas of law. It is
my hope that the symposium and this edition of the Nova Law Review further
this important dialogue on the future of media jurisprudence.
As policy makers, we must be careful not to “put new wine into old
bottles: else the bottles break, the wine runs out, and the bottles perish: but
they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.”16 Neither,
however, can we do nothing. “The wine in the bottle does not quench
thirst.”17 By testing the metaphors, trying new regulations, and debating the
future of new media, we will grow the best policy for the information age.

16.
Matthew 9:17.
17.
GEORGE HERBERT, THE ENGLISH POEMS OF GEORGE HERBERT: TOGETHER
WITH HIS COLLECTION OF PROVERBS ENTITLED JACULA PRUDENTUM 241 (1902) (Google eBook
Ed.)
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in ABC,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 reflects a growing imbalance between the market power
of broadcasters and the government-owned distribution technology they
control to distribute their content.2 Broadcast networks and affiliates, in
legal filings and public comments, have drawn a line in the sand when it
comes to technologies such as Aereo’s, which allow viewers to bypass local
cable systems to receive antenna signals: Had the Supreme Court sided with
Aereo, incumbent broadcasters threatened publicly to migrate their signals to
other Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (“MVPDs”), such as
cable or internet service providers.3 Since nearly eighty-three percent of
Americans receive their digital broadcast signals via cable and satellite
MVPDs, broadcasters have grown to rely on retransmission consent fees
*
Professor of Law and Director of the Amicus Project, Southwestern Law
School. Supervising Editor of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law,
published by the American Bar Association and the Donald E. Biederman Entertainment and
Media Law Institute at Southwestern. The author thanks Natasha Mehlum, a Biederman
Scholar at Southwestern, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1.
No. 13-461, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2014).
2.
See id. at 8, 12–13, 17–18.
3.
See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2012); Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip. op. at 8,
12–13, 17–18; Greg Sandoval, A Bet That Diller-Backed Aereo TV Startup Wins Its Day in
Court, CNET (June 3, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/a-bet-that-diller-backedaereo-tv-startup-wins-its-day-in-court/.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

21

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

326

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

from these MVPDs as a primary source of revenue, in addition to
advertising.4
Broadcasters’ reliance on retransmission fees, however, undermine
the free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution enshrined in the
Communications Act of 1934, and enforced by the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) through regulation.5 Those fortunate enough to be
granted a broadcast license benefit from what is known as a command-andcontrol spectrum use policy that gives the licensee exclusive control of a
large amount of frequency bandwidth—government bandwidth that is scarce,
valuable, and in high demand by other telecommunications providers.6 This
Article will examine the law and policy issues relating to a significant
reduction—but not an abandonment—of the command-and-control system of
spectrum use by current licensees.7 Simply put, broadcasters would use less
spectrum to receive the same core benefits they have now.8 Indeed,
Congress and the FCC should encourage a spectrum allocation system that
allows for more efficient and localized use of frequency bandwidth by more
users, while preserving public interest set-asides for current network and
affiliate content on non-broadcast MVPDs.
II.

REVISITING THE FCC’S SPECTRUM REALLOCATION DEBATE

In 2002, FCC Chairman Michael Powell convened a Spectrum Task
Force that issued a report analyzing FCC policy regarding spectrum use.9
The mandate of the task force was not only to review the current approaches
to spectrum management, but also to explore alternative models of spectrum
management that would “better promote the most efficient and productive
use of [the] spectrum.”10
In its report, the Spectrum Task Force describes three models of
spectrum use in the United States: command-and-control, exclusive use, and

4.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS ASS’N (July 30, 2013), http://www.ce.org/
News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases/Only-Seven-Percent-of-TVHouseholds-Rely-on-Over-t.aspx; Sandoval, supra note 3.
5.
See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–154 (2012);
Sandoval, supra note 3.
6.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE
SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 2–3, 10–11 (2002).
7.
See infra Part II, III.
8.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 2–3, 17–18.
9.
See id. at 1.
10.
Id.
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open access.11 Command-and-control is the most regulatory intensive of the
models.12 “The traditional process of spectrum management in the United
States,” command-and-control, requires the FCC to “allocate[] and assign[]
frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific governmentdefined uses,” including broadcasting.13 Nearly every aspect of spectrum
use is defined by the FCC, including: user eligibility requirements, “service
restrictions, power limits, build-out requirements”, and infrastructure
specifications, among others.14
One of the great innovations of the Spectrum Task Force Report is
its nod to exclusive use and open access use alternatives, both of which are
more efficient than traditional command-and-control.15 The 2002 Spectrum
Task Force Report describes exclusive use as
[a] licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive and
transferable rights to the use of [a] specified spectrum within a
defined geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed
primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum users against
interference. Under this model, exclusive rights resemble property
rights in spectrum, but this model does not imply or require
creation of full private property rights in spectrum.16

Many envision a system where broadcast signals could be relayed
like mobile telephony across licensed signal conduits.17 In such a system,
programmers can distribute content without monopolizing a dedicated
frequency in an entire market.18 In effect, this is what many consumers do
when they live stream a retransmitted feed from a broadcast television or
radio station over a 4G or LTE connection to their smartphone or tablet.19
From the consumer’s standpoint, there is no discernible difference in the
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2.
See id. at 3–5.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

2.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 17, 19.
16.
Id. at 2.
17.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
18.
See WILLIAM LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NEW MODELS FOR PROTECTED SHARED ACCESS 4–5 (2014),
available at http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFP_Papers/CFP%20Spectrum%20Sharing%
20Paper%202014.pdf.
19.
See Walter S. Mossberg, 4G or Not 4G: A Guide to Cut Through All the
‘Fast’ Talk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2012, at D1; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on
Over-the-Air Signals, According to CFA Study, supra note 4.
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reception experience.20 But from a spectrum use standpoint, using a
frequency for program streaming is much more efficient.21 For one, it is
interactive, allowing consumers to choose what programs to stream over it.22
But more importantly, the frequency itself is used more efficiently.23
The least restrictive of the models is open access, also widely
referred to as the commons.24 The commons is kind of like the wild west of
spectrum use.25 As the report describes, the commons model
[a]llows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share
frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical
standards or etiquettes but with no right to protection from
interference. Spectrum is available to all users that comply with
established technical etiquettes or standards that set power limits
and other criteria for operation of unlicensed devices to mitigate
potential interference.”26

By the turn of the current century, a number of academics, including
Lawrence Lessig, pushed the commons model as a means to make spectrum
use more efficient.27 In his book, The Future of Ideas, Lessig lauds the
commons as a way to free spectrum from the yoke of government control:28
My claim is that there is enough evidence of a different way to
order spectrum that we should be exploring whether spectrum
could be ordered as a commons.
. . . There would be a role for regulation even if spectrum were
free. But this regulation would look very different from the
regulation that now controls spectrum. The government—or the
market—would not be deciding who gets to use the spectrum. The
government would simply be assuring that the technologies that
use the spectrum are properly certified technologies.

20.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CFA Study, supra note 4.
21.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 6.
22.
See id.
23.
See id.
24.
Id. at 2.
25.
See id.
26.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
2.
27.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 92 (2001).
28.
Id. at 83–84.
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. . . The role of the government . . . would be much less invasive
than under the current regulatory regime.29

Despite its embrace of the alternative spectrum management models
for certain uses, the Spectrum Task Force ultimately concludes that certain
uses of spectrum should continue to be managed under traditional commandand-control.30 Command-and-control, in their view, is important to promote
and enforce public interest objectives:31
With respect to the command-and-control model, . . . the
[Task Force] recognizes that continued use of this approach may
be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by
regulation is necessary to accomplish compelling public interest
objectives. However, such objectives should be carefully defined,
and the amount of spectrum subject to a command-and-control
should be limited to . . . [that which] ensure[s] that those objectives
are achieved. Many spectrum users will claim that they warrant
special consideration and thus deserve exemption from any reform
of their service allocation rules. It is therefore critical to
distinguish between special interest and the public interest,
establishing a high bar for any service to clear prior to receiving an
exemption.32

The Spectrum Task Force Report concluded in 2002 that commandand-control was, as of then, the best model for broadcasting.33 But they left
open the possibility that the time may come when efficiency considerations
would outweigh public interest mandates.34 “For the time being, broadcast
spectrum should continue to be subject to the command-and-control model
due to the public interest obligations placed on broadcasters and the free
over-the-air nature of broadcast service.”35 In the future, the balance
between efficiency and public interest would need to be reevaluated.36
We further recommend that the Commission fundamentally alter
the existing balance among these models—which is dominated by
29.
30.

Id. at 83.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
See id. at 44.
See id.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

36.

Id.

20.

44.
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legacy command-and-control regulation—by expanding the use of
both the exclusive use and commons models throughout the radio
spectrum, and limiting the use of the command-and-control model
to those instances where there are compelling public policy reasons
to continue using it.37

In the nearly fifteen years since the Spectrum Task Force published
its report, the need for greater spectrum use efficiency has increased
significantly with the explosion of broadband and mobile telephony.38 At the
same time, the utility of spectrum-based command-and-control broadcasting
has diminished significantly.39 Broadcasters thrive in an age when the vast
majority of American households rely on signal retransmission to receive
broadcast programming through cable or satellite service, or by simply
streaming on demand over a broadband Internet connection.40 Is the current
6 MHz command-and-control allocation really in the public’s interest? Or is
it tantamount to an overly generous give-away of a government benefit to
meet an industry’s special interest? This Article proposes that the time has
come to revisit the balance between efficiency and public interest in the use
of broadcast spectrum.41
III.

REFRAMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEBATE

Broadcasters benefit from two government-granted legal
monopolies.42 They enjoy a license—without a government fee—that
entitles them to command and control 6 MHz of radio spectrum in a
specified local market for their private benefit.43 In addition, Congress
created a market for these licenses, worth fifty billion dollars in the
aggregate, by allowing broadcast entities to transfer licenses to third parties
at market rates—and without recoupment of any of that value to the
37.
Id. at 16–17.
38.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
39.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 42.
40.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
41.
See infra Part IV.
42.
See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2012); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Equities and
Economics of Property Interests in TV Spectrum Licenses, NAVIGANT ECON. 6–7 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/011614_Navigant_spectrum_study.pdf.
43.
47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c)(1); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE
BROADCAST TELEVISION SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTION: INNOVATION IN POLICY TO IGNITE
INNOVATION FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS, FCC STAFF SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318455A1.pdf.
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government.44 Broadcasters also keep their licenses in perpetuity, with
largely pro forma renewals every eight years.45 In addition, broadcast
licensees’ stations are universally available to the public, either through
channels mandated for antenna reception on American television sets or, at
the licensee’s election, through compulsory free carriage on pay television
systems in their local area.46 In return for this command-and-control benefit,
licensees are subject to regulations in the public interest, including public
interest requirements for broadcasters, including candidate access, children’s
television programming, indecency, and even no-longer-operable initiatives
like ascertainment and the Fairness Doctrine.47
Broadcasters also benefit from a second government monopoly, a
bundle of exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.48 The
principal benefit available to licensees under copyright law is the ability to
negotiate—and renegotiate—retransmission consent of its programming with
other pay television MVPDs, like cable and satellite providers.49 These
negotiated retransmission fees stand as a revenue-generating alternative to
the must-carry rules available under the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable Television Act”), which
mandates compulsory carriage of a broadcaster’s signal without a licensing
fee if the broadcaster so elects.50 Until the 1970s, pay television
retransmission consent and negotiated royalty payments were not issues for
broadcast licensees who relied on cable television systems to relay their
signals into communities where topography or interference prevented
spectrum reception.51 These Community Antenna Television systems, as
they were known during this era, were allowed to retransmit the licensees’
signals for free so that broadcasters could more fully realize the benefit of
their command-and-control spectrum allocation.52 Broadcasters essentially

44.
Eisenach, supra note 42, at 6, 11.
45.
47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1).
46.
See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
47.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969).
48.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
49.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. 1460, 1482. Broadcasters also enjoy limited
rights as exclusive licensees of other copyright holders that create television programming. 17
U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5).
50.
See § 4(a), 106 Stat. at 1471; § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. at 1482.
51.
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
385–90 (1st ed. 2001).
52.
Id. at 380.
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did without one government benefit to avail themselves more effectively of
the other.53
By the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the media
landscape had already changed.54 In the 1960s, cable television providers
discovered that customers were willing to pay for original content.55
Dedicated basic cable channels and premium services proliferated, and pay
television became a programming alternative to broadcasting.56 Cable was
no longer Community Antenna Television; it had become a competing
programming source, and a nascent threat to the established hegemony of
broadcasting.57 This threat was addressed in the Copyright Act, in the very
provisions that were before the United States Supreme Court in the Aereo
case in 2014.58 Indeed, the public performance language that expressly
applies copyright protection to the unaltered retransmission of a
broadcaster’s signal legislatively overruled two Supreme Court cases from
the CATV era, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.59 and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,60 which had
viewed unaltered retransmissions as an exception to the retransmission
consent requirement under the Copyright Act.61
In the four decades since the Copyright Act, broadcast licensees’
reliance on the benefits of retransmission consent has increased significantly,
as pay television became the dominant pipeline into American homes for
television programming.62 Now television broadcasters, and the networks
that own many of the stations, regularly engage in negotiations with cable
television providers in hope of exacting a high market rate fee for
retransmission consent.63 While they take a risk of having the negotiations
fail, and getting blacked out on a local system, the upside has been great for
broadcasters.64 A number of recent instances underscore the importance of

53.

See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note

6, at 3–4.
54.
See Sharon Strover, Cable Television: United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELEVISION 2004, (Museum of Broad Commc’ns, Vol. 1, 2004).
55.
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
58.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2012); see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461,
slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 25, 2014).
59.
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
60.
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
61.
17 U.S.C. § 101; Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 7; see also
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 414–15; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400–01.
62.
See Strover, supra note 54.
63.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1.
64.
See id.
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this new revenue source to broadcasters.65 In the 1990s, then Disney chair
Michael Eisner may have threatened to pull Monday Night Football from its
ABC network lineup because he was frustrated over affiliate compensation,
which he considered uneconomic.66 The move of Monday Night Football to
ESPN, became a reality under Bob Iger’s tenure, in 2006.67 A more dramatic
dust-up was created by Chase Carey, COO of News Corporation, in 2013
when he publicly mused about moving the entire Fox Broadcasting Network
to cable.68 The threat was made in response to the perceived threat of Aereo
to upend the retransmission consent fees that Fox had begun to rely upon.69
One is left to wonder if Fox and other networks would have really abandoned
their command-and-control spectrum if Aereo had prevailed in 2014.70
The problem for broadcasters is that these two monopolies are
fundamentally incompatible.71 The more licensees rely on the Copyright Act
for revenue, the less valuable the benefit of command-and-control spectrum
is for them.72 It is an inverse proportion that has been borne out by the failed
promise of digital signal propagation.73
In 2009, the FCC completed a gradual transition from the National
Television System Committee (“NTSC”) standard definition television—the
system that had been in place since 1940—to advanced television signals, a
digital system that was supposed to usher in an era of crystal-clear reception
and high-resolution.74 Unlike its analog counterpart, signals encoded
65.
See, e.g., David S. Cohen, News Corp. Threatens to Make Fox Cable-Only
Amid Aereo Dispute, VARIETY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://variety.com/2013/
digital/news/chase-carey-threatens-to-yank-fox-from-broadcast-tv-over-aereo-1200334235/.
66.
See Marc Gunther & Carol Vinzant, Eisner’s Mousetrap Disney’s CEO
Says the Company Has a Lot of Varied Problems He Can Fix. But What If the Real Issue Is
Something He Can’t Face?, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 1999), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/1999/09/06/265291/index.htm.
67.
See Bob Raissman & Matt Marrone, ESPN Grabs “Monday Night
Football”, AM. SPORTSCASTERS ONLINE, http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/
mondaynightfootball.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015); Robert A. Iger: Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/aboutdisney/leadership/ceo/robert-iger (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
68.
Cohen, supra note 65.
69.
See id.
70.
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25,
2014); Cohen, supra note 65.
71.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), with FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra
note 43, at 1, 5.
72.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106; KIMBERLY M. RANDOLPH, STOUT RISIUS ROSS
SPECTRUM
LICENSES:
VALUATION
INTRICACIES
2
(2011),
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/spectrum-licenses-valuation-intricacies.pdf.
73.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 5.
74.
James Miller & James E. Preiger, The Broadcasters’ Transition Date
Roulette: Strategic Aspects of the DTV Transition, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 437, 444
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digitally cannot be partially decoded.75 Referred to as the digital cliff effect,
all of a signal must be received or nothing can be decoded.76 The digital cliff
proved to be an obstacle for antenna television households in major cities
and rural areas.77 Reception in metropolitan areas with skyscrapers or
mountains has been spotty since the transition, with large swaths of major
cities like Los Angeles and New York from what the FCC calls the cliff
effect, making antenna service impossible or too expensive.78 Households in
rural areas similarly discovered that digital signals could not reach them.79
Digital signals, as it turns out, have a higher drop-off rate as they travel
longer distances than analog signals, making them unsuitable for homes far
from city transmission towers.80
For some, it may be possible to buy an expensive roof-mounted
antenna that can scan interactively for signals, but the added expense and
technical challenges have not proven worth it for most.81 For apartment
dwellers without access to a rooftop antenna, no amount of money will make
signal reception possible.82 Moreover, unless one subscribed to a pay
television MVPD, homes were required to replace their old equipment with a
new digital television, or a set-top converter box, and a new antenna.83 To
alleviate the cost burden to consumers during the transition, the U.S.
government initiated a coupon program for low-cost or no-cost converter
boxes.84 Pay television subscribers did not have to buy new equipment; they
(2011); Digital Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/digital-television
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015); see also Roy Furchgott, A Downside to Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2008, at C6.
75.
See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.; see also Furchgott, supra note 74.
78.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 05-199, STUDY OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
FIELD STRENGTH STANDARDS AND TESTING PROCEDURES 25 (2005); see also Furchgott, supra
note 74 (noting digital reception is more easily blocked than analog reception).
79.
See Furchgott, supra note 74.
80.
See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448; Furchgott, supra note 74; The
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
Digital
TV
Transition:
Reception
Maps,
FED.
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/engineering/dtvmaps/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
81.
See Furchgott, supra note 74; The Digital TV Transition: Reception
Maps, supra note 80.
82.
See JONATHAN RINTELS ET AL., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS
& LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, TRANSITION IN TROUBLE: ACTION
NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION 27–28 (2008) (“These
digital gaps are not confined to sparsely populated rural areas; rather . . . millions of viewers
in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other major metro areas will experience digital gaps
in coverage.”).
83.
See id. at 7; Digital Television, supra note 74.
84.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3005(a)–(b), 120
Stat. 4, 23 (2005).
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could continue to use their existing NTSC televisions, did not need an
antenna, and could continue to get a high-quality signal retransmission of
broadcast and transmission of non-broadcast channels.85 In theory, pay
television subscribers would be foregoing high-definition reception, but since
many licensees had opted to multiplex their generous command-and-control
bandwidth into standard definition programming streams, pay MVPD
subscribers with standard definition receivers were not really giving up
much.86
Despite its promise of a new era for broadcasting, the government’s
transition from analog to digital television was a boon for the pay television
industry.87 Households that had once relied on free, over-the-air antenna
television could no longer economically receive a decodable signal in the
digital age.88 Instead of making broadcasters more competitive with pay
television, the move to digital television made broadcasters more reliant
upon it.89
IV.
A.

TOWARD A MORE BALANCED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION POLICY
Preserving Command-and-Control on a Smaller Scale

Efficient spectrum reallocation does not need to abandon commandand-control spectrum use, despite its inherent inefficiency.90 As the 2002
Spectrum Task Force Report points out, command-and-control assures a
variety of spectrum use in the public interest, including satellite access,
emergency services, and, of course, terrestrial broadcasting.91 This Article,
however, proposes a middle ground that is tilted much farther away from the
current command-and-control structure.92 The idea here is to reduce the
spectrum allocation to a bare minimum, enough so that licensees can
transmit by relay to digital receivers to the cord-cutters and cord-nevers,
perhaps using a technology not unlike that employed unsuccessfully by

85.
See RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 28; Only Seven Percent of TV
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
86.
Albert N. Lung, Note, Must-Carry Rules in the Transition to Digital
Television: A Delicate Constitutional Balance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 151, 206 (2000).
87.
See Digital Television, supra note 74; Only Seven Percent of TV
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
88.
RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 7.
89.
Id.
90.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 4, 44.
91.
Id. at 20–21.
92.
See infra Part IV.A.
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Aereo.93 How much spectrum is needed may be an open question, but this
would be a significant reduction in the bandwidth currently provided by
government.94 Signal power may also be an issue.95 If broadcasting is
integrated into the existing infrastructure of cell towers and hot spots, it may
be that the stations can operate at low power with little or no interference.96
The quality of revamped antenna television reception may be a concern for
licensees and broadcast networks, however.97 Broadcasters do not want it to
be too good; otherwise, they would not be able to command high
retransmission consent fees from pay television MVPDs.98 One way to
address this may be to allow broadcasters to enhance the signal to the
MVPD, allowing for a richer, or possibly even high-definition primary video
and audio signal for the cable or satellite provider’s paying customers.99
This would likely require action by Congress, but it would give broadcasters
and pay television what they want most.100 A premium tier broadcast service
would look and sound better than what would be available via antenna.101
To be clear, this is a policy that the FCC has been tentatively testing
with its voluntary spectrum buy-back plan for broadcasters, as set forth in the
Agency’s 2010 Spectrum Task Force Report.102 So far, the buy-back has not
freed up a lot spectrum, which the FCC acknowledges it needs to expand
broadband and mobile telephony to underserved communities.103
Broadcasters do not want to give up the scarce resource of spectrum, which
93.

ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 14–15, 17 (U.S. June 25,

2014).
94.
See FED COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 26, 30.
95.
See id. at 46.
96.
See id. at 14.
97.
See Michael M. Epstein, “Primary Video” and Its Secondary Effects on
Digital Broadcasting: Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under the 1992 Cable Act and
the First Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 525, 543 (2004).
98.
See id. at 542–43; Sandoval, supra note 3.
99.
See Epstein, supra note 97, at 529, 543. More revolutionary transmission
technologies like Visible Light Communications—also known as Li-Fi—could be utilized
similarly in the service of broadcasters. See Joao MM Santos et al., Hybrid GaN LED with
Capillary-Bonded II–VI MQW Color-Converting Membrane for Visible Light
Communications,
SEMICONDUCTOR
SCI.
&
TECH.,
March
2015,
at
1,
http://iopscience.iop.org/0268-1242/30/3/035012/pdf/0268-1242_30_3_035012.pdf.
100.
See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
101.
See Digital Television, supra note 74.
102.
Cecilia Kang, FCC to Offer Plan for TV Airwaves Auction, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 2012, at A26; see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS
OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 4 (2010).
103.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 102, at 4–5; see also Amy Gahran,
FCC Warns of Looming Mobile Spectrum Crunch, CNN (Nov. 5, 2010, 5:14 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/11/05/gahran.mobile.spectrum.crunch/.
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because of third-party resale has great value.104 But, in the Spectrum
Reduction Plan proposed here, the return of spectrum—and bandwidth—
would be mandatory regulation.105 By making it mandatory, the FCC can
help broadcasters understand what they apparently are unable to see: A
generous spectrum bandwidth allocation is not significant to the principal
benefit they receive as terrestrial broadcasters.106 In that sense, this proposal
takes existing FCC spectrum policy to the next level.107
To make this work, the FCC would need to reallocate de minimus
bandwidth to primary audio and video signal, as defined under the Cable
Television Act.108 Weak broadcasters—the ones that Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC109 recognized was in Congress’ purview to help
economically with the must-carry rules—could still take advantage of cable
distribution without payment—essentially the status quo benefit of
broadcasting without the inefficient use of a government resource.110 Strong
stations have demonstrated that they do not need this benefit of spectrum
monopoly, but they would still be able to use the de minimus spectrum.111
And they could still choose compulsory free carriage under current law.112
Put differently, a broadcaster gets almost all the benefits of
command and control—and the monopoly market power that comes with
it—by reducing spectrum bandwidth subject to monopoly license to a much
lower minimum.113 It is more responsive to a market reality in which
broadcasters have effectively abandoned their government monopoly in
exchange for free, over-the-air television.114 Ultimately, the real benefits of
spectrum for broadcasters are the bundle of intellectual property rights that
they have been able to monetize.115 Apart from licensing rights, the principal
benefit of the federal regulatory system today is the capability of
broadcasters to choose universal service, which most broadcasters do not
choose to avail themselves of.116
104.
105.
106.
6, at 47–48.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
6, at 42.
115.
116.
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Legislative and Broadcast Industry Opposition

Incumbent licensees might try to argue that a reduction in spectrum
allocation amounts to a taking of their property by the government.117 The
Communications Act of 1934, however, expressly disclaims any property
interest in their licenses.118 They may also argue that they have invested
heavily in the infrastructure and technology of broadcasting.119 Moreover,
this is not about revoking licenses, although Congress theoretically can do
this without cause.120 Indeed, even if broadcasters can argue that they have
some kind of property right to a government benefit, the critical aspects of
that benefit would not be lost in a Spectrum Reduction Plan.121 First
Amendment challenges would likely fail.122 Even if Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission’s123 vision of the public’s
paramount interest does not survive a challenge, it is easy to characterize
spectrum reduction as content neutral, allowing for a good deal of deference
to Congress.124 There is also no reason to think that the FCC would run afoul
of Chevron deference to its agency discretion.
One might fully expect broadcasters and their lobbyists to express
opposition to spectrum reduction.125 For one, when there is a proposed
reduction in a government benefit, the recipients of that benefit will oppose
it.126 But the critical question should be whether the public interest is being
disserved by spectrum bandwidth reduction. Indeed, the spectrum-reduced
regime permits licensees to enjoy retransmission consent rights under the
Copyright Act or compulsory carriage under Cable Television Act.127
Without generous bandwidth, broadcasters would lose the ability to
broadcast to antenna televisions in high definition.128 While the public has
an interest in high definition broadcasting, the reality is that broadcasters
split their bandwidth into lower definition programming streams instead of
using their full bandwidth for high-resolution programming.129 This signal
117.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
118.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
119.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 110, 121–22.
120.
See Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121.
121.
122.
See id. at 133–34; Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 389.
123.
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
124.
See id. at 390, 399–400; Lung, supra note 86, at 172.
125.
See Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 388–89.
126.
See id. at 388–89, 400.
127.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4 106 Stat. 1460, 1471 (1992).
128.
See Lung, supra note 86, at 206.
129.
See id.
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multiplexing has become a significant source of additional revenue for
broadcasters, but it was not part of the public interest benefit that Congress
legislated when it mandated a transition to HDTV.130 Indeed, it runs counter
to this benefit.131 In addition, whether a broadcaster transmits in HDTV is
immaterial to cable and satellite customers whose box or televisions are not
HDTV capable.132 Pay television subscribers, as discussed previously, could
benefit from an enhance signal from broadcasters, as long as their tuner and
television are HD capable.133
Pay television MVPDs might mount a challenge to new regulations
requiring set-asides for broadcast stations on their systems.134 There would
be little possibility of success in the courts, however, as the issue was settled
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Turner.135 Indeed, the
implementation of a Spectrum Reduction Plan need not require a revamping
of the must-carry rules currently in place.136 The change would be in the
amount of spectrum that would be subject to the must-carry rules, the
“primary audio and video signal.”137 From a cable or satellite provider’s
standpoint, the burden is no different than it was before—it may even be less
since unenhanced bandwidth would take up less of the subscriber’s
broadband pipeline into the home. Retransmission of an enhanced signal
would be subject to negotiation and agreement with a broadcaster; a pay
MVPD’s use of a licensee’s HDTV signal, for example, would be
determined by the market, not by government regulation.138
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article does not propose a specific action plan; the idea here is
to introduce a balance that preserves the principal rights and benefits of
broadcasters in a way that makes much more efficient use of spectrum.
Spectrum is much more valuable to the public interest if it is used for mobile

130.
131.
132.

See Epstein, supra note 97, at 557, 568.
See id.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note

6, at 43.
133.
See supra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text.
134.
See supra Part III.
135.
TBS v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997).
See id. at 185, 189–90; Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37.
136.
137.
See Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37.
138.
47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b)(1)(A), 535(g)(1) (2012); see also Eisenach, supra
note 42, at 8, 10–11.
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telephony and new wireless broadband technologies.139 Even with a de
minimus spectrum allocation, licensees still get a great deal from the
government.140 They can continue to enjoy universal service and the mustcarry rules; they can also continue to benefit from a revenue stream under the
Copyright Act.141 The government would also come out ahead here, since
much of that freed up spectrum would be auctioned. Mobile carriers and
internet service providers are willing to pay the government top dollar for a
slice of the radio frequency spectrum pie.142
A Spectrum Reduction Plan may also be a net gain for MVPD
carriers since they could benefit from freed-up spectrum. Ultimately, there
should be no additional burden for pay television providers. The burden
analysis under Turner’s application of the O’Brien test will be the same for
pay television providers.143 Presumably, the same broadcasters who
currently elect compulsory free carriage under the must-carry rules would
continue to elect compulsory carriage. It may even be less of a burden for
pay television MVPDs since broadcasters’ reduced bandwidth would take up
less space in the cable or satellite pipeline.
Could broadcasters be happy with a mandatory Spectrum Reduction
Plan? Well, that remains to be seen. At the end of the day, licensees would
not lose much. To the extent that de minimus spectrum allocation is
incompatible with HDTV transmission, broadcasters can include that in
enhanced signal negotiations—at market rates—with pay television
providers. The small percentage of homes that currently receive antenna
signals would lose high-definition capability, but since licensees multiplex
their signals into standard definition programming streams, they are not
really losing high-resolution reception.144 Licensees may chafe with the
continuation of the public interest regulations that attached to their use of
spectrum—but industry challenges of scarcity and public trustee
justifications for broadcast regulations are not new.145 Indeed, one of the
benefits to the public of a Spectrum Reduction Plan is that it does not change
the scarcity and fiduciary calculus. The spectrum is still scarce, and it is still
139.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 20–21; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to
CEA Study, supra note 4.
140.
See Evolution of Cable Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated Mar. 14, 2012).
141.
17 U.S.C. § 106; TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90.
142.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1, 2.
143.
See TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90.
144.
Lung, supra note 86, at 205–06; Only Seven Percent of TV Households
Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
145.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2; Lung, supra note 86,
at 205–06.
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administered by the government as a public trust.146 Licensees are simply
using less of it.147
In the wake of their victory in Aereo, incumbent broadcasters have
no need to make good on threats to migrate to subscription-based MVPDs
such as Netflix or Comcast.148 They enjoy the best of two monopolies:
Command-and-control over spectrum, and the exclusive rights of the
Copyright Act.149 But they do not need a generous spectrum allocation today
to run a profitable business. If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers, and the
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan. And, perhaps
most importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “‘public
interest, convenience, and necessity.’”150

146.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2.
147.
See id.
148.
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25,
2014); Sandoval, supra note 3.
149.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 2–3.
150.
See Eisenach, supra note 42, at 7, 18.
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ABSTRACT

Copyright and charity law are generally considered distinct and
unrelated bodies of law. But they are actually quite similar and complement
each other.1 Both copyright and charity law are intended to increase social
welfare by solving market and government failures in public goods caused
by free riding.2 Copyright solves market and government failures in works
of authorship by providing an indirect subsidy to marginal authors, and
charity law solves market and government failures in charitable goods by
*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A,
University of California, Berkeley, 1995. The author thanks Dean Jon Garon and the 2015
Nova Law Review Symposium, New Media and Old Metaphors. The author also thanks
Johnny Schmidt for helpful observations on the relationship between copyright and charity.
1.
See infra Part IV.
2.
See infra Part IV.A–B.
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providing an indirect subsidy to marginal donors.3 Copyright and charity
law complement each other by solving market and government failures in
works of authorship in different ways.4 Copyright solves market and
government failures in works of authorship by reducing ex ante transaction
costs, but it increases ex post transaction costs.5 Charity solves market and
government failures in works of authorship by reducing both ex ante and ex
post transaction costs.6 Accordingly, the efficient scope and duration of
copyright should reflect ex ante transaction costs, because charity can more
efficiently reduce ex post transaction costs.
II.

INTRODUCTION

As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observed, “[t]he essence of
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another.”7 In other words, metaphors express analogies.8 For better or
worse, legal reasoning depends on analogies.9 Lawyers argue cases by
comparing them to other cases, and judges decide cases by comparing them
to previously decided cases.10 Both assume that similar cases should
generally produce similar results and dissimilar cases should generally
produce dissimilar results.11 If it was negligent for a defendant to perform a
particular act in a particular circumstance, we assume that it is negligent to
perform similar acts in similar circumstances, but do not assume that it is
negligent to perform different acts in different circumstances.12
Analogical reasoning consists in determining when similarities and
differences are relevant, and when they are not.13 Scholars disagree about

3.
See infra Part IV.C.
4.
See infra Part V.C.
5.
See infra Part V.A.
6.
See infra Part V.B.
7.
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980)
(emphasis omitted).
8.
Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 199 (Dedre Gentner et al., eds., 2001).
9.
Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 741 (1993) (“Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning. It
dominates the first year of law school; it is a characteristic part of brief-writing and opinionwriting as well.”).
10.
Id. at 741, 745–48.
11.
Id. at 745–46.
12.
See id.
13.
Id. at 745.
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the merits of analogical reasoning in law.14 Critics argue that it obscures the
general theories that should determine the outcome of cases.15 But advocates
argue that it can reveal the weaknesses of general theories by recognizing the
contingent and circumstantial values that they ignore.16
But what if analogical reasoning were used to compare general
theories of law, rather than particular cases?17 Perhaps it could help identify
relationships between theories that would otherwise be obscured, and thereby
improve our understanding of those theories and how they apply in
practice.18
This Article argues that comparing the prevailing theories of
copyright and charity law reveals that they are strikingly similar and
complementary bodies of law.19 Copyright and charity law are both intended
to increase social welfare by solving market failures in public goods caused
by free riding.20 But they do so by reducing different kinds of transaction
costs.21 It follows that each should be designed to focus on the transaction
costs it is best suited to address.22
III.

WELFARE & COPYRIGHT

In his provocative article Author’s Welfare: Copyright as a
Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, Tom Bell argues that welfare
and copyright are similar because both are statutory entitlements intended to
increase social welfare by redistributing personal property rights from
members of the general public to particular beneficiaries: “Welfare aims to
improve social well-being by helping the poor, whereas copyright aims to
improve social well-being by helping those who create expressive works.”23
Welfare redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the poor, and provides the
benefit of reducing poverty, at the cost of discouraging work.24 Copyright
14.
LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL
ARGUMENT 67 (2005).
15.
E.g., Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
765 (2006) (book review).
16.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 745.
17.
See id. at 776–77.
18.
See Posner, supra note 15, at 765.
19.
See infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part IV.A–B.
21.
See infra Part V.A–B.
22.
See infra Part V.C.
23.
Tom W. Bell, Author’s Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 236 (2003).
24.
See id. at 231 n.1.
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redistributes rights from the public to authors, and provides the benefit of
increasing the supply of expressive works, at the cost of limiting their use.25
More controversially, Bell argues that the success of welfare reform
suggests the potential for successful copyright reform.26 Welfare reform
reduced the subsidy provided to the poor by limiting the availability of
welfare, and Bell claims that it was successful because it encouraged work
without increasing poverty.27 Based on the success of welfare reform, Bell
argues that copyright reform limiting the scope of copyright would increase
the use of expressive works, without reducing their supply.28
Of course, there are weaknesses in Bell’s argument.29 To begin with,
many people disagree with his assertion that welfare reform was successful,
or that it encouraged work without increasing poverty.30 If welfare reform
was not successful, perhaps copyright reform would also not be successful.
More fundamentally, Bell’s comparison of welfare and copyright is
strained, because they are not as similar as he suggests.31 Bell himself
admits that the analogy is not perfect, because copyright “looks a lot more
like property than welfare does.”32 Specifically, copyright provides rights to
exclude, but welfare only provides a right to due process.33 He argues that
his analogy still holds, because welfare and copyright are both statutory
entitlements, not property rights.34
But Bell ignores other differences between welfare and copyright
which are fatal to his analogy. First, welfare provides a direct subsidy to the
poor, but copyright provides an indirect subsidy to authors. As a result, the
burden of welfare falls on the government, but the burden of copyright falls
on consumers of works of authorship. Second, welfare is vulnerable to
25.
Id. at 245.
26.
Id. at 277.
27.
Id. at 236; Peter Edelman, Professor of Law, Poverty & Welfare: Does
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, Edward C. Sobota Memorial Lecture Series
(2001), in 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2001). Specifically, Bell refers to The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Bell, supra note 23, at 231 n.1.
28.
See Bell, supra note 23, at 236; Tom. W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:
Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 744, 746 (2001).
29.
See Edelman, supra note 27, at 1074–76, 1078–79.
30.
See, e.g., id. at 1074–76, 1078–79.
31.
See id. at 255.
32.
Id.
33.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing exclusive rights in
copyrighted works), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970) (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of welfare benefits).
34.
Bell, supra note 23, at 273–74.
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government failures caused by majoritarian politics, but copyright is
vulnerable to government failures caused by rent-seeking. Third, welfare is
intended to increase static efficiency by improving the allocation of wealth,
but copyright is intended to increase dynamic efficiency by encouraging the
creation of works of authorship. And fourth, welfare is a common-pool
resource because it is rivalrous, but works of authorship are public goods
because they are non-rivalrous.
While the differences between welfare and copyright render Bell’s
conclusions unconvincing, the analogy that he draws between welfare and
copyright still improved our understanding of copyright by showing that it is
best understood as a form of statutory entitlement, rather than a form of
physical property.35 It follows that the scope and duration of copyright
protection ought to be determined in relation to other statutory entitlements,
rather than in relation to physical property.36 Moreover, even the limited
success of Bell’s analogy suggests that alternative analogies may further
improve our understanding of copyright.37 Specifically, this Article argues
that comparing copyright and charity law can improve our understanding of
both areas of law, and show how they complement each other.
IV.

COPYRIGHT & CHARITY LAW

The prevailing theories of both copyright and charity law are
economic subsidy theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are
justified because they increase social welfare by solving market and
government failures caused by free riding.38 This formal similarity of the
respective theories of copyright and charity law is reinforced by a substantive
similarity in their purpose.39 The purpose of copyright is to increase public
welfare by solving market failures in works of authorship, which are a
particular form of public good, and the purpose of charity law is to increase
public welfare by solving market failures in charitable goods, which include
35.
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005). “If we must fall back on a physical-world analogy for
intellectual property protection—and I see no reason why we should—treating intellectual
property as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to understand the
tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property.” Id. at 1032 n.2 (stating “Tom Bell is the
first to draw this analogy, likening copyright specifically to a particular form of government
subsidy: [W]elfare”).
36.
See id. at 1069–71.
37.
See id. at 1032.
38.
Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 159–60
(2014).
39.
See id. at 168.
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a broad range of public and quasi-public goods, including works of
authorship.40 In other words, works of authorship are a category of
charitable goods, and copyright is arguably a category of charity law, or
rather, the continuation of charity by other means.41
A.

The Economic Subsidy Theory of Copyright

The economic subsidy theory of copyright holds that it is justified
because it solves market and government failures in works of authorship
caused by free riding.42 Works of authorship are non-rivalrous—or public
goods—because the consumption of a work of authorship does not affect the
supply.43 Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market
failures in public goods, because rational economic actors will consume the
good without paying the marginal cost of production.44
Copyright solves market failures in works of authorship by making
them excludable and thereby enabling authors to recover their fixed costs and
opportunity costs.45 In other words, copyright indirectly subsidizes authors
by giving them certain exclusive rights to use works of authorship for a
certain period of time.46 As a result, authors can internalize some of the
positive externalities or spillovers generated by the creation of a work of
authorship by charging consumers more than the marginal cost of
production.47 Essentially, copyright provides an incentive for marginal
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship.48
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in works of
authorship caused by free riding.49 For example, governments directly
subsidize the production of works of authorship by distributing grants to
authors.50 But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to government failures
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs, especially information costs.51
40.
See id. at 166.
41.
Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret
eds., trans., 1976) (“War Is Merely the Continuation of [Politics] by Other Means”).
42.
Frye, supra note 38, at 159–160; see also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N.
HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 141 (2013).
43.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 163; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054.
44.
Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
45.
See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054.
46.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012).
47.
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 268 (2007).
48.
Id. at 283–84.
49.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
50.
See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063.
51.
See id.
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Public choice theory predicts that rent-seeking will cause governments to
distribute grants inefficiently, and classical economics predicts that
information costs and other transaction costs will prevent governments from
distributing grants efficiently.52 In others words, governments cannot know
which authors to subsidize, and politics creates incentives to subsidize the
wrong authors.53
Copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.54 Copyright
reduces ex ante rent-seeking by subsidizing all authors in relation to the
economic value of their work of authorship.55 Copyright also reduces ex
ante transaction costs by enabling marginal authors to decide whether the
private cost of investing in authorship is smaller than the private benefit
provided by copyright.56 Presumably, individual authors can gather and
assess relevant information more efficiently than governments.57
B.

The Economic Subsidy Theory of Charity

The economic subsidy theory of charity law holds that it “is justified
because it solves market . . . and government failures in charitable goods”
caused by free riding.58 Charitable goods resemble public goods because
they are either actually or ideally non-rivalrous.59 For example, religion is
actually non-rivalrous because the consumption of religion does not affect
the supply; food banks are ideally non-rivalrous because they are intended to
provide food to all who require it.60 Accordingly, “[c]lassical economics
predicts that free riding will cause market failures in [charitable] goods.”61
Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by enabling
certain donors to deduct certain charitable contributions from their income
tax base, thereby compensating for free riding on charitable contributions by
indirectly subsidizing altruism.62 In other words, charity law indirectly
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1065.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65.
See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64.
See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 268.
See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
Id. at 158–59; see also JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109, 113 (1995).
59.
Frye, supra note 38, at 163, 165.
60.
See id. at 163–65.
61.
Id. at 163.
62.
Id. at 166–67.
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altruism.63 Essentially, charity law provides an incentive for marginal donors
to invest in the production of charitable goods, thereby generating positive
externalities.64
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in
charitable goods caused by free riding.65 Governments can and do directly
subsidize the production of charitable goods by distributing grants to
charities.66 But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to market failures
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs.67 Public choice theory predicts
that rent-seeking will cause governments to distribute grants inefficiently,
and classical economics predicts that information costs and other transaction
costs will prevent governments from distributing grants efficiently.68 In
others words, governments cannot know which charities to subsidize, and
politics creates incentives to subsidize the wrong charities.69
Charity law solves government failures in charitable goods by
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.70 Charity law
reduces rent-seeking and transaction costs by subsidizing altruism,
depending on donors to identify worthy charities.71 Presumably, individual
donors can gather and assess relevant information more efficiently than
governments.
C.

Comparing Copyright & Charity Law

The structural similarity of the economic subsidy theories of
copyright and charity law is obvious.72 Both hold that indirect subsidies are
justified because they solve market and government failures in a public good
and thereby increase social welfare.73 Copyright is justified because it
increases social welfare by providing an incentive to create works of
authorship, and charity law is justified because it increases social welfare by
providing an incentive to make charitable contributions.74

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 168, 171.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 177–78.
See id. at 164–65, 177–78.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65, 177–78.
Id. at 166–67.
Id.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Frye, supra note 38, at 162.
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The economic subsidy theories of copyright and charity law are
welfarist theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are justified
because they are efficient.75 In other words, copyright and charity law are
justified because their social benefit is larger than their social cost, so they
actually increase social welfare.76 It follows that the justification of both
copyright and charity law depends on a testable hypothesis.77 According to
the economic subsidy theory, copyright is justified because the social benefit
of increasing the production of works of authorship is actually larger than the
social cost of increasing the scope or duration of copyright protection, and
charity law is justified because the social benefit of increasing the production
of charitable goods is larger than the social cost of reduced tax revenue.78 Or
rather, copyright and charity law are justified because they increase social
welfare on the margins.79 But that hypothesis is inconsistent with the
doctrine and development of both copyright and charity law.80
D.

The Justification for Copyright

Copyright doctrine is inconsistent with its welfarist justification
because the scope and duration of copyright protection is uniform for all
works of authorship, even though the efficient scope and duration of
copyright protection necessarily depend on the circumstances.81 Each work
of authorship necessarily has unique fixed costs of production, and each
author necessarily has unique opportunity costs.82 Moreover, some authors
may choose to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they
cannot recover their fixed and opportunity costs.83 In theory, the scope and
duration of copyright protection should vary from author to author and from
work to work.
Of course, it is practically impossible to tailor the scope and duration
of copyright protection to particular authors and works. But the scope and
duration of copyright protection does not even vary among categories of
works with manifestly different fixed and opportunity costs.84 As Brad
Greenberg has memorably observed, Copyright protection under the 1976
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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Id. at 158, 172.
Id. at 162.
Frye, supra note 38, at 166–67.
Id. at 168.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012); Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032.
See id. at 1050.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302.
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Act is like an Oprah giveaway: Everybody gets one.85 An email, a novel, a
home video, and a feature film all receive copyright protection of the same
scope and duration.86
In addition, the actual scope and duration of copyright protection
were not determined in relation to its ostensible welfarist justification.87
Congress did not seriously consider marginal efficiency when it determined
the scope and duration of copyright protection.88 And courts explicitly
refrain from considering the marginal efficiency of copyright protection
when reviewing its legitimacy.89
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that copyright is
justified because authors are rational economic actors, and marginal authors
will decide whether to invest in creating works of authorship based on
whether they can expect to recover their costs.90 But in practice, many
authors are not exclusively rational economic actors, and choose to invest in
the production of works of authorship even if they do not expect to recover
their costs.91 In fact, because copyright automatically protects even the most
trivial works of expression, copyright protection is not a salient incentive to
the overwhelming majority of authors who receive copyright protection.92
For example, copyright protects emails and snapshots, but does not provide a
salient incentive to produce those works of authorship.93 The economic
theory holds that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare; so
to the extent that copyright protection is not a salient incentive, it is not
justified.94

85.
Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll: Fable or Fact?, held
by Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (Audio
Recording
19:34–19:53),
available
at
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d.
86.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302.
87.
See id. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
88.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
89.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“In sum, we find
that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be.”).
90.
See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 24–25 (2008).
91.
See id.
92.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Bell, supra note 23, at 242.
93.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
94.
BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 5–6.
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The Justification for Charity Law

Charity law doctrine is also inconsistent with its welfarist
justification because the indirect subsidy provided by the charitable
contribution deduction is unrelated to the market and government failures
that it ostensibly solves.95 The charitable contribution deduction indirectly
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by allowing certain donors to
deduct certain charitable contributions from their income tax base.96 As a
consequence, the higher the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the larger
the subsidy, and the lower the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the
smaller the subsidy.97 But there is no relationship between a donor’s
marginal income tax rate and the market and government failures associated
with the recipient of that donor’s charitable contribution.98 If anything, they
may be negatively correlated.99
In addition, the charitable contribution deduction is a salient
incentive to only a small minority of donors. Taxpayers can claim charitable
contribution deductions only if they itemize their deductions, but only about
thirty percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions.100 As a result, the
charitable contribution deduction is not a salient incentive for the seventy
percent of taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions, and is a
considerably less salient incentive for low-income taxpayers than it is for
high-income taxpayers.101
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that charity law is
justified because donors are rational economic actors, and marginal donors
will decide whether to make charitable contributions based on whether they
will receive a deduction.102 But in practice, many donors are not exclusively
rational economic actors, and choose to make charitable contributions even
though they do not expect to receive a deduction.103 The economic subsidy
95.
Frye, supra note 38, at 159–60.
96.
Id. at 159.
97.
Id. at 169.
98.
See id. at 168.
99.
See id.
100.
BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & DANIEL BANEMAN, TAX POLICY CTR., WHO
ITEMIZES DEDUCTIONS? 345 (2011), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/1001486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions.pdf.
101.
But see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1310, 1325–26, 1327
n.93 (2012) (arguing that the charitable contribution deduction may be “hypersalient” to
certain taxpayers who mistakenly believe they can claim a deduction).
102.
DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 15 (1988); Frye, supra note 38, at 158.
103.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 166, 182.
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theory holds that charity law is justified because it increases social welfare,
so to the extent that the charitable contribution deduction is not a salient
incentive to a particular donor, it is not justified.104
V.

COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY

While the premises of the economic subsidy theories of copyright
and charity law are inconsistent with copyright and charity law doctrine,
their structural similarities illuminate their complementary relationship.105
The purpose of copyright is to increase public welfare by providing an
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of
authorship, and the purpose of charity law is to increase public welfare by
providing an incentive for marginal donors to invest in the production of
charitable goods.106
Essentially, works of authorship are a category of charitable
goods.107 Works of authorship and charitable goods both increase public
welfare by providing a public good.108 In fact, charity law provides that
subsidizing the production and distribution of works of authorship is a
charitable purpose.109
It follows that copyright and charity law ought to be evaluated in
relation to one another. Under the economic subsidy theories of copyright
and charity law, indirect subsidies are justified to the extent that they are
efficient. If copyright is intended to increase public welfare by providing an
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of
authorship, copyright is justified only to the extent that it is more efficient
than charity law at providing incentives for marginal authors to invest in
charitable goods.
A.

Copyright & Efficiency

Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs that cause
market failures in works of authorship by devolving the decision—whether
to invest in the production of works of authorship—onto marginal authors,
who are generally in the best position to determine whether investing in a

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id.
Id. at 159.
See Bell, supra note 23, at 236.
See id.
See id.
See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 168.
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work of authorship is likely to increase social welfare.110 Moreover,
copyright forces authors to assume the risk of their investment by providing
a subsidy only if an author actually produces a work of authorship with
social value. Accordingly, copyright is generally highly efficient to the
extent that it enables authors to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of
investing in the production of works of authorship.111 While many authors
would choose to invest in the production of works of authorship whether or
not they received a subsidy, copyright presumably provides at least a
marginal incentive to authors who contemplate investing more than a
nominal amount of resources in producing a work of authorship.112
However, copyright is inefficient to the extent that it provides a
subsidy in excess of the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in the
production of works of authorship, not only because those subsidies do not
provide a marginal incentive, but also because they increase transaction
costs.113 To the extent that authors are rational economic actors, a subsidy
that exceeds the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in works of
authorship is inefficient; it provides an incentive to overinvest in the
production of works of authorship. The purpose of copyright is to encourage
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship that will increase
social welfare.114 Increasing the subsidy to works of authorship provides an
incentive to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they will
not increase social welfare.
In addition, copyright increases ex post transaction costs by
increasing the cost of consuming a work of authorship and increasing
information costs relating to the use of that work of authorship.115
Transaction costs imposed by copyright protection are justified to the extent
that they are offset by increases in public welfare. But copyright protection in
excess of what is required to provide an efficient incentive to marginal
authors is not justified because it creates transaction costs that are not offset
by increases in public welfare.116 In other words, copyright protection that
does not provide an efficient incentive to marginal authors provides a private

110.
BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 23–25; Bell, supra note 23, at 267,
267 n.212
111.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 24–25; Bell, supra note 23, at
267 n.212, 267–68.
112.
See Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 267 n.212, 267–68.
113.
See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032.
114.
Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 238.
115.
See id. at 277–78, 278 n.261.
116.
See id.
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benefit without generating a corresponding public benefit, and reduces public
welfare.117
To make matters worse, public choice theory predicts that copyright
is vulnerable to rent-seeking because authors have a strong incentive to lobby
the government to increase the scope and duration of copyright protection,
irrespective of its efficiency.118 In particular, owners of valuable copyrights
have an incentive to invest in lobbying the government to increase the value
of those copyrights.119
B.

Charity Law & Efficiency

Charity law efficiently reduces transaction costs that cause market
failures in charitable goods by devolving the decision—whether to invest in
the production of charitable goods—onto marginal donors, who are often in
good position to determine whether investing in the production of a
charitable good is likely to increase social welfare.120 Specifically, donors
are reasonably well-positioned to determine whether investing in the
production of a work of authorship is likely to increase public welfare.121 If
altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the
production of a work of authorship, it is likely that the production of that
work of authorship will increase social welfare, and is thereby likely that any
indirect subsidy provided by the government will be efficient.122 In addition,
if altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the
distribution of a work of authorship or the support of an author, it is likely
that the contribution will increase social welfare by enabling that author to
produce additional works of authorship, and is thereby likely that any
indirect subsidy provided by the government will also be efficient.123
C.

Comparing the Efficiency of Copyright & Charity Law

While copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs relating
to investments in the production of charitable goods, it increases ex post

117.
118.
note 35, at 1063.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 261, 264–65; Lemley, supra
Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 162, 167–68, 171.
Id. at 174.
See id. at 166, 171.
See id.
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transaction costs.124 By contrast, charity law reduces both ex ante and ex
post costs.125 Copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs more efficiently
than charity law, because authors are generally in a better position than
donors to determine whether investing in a work of authorship will increase
social welfare.126 But copyright increases ex post transaction costs by
granting windfalls to authors and creating opportunities for rent-seeking,
while charity law is associated with low ex post transaction costs, because it
depends on altruism.127
It follows that copyright should focus on providing ex ante
incentives to marginal authors, and rely on charity law or its analogues to
provide any additional subsidies to authors. Charity law is especially wellsuited to this goal, because it relies on altruism, rather than self-interest.128
Copyright assumes that authors invest in the production of works of
authorship in order to benefit themselves.129 By contrast, charity law
assumes that donors invest in the production of works of authorship in order
to benefit the public.130 Charity law is likely to increase public welfare
because it subsidizes donations intended to increase public welfare.131
But there are additional reasons to consider reducing the scope and
duration of copyright and to consider relying on charity rather than copyright
to increase investment in works of authorship. Historically, transaction costs
made it difficult for donors to determine which marginal authors to
subsidize.132 Donors did not know which authors to subsidize, and did not
have a convenient way to make contributions.133 Moreover, charity law
created incentives for them to donate to charities rather than individual
authors.134
Accordingly, donors contributed to charitable organizations, which
solved transaction costs by developing expertise in identifying which artists

124.

See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–

125.
126.

See Frye, supra note 38, at 166–68.
See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–

127.

See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Frye, supra note 38, at 168.
See Bell, supra note 23, at 238, 242.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 161.
See id. at 160–62.
Id. at 157, 182.
See id. at 157.
Id. at 187–88.

68.
68, 182.
68, 182.
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to subsidize and provided charitable contribution deductions.135 But authors
and donors also developed legal workarounds, which enabled them to steer
charitable contributions to particular authors.136 And more recently, social
entrepreneurs have developed methods of using technology to solve charity
failures, and more efficiently encourage and enable marginal donors to make
donations in support of the production of works of authorship.137
1.

Fiscal Sponsorship

For example, in the arts sector, donors and authors use fiscal
sponsorship in order to enable donors to both support particular authors or
particular projects and claim a charitable contribution deduction.138 In
theory, charity law only permits taxpayers to claim charitable contribution
deductions for donations to charitable organizations that are exempt under 26
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).139 As a consequence, it does not allow taxpayers to claim
charitable contribution deductions for donations to individuals, which are
generally treated as gifts for income tax purposes.140
Donors and authors use fiscal sponsors in order to circumvent that
restriction.141 A fiscal sponsor is a charitable organization that receives
charitable contributions from donors on behalf of particular authors.142 The
donor claims a charitable contribution deduction, the charity claims a fee,
and the author receives the balance of the donation.143 Essentially, fiscal
sponsorship is a legal fiction that enables donors to claim a deduction for a
contribution to an individual.144 In theory, the charity receiving the
contribution is not obligated to pass the donation on to its intended private
recipient, and makes an independent determination that providing funds to
that author is consistent with its charitable purpose.145 But this obligation is
observed almost entirely in the breach, and charities acting as fiscal sponsors
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Frye, supra note 38, at 183.
Id.
Id. at 159, 190–92.
Id. at 187–88.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., FISCAL SPONSORSHIP:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORMING A NONPROFIT 501(C)(3) CORPORATION 2 (2009), available at
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0483.pdf.
140.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
141.
PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
142.
See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2.; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship
Service, IOBY, https://www.ioby.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
143.
Frye, supra note 38, at 187.
144.
See id.
145.
See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship
Service, supra note 142.
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effectively function as conduits for donations that would otherwise be
ineligible for charitable contribution deductions.146
Interestingly, the IRS has tolerated the practice of fiscal sponsorship,
despite its apparent inconsistency with federal tax law.147 The best
explanation for the IRS’s forbearance is probably that while fiscal
sponsorship may strain the letter of the law, it is generally consistent with its
purpose.148 Charities generally exercise at least some oversight over the
authors and projects they agree to sponsor, and sponsoring works of
authorship is generally a charitable activity.
In addition, fiscal sponsorship may help solve market failures
associated with works of authorship by reducing transaction costs associated
with determining which works to sponsor.149 It is costly for charities to
determine which authors and projects to sponsor, and it is difficult for
charities to solicit funds to sponsor works of authorship in general, rather
than specific projects.150 Fiscal sponsorship reduces these transaction costs
by enabling donors and authors to make a direct connection, without a
mediating charity.151
In any case, the prevalence of fiscal sponsorship suggests that charity
law provides a salient incentive to at least some marginal donors. In the
absence of fiscal sponsorship, donors could still make gifts to individual
authors.152 The primary purpose of fiscal sponsorship is to ensure that
donors can claim a charitable contribution deduction for their donation.153
Presumably, the ability to claim a charitable contribution deduction
motivates at least some marginal donors to give.
However, fiscal sponsorship has a critical weakness, which is a
function of its reliance on leveraging the charitable contribution deduction in
the service of reducing transaction costs.154 Because fiscal sponsorship
depends on the salience of the charitable contribution deduction, it cannot
provide a salient incentive to marginal donors who cannot claim the
146.

See Frye, supra note 38, at 187; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra

note 142.
147.
See Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
148.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 187–88; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service,
supra note 142.
149.
Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
150.
See id.
151.
See id.
152.
See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 101, at 1320.
153.
Id. at 1318–19. In addition, fiscal sponsorships enable certain private
foundations that are only permitted to make grants to public charities to effectively make
grants to individual authors. See Ioby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
154.
See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 3.
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deduction.155 As a result, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers should be
indifferent to fiscal sponsorship.
2.

Crowdfunding

As I have previously shown, charity law is vulnerable to charity
failures, or inefficiencies in its ability to solve market and government
failures, caused by the inability of the charitable contribution deduction to
provide a salient incentive to the overwhelming majority of taxpayers who
do not itemize their deductions.156 I argue that the remarkable success of
crowdfunding—which already provides more arts funding than the federal
government—is a function of its ability to solve some of those charity
failures. First, crowdfunding reduces transaction costs associated with
soliciting donations, by providing authors with low-cost platforms that make
it easy to leverage the network effects of social media.157 Second,
crowdfunding reduces transactions associated with making donations, by
reducing search and information costs on donors.158 And third, reward-based
crowdfunding enables authors to provide salient incentives to marginal
donors who cannot claim charitable contribution deductions.159
Essentially, crowdfunding is a way of using technology to solve
charity failures.160 Of course, crowdfunding works of authorship is generally
not charitable in the strictest sense, as most donations are not charitable
contributions under the Internal Revenue Code.161 However, it is often
charitable in the broader sense that the contributions include a gratuitous
element and are intended to support the creation of works of authorship that
will increase public welfare.162

155.
Fiscal Sponsorship for Nonprofits, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/fiscal-sponsorship-nonprofits (last visited
Aug. 27, 2015).
156.
Frye, supra note 38, at 171, 173.
157.
Id. at 178–79.
158.
Id. at 182.
159.
Id. at 183, 190–91.
160.
Id. at 178.
161.
See Frye, supra note 38, at 160–61, 180–81.
162.
Id. at 179−81.
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Open-Source

The open-source movement is another way of using technology to
solve charity failures.163 Open-source is a development model that provides
universal access to works of authorship by providing a free license to use and
distribute the work, and by requiring that authors of derivative works also
provide a free license to use and distribute the derivative work.164 The opensource movement initially focused on computer software, enabling authors to
provide a free license for the public to use, distribute, and improve source
code.165 But the open-source movement has subsequently expanded to other
forms of authorship and innovation, and has inspired many related open
licensing schemes, like Creative Commons.166 Open-source is especially
prevalent in various scholarly fields, and there is an emerging norm among
scholars in many fields to provide open access to all of their papers and
research.167
Essentially, open-source is a way of using the Internet and social
media to reduce transaction costs associated with copyright and other forms
of intellectual property.168 Historically, works of authorship were distributed
by commercial intermediaries, which reduced transaction costs by enabling
authors to effectively distribute works of authorship to the public.169 The
Internet and social media have rendered many of those commercial
distributors largely irrelevant by enabling authors to effectively distribute
certain categories of works of authorship to the public at no cost.170 Many
authors do not need to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of
authorship.171 For example, most scholars produce works of authorship as a
function of their employment.172 As a consequence, open-source is attractive
163.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY 46 (2004).
164.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 17−18; LESSIG, supra note 163,
at 46; About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last
visited Aug. 27, 2015).
165.
See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46; About the Licenses, supra note 164.
166.
See About the Licenses, supra note 164.
167.
See id. But see ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR:
MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 128 (rev. ed.
2001).
168.
See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46−47; supra Part V.A.
169.
See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 266–67 n.31.
170.
See id; Eric Schlacter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in
Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 15, 22 (1997).
171.
See Schlacter, supra note 170, at 22.
172.
LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46–47.
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to scholars, as it enables them to distribute their works of authorship at no
cost to the consumer, thereby increasing its distribution in the academic gift
economy.173
VI.

CONCLUSION

Copyright and charity law are similar because they both use indirect
subsidies to solve market and government failures in public goods caused by
free riding. Copyright solves market and government failures in works of
authorship, a particular category of public goods. Charity law solves market
and government failures in charitable goods, which include a broad range of
public and quasi-public goods, including works of authorship. Copyright
solves market failures in works of authorship by making them partially
excludable and thereby limiting free riding, and solves government failures
by reducing information costs associated with determining which works to
subsidize. Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by making
certain charitable contributions deductible, and thereby compensating for
free riding, and solves government failures by reducing transaction costs
associated with majoritarian politics. In other words, copyright and charity
law are complements that use different means to pursue similar goals.
Notably, copyright and charity law are associated with different
transaction costs. Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs by
delegating the decision whether to invest in works of authorship onto
marginal authors and by forcing them to internalize the risk associated with
investing in works of authorship. But copyright increases ex post transaction
costs by making it more difficult and expensive for consumers to use works
of authorship. Moreover, copyright encourages rent-seeking by the copyright
owners of works with substantial social value.
By contrast, charity law moderately reduces both ex ante and ex post
transaction costs by delegating the decision whether to invest in charitable
goods onto marginal donors, and by providing a relatively modest and
contingent subsidy. While copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs
associated with investment charity law more efficiently than charity law,
copyright increases ex post transaction costs, and charity law does not. In
addition, new technologies like crowdfunding and the open-source
movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market and
government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors.
173.

Id.; see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 266–67.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1

58

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY

363

As a consequence, we should consider reducing the scope of
copyright protection to focus on its ability to efficiently reduce ex ante
transaction costs by enabling authors to recover their fixed and opportunities
costs, and use charity law and related technologies to reduce ex post
transaction costs associated with investment in the creation of works of
authorship.
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Newspersons’ shield laws are not meant to protect a privileged class
of journalists.1 Nor are they meant to protect whistleblowers whose acts fall
under a different set of laws.2 Instead, shield laws are meant to protect the
free flow of information to the public.3 Unfortunately, the conversation
pertaining to shield laws is consumed by arguments over how to define who

*
Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Media and the Arts,
SUNY-Oswego.
1.
See infra Part III.D.1.a.
2.
See Sarah Wood Borak, Comment, The Legacy of "Deep Throat": The
Disclosure Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No
FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 618 (2005).
3.
See Jill Laptosky, Note, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with an Illusory
Shield: How the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L.J.
403, 421–22 (2010).
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is a journalist.4 But in the digital age, this debate is futile, as no one can give
an adequate answer.5 In response to this debate, this Article argues that a
federal shield law needs to be adopted that protects information, not people.6
In particular, this Article focuses on open leak organizations—such as
WikiLeaks—that challenge traditional notions of journalism.7 First, this
Article outlines the history and controversy surrounding WikiLeaks and the
publishing of national security information.8
Then, it outlines the
development of shield laws and the current state of the privilege at the
federal level.9 Finally, the Article presents a model shield law that protects
the publishing of national security information, which serves the public
interest and does not create an immediate, irreparable harm.10
I.

INTRODUCTION

WikiLeaks innocently describes itself as a non-profit media
organization dedicated “to bring[ing] important news and information to the
public”;11 but for many of the world’s governments, it is a saboteur
organization centered on anarchy.12 In 2010, WikiLeaks exposed hundreds
of thousands of U.S. government documents.13 Some consider the document
dumps to be vital to political change, including being the catalyst for the

4.
See id. at 425; HENRY COHEN & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL34193, JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN THE
109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES 7 (2008).
5.
See infra Part III.C.
6.
See infra Part III.D.
7.
See infra Parts I–II.
8.
See infra Part II.
9.
See infra Part III.C–D.
10.
See infra Part III.D.
11.
About: What is Wikileaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org/
About.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
12.
See Stephanie Condon, Congress Lashes Out at Wikileaks, Senators Say
Leakers May Have “Blood on Their Hands”, CBS NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010, 5:03 PM) http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-lashes-out-at-wikileaks-senators-say-leakers-may-haveblood-on-their-hands/. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) said:
[the leak] is an outrageous, reckless, and despicable action that will undermine the ability
of our government and our partners to keep our people safe and to work together to
defend our vital interests. Let there be no doubt: the individuals responsible are going to
have blood on their hands.

Id. Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said, “[l]eaking the material is deplorable . . . . The world is
getting dangerous by the day and the people who do this are really low on the food chain as
far as [I am] concerned. If you can prosecute them, [let us] try.” Id. Rep. Peter King (R-NY)
called WikiLeaks a terrorist group. Id.
13.
See Baghdad War Diary, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:00 PM),
http://www.wikileaks.org/irq/.
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Arab Spring.14 However, some, like the U.S. government, fear WikiLeaks’
power to reveal secrets—which led to the derailing of a proposed federal
shield law for journalists.15
The information that WikiLeaks published was often republished by
traditional news outlets.16 However, no criminal charges were brought
against these traditional news outlets for the revelations because the
traditional media outlets exist in a framework of traditional laws.17 For
example, the traditional media is exempt from prosecution under the
Espionage Act of 1917 (“Espionage Act”) and cannot be punished for
publishing truthful information that is legally obtained.18
A traditional media outlet can offer confidentiality to a source.19
However, it cannot offer absolute anonymity since most state shield laws
have several exemptions.20 Furthermore, national security whistleblowers
have almost no promise of anonymity, because of the lack of a federal shield
law.21 Thus, the risks are high for whistleblowers when working with
traditional news outlets.22 Consequently, there are less revelations of
government information.23 It is arguable that in the traditional model, the
public interest is harmed.24

14.
Peter Walker, WikiLeaks and Guardian Hailed as Catalysts of Arab
Spring, GUARDIAN, May 13, 2011, at 17.
15.
See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 426; infra Part III.C.
16.
See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle
over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 333–36
(2011).
17.
See id. at 353–56. To have done so would certainly have been politically
unpopular, but it is possible that criminal charges would have held up in court. See, e.g.,
Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22,
2006, at A4. “Undoubtedly, Congress has the power to enact specific and appropriate
criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets.” N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
18.
See The Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012); Pentagon
Papers, 403 U.S. at 744–45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
19.
See, e.g., Latara Appleby, Judge Rules Reporter Can Claim Fifth
Amendment and Keep Source Secret, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/judge-rules-reportercan-claim-fifth-amendment-and-keep-source-secre.
20.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972); Laptosky, supra note
3, at 410–11.
21.
See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 421–22.
22.
See id. at 421.
23.
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National
Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 456 (2014).
24.
See infra Part III.D.
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But for these open leak sites dedicated to transparency—such as
WikiLeaks—the rules are seemingly different.25 Though open leak sites
consider themselves journalism outlets,26 they seem to be more concerned
with transparency for transparency’s sake.27 They are online platforms for
uploading documents that allow for easy and instantaneous information
leaks, which exceed any Freedom of Information Act.28 Their encryption
software offers confidentiality, which surpasses any shield law.29 But their
acts, such as WikiLeaks’ voluminous data dumps, suggest little regard for
vetting information.30 Furthermore, without some secrecy, governments
become less effective31 and total transparency creates very real threats to

25.
See Benkler, supra note 16, at 347. Most open leak sites are outside the
United States and offer many complex jurisdictional issues since they are international
organizations, usually with no physical headquarters. Id.; see also infra note 43 and
accompanying text. But for the purpose of this Article, we will not treat open leak sites as
extra-territorial entities. We will treat them as any media outlet that publishes in the United
States and assume that similar sites could one day be based in the United States, or at the very
least, within its jurisdiction.
26.
E.g., WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
27.
See infra Part II.A.
28.
See Doug Meier, Note, Changing with the Times: How the Government
Must Adapt to Prevent the Publication of Its Secrets, 28 REV. LITIG. 203, 211 (2008). Some
critics argue that open leak sites incite leakers to break the law with the ease of dropboxes and
the promise of confidentiality. Id. Cf. Tim Wu, Drop the Case Against Assange, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/drop-the-case-againstassange/ (arguing that there is no case against Assange for conspiracy to commit a crime).
29.
See About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11.
30.
See Julian E. Barnes & Jeanne Whalen, Pentagon Slams WikiLeaks’ Plan
to Post More War Logs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748704407804575425900461793766#articleTabs%3Article.
WikiLeaks claims to have sought the assistance of the Pentagon in redacting names of people
in potential danger from the documents’ release. See id. But, in August of 2011, it was
reported that due to internal strife and lack of security, WikiLeaks accidently released
thousands of documents without redaction. See Hayley Tsukayama, WikiLeaks Cables
Possibly Released by Accident, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/wikileaks-cables-possibly-released-byaccident/2011/08/29/gIQAfQHsnJ_story.html.
31.
See Chris Good, WikiLeaks and the U.S. Image, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2010,
6:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/12/wikileaks-and-the-us-image/
67487/#.
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people’s lives.32 Thus, it is arguable that in the new model the public interest
is also harmed.33
This Article puts forward a model shield law that promotes the free
flow of information that serves the public interest.34 Part II of the Article
outlines the history of the most infamous open leak site, WikiLeaks.35 Part
III examines the history of shield law protection at the federal level,
including the recent proposals in Congress.36 Part IV proposes a model
shield law to be adopted at the federal level that would protect publishers of
national security information that serves the public interest.37
II.
A.

WIKILEAKS

Brief History

WikiLeaks can be best described as a whistleblower intermediary.38
It receives and releases leaked documents produced by governments and
corporations.39 WikiLeaks’ goal is “to allow [for] ‘the entire global
community to relentlessly examine any document for its credibility,

32.
See Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission for Total
Transparency, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/06/
07/no-secrets. Julian Assange has agreed that the release of documents could lead to the
organization having “blood on our hands.” Id.
33.
See Good, supra note 31; Khatchadourian, supra note 32. The U.S.
government has volumes of classified documents that would not be a direct harm to national
safety if released, but the release would hurt American interests worldwide. See Good, supra
note 31. For example, WikiLeaks’ document dump in November 2010, was maligned by the
media as being mostly a revelation into the foreign policy playbook versus a revelation of
incriminating material. Id.; Rainey Reitman, The Best of Cablegate: Instances Where Public
Disclosure Benefited from the Leaks, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2011), http://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/cablegate-disclosures-have-furthered-investigative. “By the
end of the year, the story of this wholesale security breach had outgrown the story of the
actual contents of the secret documents and generated much breathless speculation that
something—journalism, diplomacy, life as we know it—had profoundly changed forever.”
Bill Keller, The Boy Who Kicked the Hornet’s Nest, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2011, at 33,
34. These documents fall into a legal void and are not statutorily protected. See Stewart
Harris, The First Amendment and the End of the World, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 785, 816–28
(2007) (providing a detailed discussion of this statutory void).
34.
See infra Part III.D.
35.
See infra Part II.
36.
See infra Part III.
37.
See infra Part IV.
38.
See Ann Woolner, WikiLeaks Secret Records Dump Stays in Legal Clear,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 27, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201007-28/wikileaks-secret-records-dump-stays-in-legal-clear-ann-woolner.
39.
Meier, supra note 28, at 204.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

65

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

370

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

plausibility, veracity, and validity.’”40 Some of these documents are
classified for reasons such as national security and trade secrets, while others
are classified for ostensibly public relations reasons.41
WikiLeaks describes itself as a multijurisdictional public service.42
Its headquarters are located in Sweden, because that nation provides the
world’s most expansive journalist’s shield law protecting confidential
sources.43 The public face of WikiLeaks is Julian Assange,44 but the site
claims to have several founders, which include dissidents, journalists, and
technologists from around the world.45 Since it was created in 2006,46
WikiLeaks has released thousands of documents.47 These documents range
from government-approved assassinations in Somalia to the dumping of
40.
Id.
41.
See id. at 211–12.
42.
WikiLeaks:
About,
WIKILEAKS,
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/
WikiLeaks:About (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); see also Nicola Laver, Revealing the Truth,
INT’L
B.
ASS’N
(Dec.
2010),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=CEA217A9-682C-4F6A-9465-5445603259D7.
43.
Woolner, supra note 38. WikiLeaks has no actual physical headquarters.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32. For a discussion on the differences between press
protections in the United States and Sweden, see David Corneil’s Harboring WikiLeaks:
Comparing Swedish and American Press Freedom in the Internet Age, 41 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J.,
477 passim (2011).
44.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32. Julian Assange was born in 1971—
the same year as the Pentagon Papers decision—in Australia. Id.; see also N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 713–14 (1971) (per curiam). He has worked
as a journalist and publisher. Khatchadourian, supra note 32. As a teenager, he was charged
with hacking computers. Id. Later in life, he attended college in Australia, but dropped out.
Id. In 2006, he was a founding member of WikiLeaks. Id. He has also had run-ins with the
law for sexual assault. Justin Elliott, Julian Assange and the Sex Crime Trojan Horse, SALON
(Dec. 1, 2010, 2:46 PM), https://www.salon.com/2010/12/01/wikileaks_assange_legal_
dangers/.
45.
MICHAEL D. HORVATH, WIKILEAKS, WIKILEAKS.ORG—AN ONLINE
REFERENCE TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, INSURGENTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS? 5
(2008), http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/wikithreat.pdf; see also
WikiLeaks: About, supra note 42. WikiLeaks started as a pure wiki with posts, comments,
and user-edited content. Chris Grams, Does WikiLeaks Damage the Brand Image of Wikis?,
OPENSOURCE.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://opensource.com/business/10/12/does-wikileaksdamage-brand-image-wikis; HORVATH, supra note 45, at 5, 10; WikiLeaks: About, supra note
42.
46.
Khatchadourian, supra note 32. The website is published under the
auspices of the Sunshine Press Organization. About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11.
47.
Larry Shaughnessy, WikiLeaks Redacted More Information In Latest
Documents Release, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/
10/22/wikileaks.editing/; WIKILEAKS, supra note 26. WikiLeaks claims to have millions of
documents, but has only released approximately twenty thousand since its inception. Kim
Zetter, Claim: WikiLeaks Published Documents Siphoned over File Sharing Software, WIRED
(Jan. 20, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/wikileaks-and-p2p.
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toxic chemicals in the Ivory Coast.48 The document leaks have also included
information that has had less significance on world affairs, such as the
secrets of scientology and some of Sarah Palin’s personal e-mails.49
WikiLeaks received the most media attention for its leaks of U.S.
government documents.50 The organization has alleged that it still holds
seventy-five thousand U.S. intelligence reports on Afghanistan, four hundred
thousand classified U.S. reports on the Iraq War, and two hundred fifty
thousand confidential U.S. State Department diplomatic cables.51 In April
2010, WikiLeaks gained international recognition with the release of a video
from the U.S. military operations in Iraq.52 This video, Collateral Murder,53
was gun-sight footage of an airstrike that occurred in Baghdad in July of
2007.54 Early on that day, the U.S. troops had been engaged in combat with
insurgents.55 The video is from later in the day and shows Iraqis and two
Reuters reporters walking the streets with no clear threat of violence.56 The
U.S. soldiers, in Apache helicopters, mistakenly identify the Iraqis as
insurgents and mistake the journalists’ camera as a gun.57 The Apache
helicopter fired upon the crowd.58 The video captured the troops celebrating
their actions.59 In the incident, ten Iraqi civilians and the two Reuters
employees were killed.60
48.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32; WIKILEAKS, supra note 26.
49.
Khatchadourian, supra note 32.
50.
See HORVATH, supra note 45, at 5. In 2010, WikiLeaks revealed a secret
2008 U.S. Department of Defense study strategizing on how to counter WikiLeaks. See id.
51.
Laver, supra note 42.
52.
See Sunshinepress, Collateral Murder-Wikileaks-Iraq, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.youtube.com/
watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0. The WikiLeaks version of the military video has been
criticized as being edited and distorting the truth. Larkin Reynolds, NSJ Analysis: WikiLeaks
and Jus in Bello: Room for a Congressional Response?, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Apr. 9,
2010, 2:40 PM) http://harvardnsj.org/2010/04/nsj-analysis-applying-the-law-of-armedconflict-to-wikileaks/ (citing arguments that the video is consistent with the military’s report).
53.
Sunshinepress, supra note 52. Full footage of Collateral Murder is
available on YouTube. Id. Assange commented on the naming of the video: “We want to
knock out this collateral damage euphemism, and so when anyone uses it they will think,
collateral murder.” Greg Mitchell, One Year Ago: How The ‘Era of WikiLeaks’ Began-With
‘Murder’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
greg-mitchell/one-year-ago-now-the-era-the-era-b_841376.html.
54.
Elisabeth Bumiller, Video Shows 2007 Air Attack in Baghdad That Killed
Photographer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A13.
55.
See id.
56.
Id.
57.
See id.
58.
Id.
59.
See Bumiller, supra note 54. The soldiers’ reactions are documented on
the film: “‘Look at those dead bastards,’ one pilot says. ‘Nice,’ the other responds.” Id. “A
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The traditional press had originally covered the airstrike story in
2007, but without much scrutiny.61 Reuters later made a Freedom of
Information Act request for the video, but was denied a copy.62 The U.S.
military conducted an investigation into the incident and relieved all of the
soldiers of any wrongdoing, stating that the soldiers did not know there was a
journalist in the group.63 The video was eventually leaked to WikiLeaks and
Assange premiered the release at the National Press Club in Washington,
District of Columbia on April 5, 2010.64 Just weeks after the video was
posted, the military arrested Private First Class (“PFC”) Bradley Manning for
being the source of the leak.65
In July of 2010, WikiLeaks began releasing documents from the
Afghan War Diary—a compilation of more than seventy-five thousand

wounded man can be seen crawling and the pilots impatiently hope that he will try to fire at
them so that under the rules of engagement they can shoot him again.” Id.
“All you gotta do is pick up a weapon,” one pilot says. A short time later a van
arrives to pick up the wounded and the pilots open fire on it, wounding two children
inside. “Well, it [is] their fault for bringing their kids into a battle,” one pilot says.
At another point, an American armored vehicle arrives and appears to roll over one
of the dead. “I think they just drove over a body,” one of the pilots says, chuckling
a little.

Id.
60.

Id. This is how Mr. Assange described the video:

“In the first phase, you will see an attack that is based upon a mistake, but certainly
a very careless mistake. In the second part, the attack is clearly murder, according
to the definition of the average man. And in the third part, you will see the killing
of innocent civilians in the course of soldiers going after a legitimate target.”

Mitchell, supra note 53.
61.
See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, 2 Iraqi Journalist Killed as U.S. Forces Clash
with Militias, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A8. A Google News Search for the month of July,
2007 lists 45 articles on “Reuters journalist killed in Iraq” published on July 12th and 13th.
See, e.g., id. For comparison, a Google news search of July 17th, 2007 lists 122 articles on
“Victoria Beckham snubs Paris Hilton.” See, e.g., Victoria Beckham Snubs Paris Hilton, OH
NO THEY DIDN’T! (July 17, 2007, 10:27 PM), http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/
13986354.html?thread=1618067762.
62.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32. Reuters viewed the video three years
after the incident. Id.
63.
Bumiller, supra note 54. The redacted military report of the investigation
stated the Reuters employees “‘made no effort to visibly display their status as press or media
representatives and their familiar behavior with, and close proximity to, the armed insurgents
and their furtive attempts to photograph the coalition ground forces made them appear as
hostile combatants to the Apaches that engaged them.’” Id.
64.
Khatchadourian, supra note 32; Mitchell, supra note 53.
65.
See Julie Tate, Manning Is Sentenced to 35 Years for Leaks, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 2013, at A1. Manning is now incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Id. He is
serving a thirty-five year sentence—with a chance for parole after ten years served—for
leaking classified information to WikiLeaks. Id. He was acquitted of the most serious charge
of aiding the enemy, but was found guilty of violating the Espionage Act. Id.
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previously unreleased documents relating to the war in Afghanistan.66
Similarly, in October of 2010, WikiLeaks began to release hundreds of
documents from the alleged holding of four hundred thousand documents
relating to the Iraq War.67 In November of 2010, WikiLeaks began the
release of U. S. diplomatic cables68 that it claimed numbered in the hundreds
of thousands.69
WikiLeaks has also released information—through
Facebook and Twitter—suggesting that it has other documents including
classified video of the notorious Gharani massacre in Afghanistan,70
incriminating material on British Petroleum, and an insurance file set to
release all the documents held should WikiLeaks ever be shutdown.71 In
2012, WikiLeaks published more material referring to the U.S. Intelligence
community, including information on private companies, such as Stratford,
and The Detainee Policies, which outlines the rules and procedures on U.S.
military custody of detainees.72 In 2013, it was reported that WikiLeaks

66.
Kabul War Diary, WIKILEAKS (July 25, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://
www.wikileaks.org/afg; see also Alastair Dant & David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: Our
Selection of Significant Incidents, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/interactive/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-events.
67.
Baghdad War Diary, supra note 13; see also Iraq: The War Logs,
GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq-war-logs (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
68.
Reitman, supra note 33; see also Seumas Milne & Ian Black, Secret
Papers Reveal Slow Death of Middle East Peace Process, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2011, 3:08
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/23/palestine-papers-expose-peaceconcession. The first release was one thousand six hundred documents. Milne & Black,
supra note 68.
69.
Reitman, supra note 33. In the media, this leak was affectionately known
as Cablegate. Id.
70.
See Philip Shenon, WikiLeaks Founder to Release Massacre Video, DAILY
BEAST (June 15, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-15/
wikileaks-founder-has-garani-massacre-video-according-to-new-email.html; Luke Villapaz,
WikiLeaks Releases Massive 400 Gigabyte Encrypted ‘Insurance’ Files on Facebook, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 18 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/wikileaks-releases-massive400-gigabyte-encrypted-insurance-files-facebook-1389531.
71.
David Leppard & John Ungoed-Thomas, Assange Ready to Unleash Tide
of New Secrets, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at 17.
72.
Andy Greenberg, Wikileaks Announces ‘The Detainee Policies’: A
History of U.S. Post-9/11 Military Prisoners in Leaked Documents, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012,
7:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/25/wikileaks-announces-thedetainee-policies-a-history-of-american-military-detainees-in-leaked-documents/.
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released 1.7 million U.S. Intelligence documents from the 1970s.73 That
year, it also played a role in evacuating Edward Snowden to Hong Kong.74
B.

Reaction to WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks has received mixed reactions.75 Some people have
praised WikiLeaks for advancing the free flow of information, transparency,
and accountability.76 Proponents believe that WikiLeaks has democratized
information so we are “no longer reliant on a middle man to offer up an
interpretation of [what is] going on.”77 The Executive Director of the First
Amendment Coalition called WikiLeaks a journalistic necessity.78 Time
magazine called WikiLeaks the most important thing that could happen to
journalism since the Freedom of Information Act.79 Both the Index on
Censorship80 and the Amnesty International81 gave an award to WikiLeaks
for its work.82 Some have even argued that WikiLeaks has spurred recent
pro-democracy movements in the Middle East.83
73.
Kissinger Cables: WikiLeaks Publishes 1.7m U.S. Diplomatic Documents
from 1970s, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 08, 2013, 4:42 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/wikileaks-files/9977979/Kissinger-Cables-Wikileaks-publishes-1.7m-US-diplomaticdocuments-from-1970s.html.
74.
Shane Scott, Offering Aid, WikiLeaks Gets Back in the Game, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2013, at A1.
75.
Compare Matthew Barakat, Daniel Ellsberg Defends Julian Assange,
Bradley Manning, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 1:56 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/16/daniel-ellsberg-wikileaks_n_797801.html, with Bank
Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
76.
Barakat, supra note 75. Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the classified
Pentagon Papers praised WikiLeaks: ‘“I think they provided a very valuable service.’” Id.
77.
Sean Lahman, The Importance of WikiLeaks, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE
(Dec. 10, 2010, 7:26 PM), http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/local/
blogs/watchdog/2010/12/10/the-importance-of-wikileaks/2269423/.
78.
Laver, supra note 42.
79.
Tracy Samantha Schmidt, A Wiki for Whistle-Blowers, TIME, (Jan. 22,
2007), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1581189,00.html.
80.
Index on Censorship, Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of
Expression Awards Announced, INDEX (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/
2008/04/winners-of-index-on-censorship-freedom-of-expression-award-announced/.
WikiLeaks won the Economist New Media Award in 2008. Id.
81.
Amnesty International Media Awards 2009: Full List of Winners,
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009, 6:15 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/
jun/03/amnesty-international-media-awards.
82.
Id.; Index on Censorship, supra note 80.
83.
See Daily Mail Reporter, ‘First Wikileaks Revolution’: Tunisia Descends
into Anarchy as President Flees After Cables Reveal Country’s Corruption, DAILY MAIL (Jan.
15, 2011, 12:27 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1347336/First-WikileaksRevolution-Tunisia-descends-anarchy-president-flees.html (arguing that movement to oust
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WikiLeaks has also received criticism.84 In 2008, the Swiss banks—
Bank Julius Baer and Company and Julius Baer Bank and Trust Company—
filed a preliminary injunction against WikiLeaks after the site published
information about the banks’ accounts.85 A California district court judge
ordered a U.S. based ISP to stop hosting the WikiLeaks site.86 After much
scrutiny in the press, the judge reversed his order stating that it may have
amounted to unconstitutional prior restraint.87 In 2010, the U.S. government
opened a criminal probe into the organization to determine if it could bring
charges under the Espionage Act.88 The U.S. government has also blocked
its employees from accessing WikiLeaks on both their work and personal
computers.89 It has also been reported that the U.S. government has
pressured international corporations90 and foreign governments to stop

Tunisian president began after corruption in its government was released by WikiLeaks in a
cable documenting widespread government corruption).
84.
See, e.g., Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, No. C08-00824JSW,
2008 WL 413737, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008).
85.
Id. at *1. There had been allegations that the bank was laundering money.
See id.
86.
See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985–86
(N.D. Cal. 2008); Bank Julius Baer & Co., 2008 WL 413737, at *1–2.
87.
Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 985; see also Jonathan D.
Glater, Judge Reverses His Order Disabling Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A11
(describing Judge White’s concern over his previous order). Despite the original order, mirror
sites of Wikileaks.org were pervasive online. See Glater, supra note 87.
88.
Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but
Legal Scholars Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A18 (explaining the legal
hurdles of prosecuting the press under the Espionage Act because of subsequent rulings of the
Supreme Court of the United States expanding free press rights); see also The Espionage Act
of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012).
The one effort to prosecute recipients of a leak under the Espionage
Act ended in embarrassment for the Justice Department. In 2005, it indicted two
lobbyists for a pro-Israel group who had been accused of receiving leaked
information from a Pentagon official and conveying it to others. The case
collapsed after a judge ruled that prosecutors had to prove that the lobbyists
specifically intended to harm the United States or benefit a foreign country.

Savage, supra note 88.
89.
Ewen MacAskill, Ban on Federal Staff Reading WikiLeaks Hampering
Work, Says US Official, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2010, 13:54 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/dec/10/us-ban-staff-wikileaks-official.
90.
See, e.g., Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online After Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/europe/
04domain.html?_r=1&hp. PayPal suspended WikiLeaks account in early 2010. Kevin
Poulsen, PayPal Freezes WikiLeaks Account, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2010, 3:31 AM), http://
www.wired.com/2010/12/paypal-wikileaks/. Amazon.com cut ties with WikiLeaks in
December of 2010. Vance, supra note 90. Throughout its short history, WikiLeaks has had
trouble securing funding. Jeanne Whalen & David Crawford, How WikiLeaks Keeps Its
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associating with WikiLeaks.91 Congress also proposed the Securing Human
Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act (“SHIELD Act”),
which would have expanded the Espionage Act to include criminalizing the
dissemination of information “concerning the human intelligence activities
of the United States” that harms the United States’ national interests.92 This
was after the Federal Government convened a federal grand jury to examine
if WikiLeaks could be charged with violating the Espionage Act.93 In 2013,
documents leaked by Edward Snowden showed that the NSA had put Julian
Assange on the manhunt target list, joining top members of Al-Qaeda.94
These people and organizations may very well be journalistic
entities.95 Like traditional news media, they serve the public interest in the
free flow of information.96 It is even arguable that open leak sites are
fulfilling the press’ role of watchdog by revealing information that the
traditional media97 either does not have access to, or will not cover because
of corporate flak.98 Nonetheless, if the traditional media companies came
across sensitive information, such as leaked government documents, it is
likely that they would publish the information.99 But under the current

Funding
Secret,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
23,
2010,
12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704554104575436231926853198.
91.
See Vance, supra note 90. This has allegedly included pressuring foreign
government to enforce sexual assault charges against Julian Assange. See Elliott, supra note
44 (arguing that the criminal prosecution for sexual assault was pretextual).
92.
Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks, the Proposed SHIELD Act and the First
Amendment, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 105, 105 (2011); see also SHIELD Act, S. 4004,
111th Cong. (2010). The SHIELD Act may be unconstitutional on its face because it does not
require that the publisher know that the information would cause grave and imminent harm.
Stone, supra note 92, at 105.
93.
Assange Attorney: Secret Grand Jury Meeting in Virginia on WikiLeaks,
CNN
(Dec.
13,
2010,
12:00
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/12/13/
wikileaks.investigation/; see also The Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012);
John Letzing et al., WikiLeaks Wants Google Answers on Giving Staff Data to U.S., WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wikileaks-wants-google-answers-on-givingstaff-data-to-u-s-1422302056.
94.
Julian Assange on Being Placed on NSA “Manhunting” List & Secret
Targeting of WikiLeaks Supporters, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 18, 2014), http://
www.democracynow.org/2014/2/18/julian_assange_on_being_placed_on.
95.
See About: What Is Wikileaks?, supra note 11.
96.
Id.
97.
See, e.g., supra notes 61, 77 and accompanying text.
98.
See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition
Policy for Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that Support the Media
Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101, 106–07, 118 (2009). A third
of news journalists and editors surveyed have reported that news stories will not be reported if
it might negatively affect an advertiser or the parent company. Id. at 118.
99.
See id. at 119.
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precedent, those traditional media entities would not be punished, whereas
open leaks sites, such as WikiLeaks, are under fierce legal scrutiny.100
Some in the traditional media have argued that open leak sites are
not journalistic organizations deserving protection.101 Under traditional
models, it is hard to argue otherwise.102 Open leak sites challenge our
traditional notions of journalism.103 For example, WikiLeaks claims to vet
information, but the release of hundreds of thousands of documents seems to
suggest otherwise.104 Critics argue that WikiLeaks does nothing more than
provide a platform for others to publish illegally obtained documents.105
Finally, WikiLeaks’ own lack of transparency106 and absolute protection of
secrecy are antithetical to the very principles that it espouses.107
Many critics argue that the objective of open leak sites is not to
simply promote the free flow of information for a democratic society, but to
instead create a new world order based in anarchy—or the end of the
established hegemony.108 Finally, some have argued that these sites incite
criminal activity.109 The argument is that otherwise law-abiding citizens,

100.
See Savage, supra note 88; Assange Attorney: Secret Grand Jury Meeting
in Virginia on WikiLeaks, supra note 93.
101.
See Benkler, supra note 16, at 319–20; Lauren J. Russell, Comment,
Shielding the Media: In an Age of Bloggers, Tweeters, and Leakers, Will Congress Succeed
in Defining the Term “Journalist” and in Passing a Long-Sought Federal Shield Act?, 93 OR.
L. REV. 193, 217–18 (2014).
102.
See Meier, supra note 28, at 211.
103.
See id. at 211–12.
104.
See About: What Is WikiLeaks, supra note 11; Condon, supra note 12;
Kissinger Cables: Wikileaks Publishes 1.7m U.S. Diplomatic Documents from 1970s, supra
note 73.
105.
See Barnes & Whalen, supra note 30.
106.
About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11; see also Khatchadourian,
supra note 32. In September of 2010, Daniel Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks and began
Openleaks, a site that is meant to be more transparent than its predecessor, which DomsheitBerg claimed was no longer a true wiki site. Andy Greenberg, WikiLeaks’ Stepchildren,
FORBES ASIA, Jan. 2011, at 28; Ben Piven, Copycat WikiLeaks Sites Make Waves, AL JAZEERA
(Dec. 17, 2010, 3:25 GMT), http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2010/12/
20101216194828514847.html# (highlighting five new international open source
whistleblower sites).
107.
See Benkler, supra note 16, at 312–13, 320; About: What Is WikiLeaks?,
supra note 11.
108.
See Condon, supra note 12.
109.
Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12. WikiLeaks argues that it does not incite
criminal activity or solicit information, but Julian Assange has called for a list of the most
wanted leaks. See Woolner, supra note 38.
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who would have never broken the law and revealed national security secrets,
are enticed by the protections of anonymity offered by these sites.110
Since 2010, WikiLeaks has struggled.111 Much of their funding has
dried up, as companies such as PayPal announced that they would no longer
work with the organization.112 Julian Assange took asylum in the Ecuadorian
embassy in London after he was accused of sexual assault.113 Many
members of the organization have left.114 Nevertheless, WikiLeaks has
inspired many similar sites such as OpenLeaks, created by former WikiLeaks
spokesperson, Daniel Domscheit-Berg; BrusselsLeaks; TradeLeaks;
BalkanLeaks; RuLeaks, Russia; and Honest Appalachia.115 There are
numerous other sites, and many more will come.116 Despite governments’
best efforts, the open leaks sites are here to stay and have changed our
contemporary notions of state secrets and transparency.117

110.
See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12. “WikiLeaks [has] describe[d] itself
as ‘an uncensorable version of Wikipedia for untraceable mass document leaking and analysis.
It combines the protection and anonymity of cutting-edge cryptographic technologies with the
transparency and simplicity of a wiki interface.’” Id. at 211. Meier argues that this promise is
more akin to espionage than it is journalism, which can offer complete anonymity, as most
shield laws have exemptions for such cases. Id. at 211–12; SHIELD Act, S. 4004, 111th
Cong. (2010).
111.
See Poulsen, supra note 90.
112.
Id.
113.
Elliott, supra note 44; Ricardo Patino, Two Years on, Julian Assange is
Still a Prisoner of Process, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2014, 14:30 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/17/julian-assange-ecuador-political-asylumstalemate.
114.
See Benkler, supra note 16, at 325–26; see also Gina Pace, WikiLeaks in
Disarray, Says Former No. 2 Staffer, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010, 12:37 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaks-in-disarray-says-former-no-2-staffer/.
115.
Leak Site Directory, LEAK DIRECTORY, http://leakdirectory.org/
index.php/Leak_Site_Directory (last updated June 6, 2015); Piven, supra note 106. For a
comprehensive list of open leaks sites, go to Leak Site Directory. Leak Site Directory, supra
note 115.
116.
See Leak Site Directory, supra note 115.
117.
See Benkler, supra note 16, at 347, 350 (outlining how the traditional
press assisted the government in painting WikiLeaks as a threat).
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Lack of a Federal Shield Law118

On the federal level, there is no statutory protection against
compelled disclosure of sources.119 In the last thirty-four years, at least
twenty U.S. journalists have spent time in jail for contempt of court after
refusing to disclose their sources.120 In recent years, reporters like Vanessa
Leggett,121 Judith Miller,122 Matt Cooper,123 Mark Fainaru-Wada,124 Lance
Williams,125 and James Risen126 have received media attention because they

118.
For purposes of this Article, we will only consider protections at the
federal level. See infra Part III.B–D. Fortunately for journalists, there are now thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia that have statutory protection for journalists. See
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 410. Two other states have adopted evidentiary rules that protect
journalists. See id. Of the eleven other states, only one state, Wyoming, does not recognize a
qualified constitutional or common law privilege. Id. (detailing the current state of shield
laws in the country).
119.
See infra Part III.C.
120.
See Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for
Refusing to Testify, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
121.
Id. Leggett wrote a non-fiction book about a high profile murder in
Houston, Texas. See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 412. Leggett had interviewed the suspect
while he was in custody. Id. at 413. The suspect subsequently committed suicide. Id. at 414.
The prosecution asked for Leggett’s notes and she refused. Id. The suspect was
posthumously acquitted. Id. Then, the federal government began its own investigation and a
grand jury subpoenaed Leggett. Laptosky, supra note 3, at 414. She refused to testify citing a
reporter’s privilege. Id. The Fifth Circuit upheld her contempt conviction and she was
sentenced to jail. Id. She served 168 days in jail. Id. at 415.
122.
See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 415–19.
123.
See infra Part III.C.
124.
See Peter Meyer, Note, BALCO, the Steroids Scandal, and What the
Already Fragile Secrecy of Federal Grand Juries Means to the Debate over a Potential
Federal Media Shield Law, 83 IND. L. J. 1671, 1672–73 (2008) (detailing the BALCO case).
Fainaru-Wada and Williams were reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle who wrote the
book Game of Shadows: Barry Bonds, BALCO, and the Steroids Scandal That Rocked
Professional Sports, which investigated steroids use in professional sports. Id. at 1673. A
source for their book was the contents of a leaked federal grand jury testimony. Id. at 1672–
73. The reporters were subpoenaed to disclose their source and they refused. Id. at 1680.
They were sentenced to eighteen months in jail, but never ended up serving time because the
source came forward. See id.
125.
See Meyer, supra note 124, at 1673.
126.
See Jonathan Mahler, Reporter’s Case Poses Dilemma for Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2014, at A1.
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were threatened with jail time or served jail time for a refusal to disclose
confidential sources in federal court.127
B.

Branzburg v. Hayes128

The Supreme Court of the United States does not recognize a
constitutional right for journalists to protect the confidentiality of their
sources.129 In Branzburg, newspapers had published stories on illegal
activity.130 The journalists kept their sources anonymous.131 Subsequently,
the respective journalists were subpoenaed before a grand jury, but refused to
reveal their sources.132 The journalists were found to be in contempt, but
appealed, stating that forced compulsion violated the First Amendment.133
The Supreme Court disagreed with the journalists and upheld the
conviction.134 The Court stated there was no constitutional right not to
answer a grand jury; rather, the only recourse was for journalists to seek
statutory protections.135 However, in concurrence, Justice Powell created the
oft-cited qualified privilege.136 Justice Stewart forwarded the three-part
Branzburg test.137 In order to compel the journalist to divulge the source, the
state must:

127.
See Meyer, supra note 124, at 1671. Furthermore, for the exposed source,
federal law provides few protections for a whistleblower, especially when the information is
classified or pertains to national security. See Papandrea, supra note 23, at 450–51 (outlining
the limited statutory protections for national security whistleblowers).
128.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
129.
See id. at 697–98. In a 5-4 split, the Court rejected a First Amendment
absolute privilege to confidential sources. Id. at 665, 698. In all three consolidated cases, the
facts involved journalists who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury. Id. at 667–70, 672–74.
Justice Powell argued that the holding of the case was only limited to grand jury proceedings.
Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
130.
Branzenburg, 408 U.S. at 667, 669. Branzburg was consolidated with two
other cases, Pappas and Caldwell, where the journalists were protecting the identity of a
Black Panther. Id. at 665, 669, 672.
131.
Id. at 667–70.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 668–70, 679–80.
134.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708–09.
135.
Id. at 685, 706. The Court said that states were free to interpret their own
constitution’s free press clauses. Id. at 706.
136.
Id. at 709–710 (Powell, J., concurring). This privilege is recognized in all
different types of proceedings. See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir.
1986) (criminal case); LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (civil case);
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (civil case); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980) (libel case); Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464, 467–68 (9th Cir. 1975).
137.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
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(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the [journalist]
has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of [the] law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in the information.138

C.

Free Flow of Information Act(s)

Within the first “six years after [the decision in] Branzburg, ninetynine bills for a federal shield law were introduced in Congress.”139 None of
the bills even made it to a floor vote, as Congress could not agree on a
definition of journalist.140 Congress then abandoned the proposals after the
courts started to recognize the Branzburg qualified privilege and states
started to adopt their own shield laws.141
The national headlines of Judith Miller’s incarceration renewed
Congress’ consideration for a federal shield law.142 In 2004, Senator Dodd
proposed an absolute reporter’s privilege against disclosure of confidential
information.143 Then, in 2005, a bipartisan bill was proposed in the House.144
This bill was also an absolute privilege for confidential sources.145 But, all
non-confidential sources only had a qualified privilege that could be
overcome with a showing of clear and convincing evidence.146 These bills
138.
Id. Though the test is oft-cited, federal courts have mostly applied the
majority opinion. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
139.
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 421.
140.
Id. The press organizations also insisted that a shield law gives absolute
protection, which the government did not want to allow. Id.
141.
Russell, supra note 101, at 207.
142.
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 416, 418, 421. The media insisted that the
privilege had to be absolute. Id. at 421.
143.
Id.; see also Free Speech Protection Act of 2004, S. 3020, 108th Cong. § 3
(2004).
144.
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422. This bill was also known as the Free Flow
of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 581. Id.; see also Free Flow of Information Act of 2005,
H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005). A companion bill was also introduced in the Senate.
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422; see also Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 340, 109th
Cong. § 1. United States Senator Lugar, the bill’s sponsor, stated that it was essential to
protect whistleblowers and confidentiality agreements needed for the free “‘flow of
information [to] the public.’” Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422; Press Release, U.S. Senator
Richard Lugar, Lugar Introduces Bill to Shield Media (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20050225213402/
http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=231858.
145.
See H.R. 581 § 4.
146.
Id. § 2(a).
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were revised several times to answer concerns from the executive branch,
including the addition of an exception for national security.147 Eventually,
these bills died in committee.148
In 2007, shield law legislation was introduced once again.149 This
time, there were concerns that the definition of journalist was too vague.150
The 2007 bill protected anyone regularly engaged in journalism for “‘a
substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial
gain.’”151 But the House still passed the legislation.152 The proposed law
would only protect information that was obtained while engaged in
journalism.153 But, the privilege would not be absolute.154
There was also a more stringent test in order to have confidential
information compelled.155 The government would have to show that the
information was necessary to: (1) prevent a national-security threat;156 (2) to
thwart imminent death or significant bodily harm; (3) ascertain the identity
of an individual who disclosed a trade secret, personal health, or financial
information; or (4) to identify the source of a leak of classified information
that could cause significant and articulable harm to national security.157
Finally, the court would have to apply a balancing test to determine whether
compelling the disclosure serves more of a public interest than
newsgathering.158 The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a similar bill,

147.
See S. 1419, § 2(a)(3)(A); H.R. 3323, § 2(a)(3)(A).
148.
See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 424.
149.
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. (2007);
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007).
150.
See COHEN & RUANE, supra note 4, at 7.
151.
H.R. 2102, § 4(2); see also Federal Shield Law Efforts, REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-shield-law (last updated
Sept. 12, 2013).
152.
See Federal Shield Law Efforts, supra note 151. In October of 2007, the
House passed H.R. 2102 by a vote of 398–21. Id.
153.
See id.
154.
See id.
155.
See id. First, the government must exhaust all available sources. See H.R.
2102 § 2(a)(1); S. 1267 § 2(a)(1).
156.
Federal Shield Law Efforts, supra note 151. A national-security threat
includes a terrorist threat. Id.
157.
Id. The government must first exhaust all available sources and the leak
would have to harm national security. See id.
158.
Id. “[T]he public interest in compelling disclosure of the information . . .
outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.” Free Flow
of Information Act of 2013, H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2013). The privilege does not
apply to eyewitness testimony of a crime or tortuous activity. Federal Shield Law Efforts,
supra note 151.
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which was awaiting a full-vote in the Senate that never happened.159 In
2009, the House passed another bill that was identical to the bills introduced
in 2007.160 The Senate modified it and the bill was placed on the Senate
calendar.161 However, Congress took no significant action on it.162
In 2013, the White House showed support for federal shield law
legislation.163 The bill supported by the White House was authored by
Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-NC).164
This particular bill gave different levels of protection depending on if a case
was civil, criminal, or dealing with national security.165 In a civil case, the
party seeking the source would have to show why the need for the
information outweighed the public interest in newsgathering.166 In a criminal
case, the test would be similar with the exception being that the burden of
proof would be on the journalists seeking to quash the subpoena.167 When
the case involved national security interests, the government would only
have to show that information may prevent harm to national security.168
D.

Analysis
1.

Focus on Protecting Information, not Journalists
a.

Serving the Public Interest

Pursuant to Bartnicki v. Vopper,169 a media outlet that publishes
truthful information that it obtained legally cannot be punished.170 But in

159.
KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34193, JOURNALISTS’
PRIVILEGE: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN RECENT CONGRESSES 4 2011.
160.
Id. at 10. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a similar bill and it is
awaiting a full-vote in the Senate. Id. at 9.
161.
Id.
162.
See id. at 9. Many people believe that a WikiLeaks’ document dump has
derailed the Federal Reporter’s Shield Law. See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not
Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 669
(2011). For a discussion on this and an argument as to why the Federal Reporter’s Shield Law
would not protect WikiLeaks, see WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s
Privilege in Any Form. Id.
163.
See Charlie Savage, Criticized on Records Seizure, White House Pushes
Shield Law, PITTSBURGH POST, May 16, 2013, at A5.
164.
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).
165.
Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).
166.
Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii).
167.
Id. § 2(b). The burden of proof would be clear and convincing evidence.
Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).
168.
S. 987 § 2(a)(2)(A)(iv).
169.
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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today’s media landscape, the definition of who is a publisher deserving
protection is unclear.171 But journalists are not defined by who they are.172
A person should not have to work for a traditional media company or have
been trained in a journalism program in order to be considered a journalist
deserving legal protections. Rather, it is the information collected and
disseminated that defines journalism. It is more important to protect the
principles and product of journalism, than it is to be obsessed with the person
behind it.173
Thus, any federal shield law should define protected persons as any
person who collects, vets, and disseminates information that is in the public
interest.174 Furthermore, just because a person receives information from an
anonymous source, that should not destroy his or her journalistic
legitimacy.175 In fact, traditional journalists have used anonymous sources
for decades to serve the public interest.176

170.
Id. at 517, 529–30 (holding that radio station could publish illegally taped
phone conversation that it had obtained legally from a third person).
171.
See supra Part III.C.
172.
See supra Part III.C.
173.
See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 88, 99 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006); supra Part III.C. A website that accepts the posting of confidential information is
“conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper, and we see no theoretical basis
for treating it differently.” O’Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99.
174.
See Russell, supra note 101, at 225. Note: This policy is concerned with
information pertaining to national security that is almost always in the public interest. See
Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2013); Meier,
supra note 28, at 209; Russell, supra note 101, at 225. The idea of defining journalist
conflicts with the First Amendment protection of all publishing, but nevertheless, courts have
attempted to in applying reporter’s privilege. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,
151 F.3d 125, 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Russell, supra note 101, at 225. In Titan
Sports v. Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc., the Third Circuit forwarded a three-prong test:
(1) the claimant was engaged in investigative reporting; (2) the claimant was gathering news;
and (3) the claimant “possess[ed] the intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to
disseminate this news to the public.” Titan Sports, Inc., 151 F.3d at 131. The Second Circuit
has held that in order to claim the privilege, the person must be “involved in activities
traditionally associated with the gathering and dissemination of news, even though he may not
ordinarily be a member of the institutionalized press.” Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d
136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987).
175.
See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Russell, supra note 101, at 222–23.
176.
See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S
MEN 71 (1974).
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New Standard for Compelling Disclosure of Confidential Sources

Under the status quo, open leaks sites would be compelled to
disclose their sources or any information leading to the source.177
Consequently, Congress should pass a new version of the Free Flow of
Information Act that protects all publishers who are serving the public
interest. This Free Flow of Information Act should apply anytime the news
media is subpoenaed and faces a compelled disclosure of its sources.
However, the new proposed law would only apply when instances of
national security leaks and compelled disclosure would lead to the source of
the leak.
First, if the leak revealed illegal government actions, the publisher
would not be compelled to disclose the source.178 If the leak did not reveal
illegal action, then in order to compel the disclosure of the source, the
government will have to prove a three-part test. The government must show
with a preponderance of evidence179 that: (1) the disclosure is necessary to
identify the source of the leaked classified information;180 and (2) that the
leak could cause “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage” to national
security.181 Third, the court must apply a balancing test to determine whether

177.
See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12.
178.
See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209. The leak
served the public interest in line with the stated principles of whistleblower statutes. See
Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209. Thus, all parties are immune from
liability. See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209–10 (discussing the
legislative history of federal whistleblower statutes).
179.
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2007). This is a lower standard than the previous federal shield law bills, both of which
failed to be adopted. Compare Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. §
(2)(a) (2007), and Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § (2)(a)
(2007) with Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. § (2)(a) (2005) and
Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § (2)(a) (2005). Both of these
bills occurred before WikiLeaks became prominent and essentially killed the Act. See S. 1419
§ 2; H.R. 581 § 2. This compromise might propel passage. See S. 1267 § 2(a); H.R. 2102 §
2(a); S. 1419 § 2(a); H.R. 581 § 2(a). More importantly, the standard is also lower than the
test used by the independent review tribunal. See S. 1267 § 2(a); H.R. 2102 § 2(a). The
desired effect is to encourage potential whistleblowers to use the legal channels rather than
risk leaking, and eventual disclosure. Compare S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1) and H.R. 2102, 110th
Cong. § (2)(a)(1) with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972).
180.
See S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1); H.R. 2102, § (2)(a)(1). The government must first
exhaust all available sources. See S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1); H.R. 2102, § (2)(a)(1).
181.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 730
(1971) (per curiam); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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this specific compelling disclosure serves more of a public interest than the
protection of newsgathering.182
3.

Balancing Transparency and Government Efficacy

Of course, this policy is in response to the government’s reaction to
WikiLeaks and other open leak sites, and their mantra of complete
transparency.183 This reaction has included the derailing of a needed federal
shield law and whistleblower protection enhancement for those who
undoubtedly disseminate information in the public interest.184
The
government’s reaction might have been an overreaction, but it is
understandable from its perspective.185 These leaks may have caused some
damage to the United States’ reputation186 and may have put actual lives in
danger.187
There is no doubt that open leaks sites do add to the free flow of
information and government accountability.188 But if these sites are going to
take the place of corporate media to better serve the public interest, then they
must live up to the ideals of journalism.189 Whoever it is that works at open
leaks sites must actually vet through the information190 and decide what truly

182.
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, S. 448, 111th Cong. §
2(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2009) (currently stalled in committee). “[T]he [public] interest in compelling
disclosure [of the information] outweighs the public interest in gathering [or] disseminating
the information or news.” Id.
183.
Shield Act, S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 448 § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii). See also
About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11.
184.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
185.
See Ken Dilanian & Richard A. Serrano, Snowden Leaks Severely Hurt
U.S. Security, Two House Members Say, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/2014/jan/09/nation/la-na-snowden-intel-20140110.
186.
Id. Or more accurately has setback its reputation rebuilding after the
international community’s opinion about the Bush Administration. See, e.g., id.
187.
See David Williams, Taliban: We’ll Behead WikiLeaks Informers, DAILY
MAIL.COM, (July 29, 2010, 22:24 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article1298817/Taliban-Well-behead-WikiLeaks-informers.html.
The Taliban was on record
promising to behead any informants found on WikiLeaks. Id. In August of 2011, it was
reported that WikiLeaks accidently released thousands of documents without redaction.
Tsukayama, supra note 30; Williams, supra note 187.
188.
See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 83 (arguing that movement to
oust Tunisian President began after corruption in its government was released by WikiLeaks
in a cable documenting widespread government corruption).
189.
See, e.g., Woolner, supra note 38. WikiLeaks is admittedly an advocacy
group, but claims that it is still a publication organization. Id.
190.
See id. WikiLeaks claims to have five journalists working full-time and
about eight hundred people who worked occasionally, none of whom were compensated.
Stefan Mey, Leak-o-nomy: The Economy of Wikileaks (Interview with Julian Assange),
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is in the public interest.191 They must redact names—as WikiLeaks has
done192—and consider what lives are being put in danger.193 Finally, these
sites must consider the cost that complete transparency has on the public.194
This can be ascertained by assessing the benefits of publication versus the
harms of publication.195 Information about military abuse, possible war
crimes, corruption, and massive spy programs serve the public interest as it
informs us about the government who represents us.196 A government,
which we empower to take lives and for which we sacrifice our lives.197 But
if transparency is just to spite those in power, to reveal behind-the-door
meetings and innocuous promises made by diplomats,198 then it hardly serves
the public interest and actually undermines the value of such sites.
Furthermore, if publication by open leaks sites lead to immediate harms such
as aiding terrorism or actual people dying,199 then these sites should not be
protected.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since the Nineteenth Century, journalists have defined themselves as
the watchdog, informing and protecting the public from the abuses of
powerful public and private interests.200 This perceived role has been the
basis for journalists’ arguments that they deserve special privileges not
MEDIEN-ÖKONOMIE-BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20101213110334/http://
stefanmey.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/leak-o-nomy-the-economy-of-wikileaks/. There is no
physical headquarters for the organization. Khatchadourian, supra note 32.
191.
See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.
192.
Shaughnessy, supra note 47.
193.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32. Julian Assange has said that the
release of documents could lead to the organization to have “blood on our hands.” Id.
However, there were no reports of deaths directly caused by information released in the leaks.
Adam Levine, Gates: Leaked Documents Don’t Reveal Key Intel, but Risks Remain, CNN
(Oct. 17, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/16/wikileaks.assessment/.
194.
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32.
195.
See id. The same test as above, but self-regulated. See id. Ideally, all
media would conduct this internal check. See id.
196.
See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.
197.
See supra note 50–56 and accompanying text.
198.
See Joshua Foust, WikiLeaks Hurts the Cause of Transparency, PBS (Dec.
3,
2010),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/wikileaks-hurts-the-cause-oftransparency/5503. “The Wikileaked embassy cables have been viewed as either the foreign
policy equivalent of TMZ or as the ruination of the entire international system.” Id.
199.
See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Bradley Manning Leak Did Not Result in Deaths
by Enemy Forces, Court Hears, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013 17:48 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/bradley-manning-sentencing-hearing-pentagon.
200.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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afforded to the general public.201 But critics argue that the traditional media
has abandoned its watchdog role to become a part of the giant oligopolistic
industries that they were meant to investigate.202 Critics claim that, as
another power player in this hierarchy, the corporate media are unable and
unwilling to investigate government sources or other barons of industry.203
Conversely, if government abusers like Abu Ghraib, Black Sites, and
Wiretapping were all exposed by the traditional press, then it is arguable that
the current legal structure is working just fine.204 So, why would the law
need to protect open leak sites, like WikiLeaks, at all? Why would the law
need to give any further protections to whistleblowers? The answers are
found in the source of the WikiLeaks most notorious drops: Army PFC
Bradley Manning.205
One must consider why Manning went to this new media site and not
the traditional press. For PFC Manning, the most important consideration
had to be that WikiLeaks promised absolute confidentiality.206 With the
traditional press in the United States, there is no federal shield law.207
Manning would not have had any real promise of confidentiality in the
traditional model.208 Even if Congress had passed the Free Flow of
Information Act, the exemptions added on to it would have undermined any
promise of confidentiality for him.209 Moreover, no current whistleblower
law protected him from criminal prosecution for whistleblowing on national
security secrets.210
Ultimately, Manning thought his justified actions were safer with
WikiLeaks, though it did not turn out to be true.211 Without WikiLeaks, the
world would never have been exposed to videos such as Collateral Murder

201.
See id. at 721. “The press has a preferred position[ing] in our
constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored
class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know.” Id.; see also Potter Stewart, Or of
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (arguing that the press clause gave the news
media separate additional protection than that afforded by the free speech clause).
202.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
203.
See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 1 (1999).
204.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
206.
See Meier, supra note 28, at 211.
207.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
208.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
209.
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. §§ 2, 5
(2013); Tate, supra note 65.
210.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713,
730 (1971) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring); Borak, supra note 2, at 635.
211.
See Tate, supra note 65; supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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and other important leaks, which arguably had less to do with protecting
national security and more to do with protecting public perception.212 So,
maybe WikiLeaks and PFC Bradley Manning are “far from deserving
condemnation for their courageous reporting,” but instead maybe they
“should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers
saw so clearly.”213

212.
See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12; Sunshinepress, supra note 52.
Recent leaks have revealed that after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Government ignored
reports of torture by Iraqi Officials, kept counts on over sixty-six thousand civilian casualties,
and ignored reports of civilians killed at U.S. Army checkpoints. Huge Wikileaks Release
Shows US ‘Ignored Iraq Torture’, BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2010, 5:42 ET), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11611319.
213.
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person,
and for securing to the individual . . . the right to be let alone. . . .
[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.”1

1.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
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The concept of privacy under the law, and concerns about invasion
of that privacy in the face of new technologies is hardly new.2 While the
above quotation sounds like it could have come from a recent blog post or
online news story, it is actually from the 1890 Harvard Law Review article
The Right to Privacy, written by Supreme Court Justices Brandeis and
Warren.3 Though the article was inspired by the justices’ concerns about the
advent of snapshot photography that allowed reporters to take pictures of the
justices and their families in public that were later published in the
newspaper, when read amid today’s concerns about privacy in the era of
Google Glass and private drones, these concerns ring just as true as they did
in the Nineteenth Century.4 Technology company Cisco has estimated that
ten billion devices were already connected to the Internet in 2013, and that
this number will grow to more than fifty billion by 2020.5 Of this growth, a
recent Business Insider report estimates that enterprise use of the Internet of
Things (“IoT”) will lead at first, but that growth in the home and government
sectors will ultimately surpass it, with government use of the IoT taking the
lead by 2019.6 This report also notes that experts believe the primary benefit
of the growth of the IoT will be savings in terms of efficiency and costs for
the home, government, and enterprise sectors; but that finding solutions to
security and compatibility concerns related to the use of these devices is the
key to enabling widespread adoption.7 While technology continues to race
ahead of the law, much remains unclear about how laws written in the age of
paper records will apply to these new advances.8 As the line between the
user and the device becomes increasingly blurred, the need for legal and
2.
See id. at 193–95.
3.
Id. at 193, 220.
4.
See id. at 195; Doug Gross, This Gadget Can Knock Drones and Google
Glass Offline, CNN (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/08/
tech/mobile/cyborg-unplug-google-glass/.
5.
See Michael Endler, Cisco CEO: We're All in on Internet of Everything;
INFORMATION WEEK (Feb. 25, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
software/information-management/cisco-ceo-were-all-in-on-internet-of-everything/d/did/1108801?; FED. TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD i (2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-thingsprivacy/150127iotrpt.pdf;
The
Internet
of
Things,
CISCO,
http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/trends/iot/overview.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015).
6.
John Greenough, The 'Internet of Things' Will Be the World's Most
Massive Device Market and Save Companies Billions of Dollars, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2014,
8:35 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-internet-of-things-market-will-grow2014-10.
7.
Id.
8.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195, 199–200; FED. TRADE
COMMISSION, supra note 5, at viii.
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business privacy solutions that are agile and practical becomes even more
paramount.9
While the use of big data that is generated by the IoT has great
potential to produce boundless technological advances, it also presents some
very real and serious legal concerns for consumers, as well as a number of
regulated industries.10 As these great changes occur, lawmakers and
regulators will need to not only stay on top of the related need for updates
and changes to the relevant laws—to protect consumers and businesses from
the potential misdeeds that can be done using big data—but also be prepared
to respond with effective solutions.11 From the Target and Home Depot data
breaches, to the dire possible results of the use of tools—like GPS spoofing
devices that can take a plane or train off course, to the possible use of big
data by terrorists, like was done in the Mumbai hotel attack of 2008—as the
IoT develops, lawyers will be presented with challenges in the form of laws
that are not up to date with the real world technologies that their clients are
using, and opportunities to not only influence changes to these laws, but also
to develop creative solutions to help clients navigate this changing
landscape.12
A prime example of the myriad of data privacy issues that consumers
and businesses face—both in regulated and unregulated industries—can be
found in an examination of the issues currently faced by the healthcare
industry in the age of the IoT.13 While wearable fitness trackers, like
FuelBand® and FitBit® devices, seem like innocuous gadgets urging users
to move more and get in shape, the long term impact of having data about
one’s habits and health collected are unknown.14 How would the data be
viewed in the eyes of a person’s physician, or insurance company for that
matter?15 When the device is more necessary for life—like a pacemaker
capable of remote monitoring via the Internet—the implications of a data
breach or potential attack by hackers become even more dire. When it
comes to healthcare related applications, the Food and Drug Administration
9.
See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 10.
10.
See id. at 7–18.
11.
See id.
12.
See Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger Than
Target’s; ‘Unique, Custom-Built Malware' Eliminated from Retailer's Systems After FiveMonth Attack on Terminals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-1411073571; Marc Goodman, A Vision of
Crimes in the Future, at TEDGlobal 2012 (June 2012), (transcript available at http://
www.ted.com/talks/marc_goodman_a_vision_
of_crimes_in_the_future/transcript?language=en) [hereinafter Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012].
13.
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 15–18.
14.
See id. at 16.
15.
See id. at 15–16.
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(“FDA”) is considering different tiers of regulation to ensure that these apps
are providing safe and accurate information to consumers.16
Health experts have expressed alarm at the safety and accuracy of
health and fitness applications, or apps, prompting the FDA to investigate
these apps, as well as propose new tiers of regulation to ensure that the
information provided is safe and accurate.17 This concern has proven to be
well founded, as even the notoriously detail oriented technology company,
Apple Computers, Inc., unveiled its new health data aggregation platform,
HealthKit®, in a presentation featuring a slide that listed the user’s blood
glucose level erroneously as being measured in mL/dL, rather than in
mg/dL.18 In addition, a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) examination of
twelve health and fitness apps shared user data—such as names, email
addresses, gender, as well as diet and fitness habits—with more than
seventy-six third parties, a finding that is even more alarming when
considered in conjunction with the reality that most of these apps do not
feature privacy policies that disclose what data is collected, how it is used,
and who it is shared with by the developer.19
When coupled with the push to convert medical records to electronic
format as part of the implementation of the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (“HITECH”), and the rising
problem of medical records identity theft, the importance of amending
privacy laws like Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”) to better protect patient data becomes all too clear.20 As most
privacy laws were drafted and enacted in the days of paper records, doing so
16.
See Andrew Litt, Caution: Untested mHealth Apps Proliferate, but Few
Good Ones Work Well, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://
www.computerworld.com/article/2474276/healthcare-it/caution-untested-mhealth-appsproliferate-but-few-good-ones-work-well.html; Amy Standen, Sure You Can Track Your
Health Data, But Can Your Doctor Use It?, NPR (Jan. 19, 2015, 3:32 AM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/health/2015/01/19/377486437/sure-you-can-track-your-health-data-butcan-your-doctor-use-it.
17.
Mark Sullivan, Apple’s On-Stage Healthkit Goof Proves It Still Has to
Earn the Trust of the Health Community, VENTUREBEAT (June 4, 2014, 6:10 AM), http://
venturebeat.com/2014/06/04/apples-on-stage-healthkit-goof-proves-it-still-has-to-earn-thetrust-of-the-health-community/; Elizabeth Weise, FDA Sets Guidelines for Medical Devices’
Cybersecurity, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/2014/10/01/fda-medical-devices-cybersecurity/16543731/.
18.
Sullivan, supra note 17.
19.
See Christina Farr, FTC Commissioner Warns on Mobile Health-Data
Gathering, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 8:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/ushealthcare-tech-washington-idUSKBN0FT02320140724.
20.
See Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical Health Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226, 226; Health Insurance Portability &
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936.
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will not only involve the input of lawmakers, but also of the creators of the
affected technologies.21
II.
A.

WHAT IS THE INTERNET OF THINGS?

Definition
The IoT is defined by the FTC as:
[T]he ability of everyday objects to connect to the Internet and to
send and receive data. It includes, for example, Internet-connected
cameras that allow you to post pictures online with a single click;
home automation systems that turn on your front porch light when
you leave work; and bracelets that share with your friends how far
you have biked or run during the day.22

The FTC estimates that this trend is only still in its infancy, stating
that experts estimate that as of 2015, there will be twenty-five billion
connected devices, and by 2020, there will be more than fifty billion such
connected devices.23 In its summary of the workshop titled The Internet of
Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World, the FTC notes the many
benefits presented by the IoT, such as how “connected medical devices can
allow consumers with serious medical conditions to work with their
physicians to manage their diseases.”24 However, the FTC also notes that the
IoT presents “security risks [to consumers] that could be exploited to harm
consumers by: (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal
information; (2) facilitating attacks on other systems; and (3) creating risks to
personal safety.”25
The FTC report states that the principles that it is basing its
recommendations on for the IoT are the Fair Information Practice Principles
of “notice, choice, access, accuracy, data minimization, security, and
accountability.”26 The principle of data minimization refers to the idea that
companies “should limit the data [that] they collect and retain, and

21.
Jason Wang, HIPAA Compliance: What Every Developer Should Know,
INFORMATIONWEEK (July 11, 2014, 9:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
healthcare/security-and-pray/hipaa-compliance-what-every-developer-should-know/a/did/1297180; see also FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at ii.
22.
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at i.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at i–ii.
25.
Id. at ii.
26.
Id.
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[ultimately] dispose of it once” the data is no longer needed.27 The report
notes that there was division among the participants in regard to this
principle, as some participants expressed concern that “requiring fledgling
companies to predict what data they should minimize would ‘chok[e] off
potential benefits and innovation.’”28 The participants in the workshop also
noted that one of the challenges with the IoT is providing notice to the user
that the device is collecting data.29
There was also some division as to the principles of notice and
choice among the workshop participants, based in large part upon the
ubiquity of these devices.30
As one participant observed, [if consumers have] “a bunch of
different sensors on a bunch of different devices, on your home,
your car, your body . . . measuring all sorts of things” it would be
burdensome both for the company to provide notice and choice,
and for the consumer to exercise such choice every time
information was reported.31

The major concern among participants as it relates to the risk is if
patients are faced with too many requests for consent to the collection of
data, they will stop using the device, which could be a serious problem in the
case of medical IoT devices.32 The participants found this to be especially
true with medical devices that have no screen or other interface that would
enable it to communicate said notice to the user, or in the case of devices
with screens, they are smaller than the screens on mobile devices and make it
difficult, if not impossible, to communicate the notice to the user.33 The
timing of the request may also be an issue that prevents users from reading a
notice, let alone consenting to it, such as when a consumer may be driving.34
B.

Prediction of Impact

There is no doubt that the IoT will affect nearly every industry,
whether in terms of better planning as a result of the analysis of data
collected by smart devices, or in the increased efficiencies created by the
ability for people to use devices to communicate data to people located
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Id. at 21 (alteration in original).
Id. at v.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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remotely.35 Just in the healthcare industry, remote monitoring of patients
over the Internet estimated to reduce hospital visits by forty percent and cost
per visit by $1800 for implantable medical devices.36
For the purposes of this Article, the focus will be on the potential
impacts of IoT and the data collected by these devices on the healthcare
industry.37
C.

Data
1.

How Data is Collected in Healthcare

The healthcare industry is particularly unique in terms of the IoT in
that it has perhaps the largest variety of types of data that can be collected, as
well as devices to collect it.38 From blood pressure levels to levels of
different materials in blood to oxygen saturation—among many others—
healthcare professionals can monitor what is going on with a patient from
head to toe.39 In addition, there are numerous conditions that can be
monitored, and just as many types of devices to monitor them.40
2.

How Data is Used in Healthcare

Medical data is used for a number of purposes, including for patient
diagnosis and treatment.41 In addition, this same information can be shared
with insurance companies for billing purposes, government agencies
collecting data, research institutions and organizations, prevention and
wellness initiatives, and for the education of health care providers, patients,
families, communities, government, and other organizations.42

35.
See id. at 7–8.
36.
Gregor Koenig, Barracuda Networks AG, Security and Privacy of
Wireless Implantable Medical Devices 4, Presentation at Security Forum 2013 (Apr. 17,
2013).
37.
See infra Part II.C–D.
38.
DARRELL M. WEST, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS,
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE THROUGH MOBILE MEDICAL DEVICES AND SENSORS 1–4, 8 (2013).
39.
See id. at 1, 8.
40.
See id. at 1–4.
41.
See Andy Ferris et al., Big Data: What Is It, How Is It Collected and How
Might Life Insurers Use It?, ACTUARY, Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, at 28, 30; WEST, supra note 38,
at 1, 3–4.
42.
See Ferris et al., supra note 41, at 29–30.
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Crime Concerns
1.

General and Healthcare Related Crime Concerns

While there are great expectations as to what solutions the advent of
big data will bring to various industries and to consumers, there are also
equally large concerns about how such data could be used by those with
nefarious intent.43 Marc Goodman of the Future Crimes Institute has spoken
about the future of crime in the age of big data, and the picture so far is not
pretty.44 While the data breaches at Target and Home Depot in 2014 caused
consumers financial headaches, the potential of criminal activity in the future
according to Goodman could be far worse.45 As Goodman notes, going back
to the time of Neanderthals, data has been a double sided coin with both
good and bad aspects; and in today’s environment of three-dimensional
printing and other high tech weapons, where the positive aspects have great
potential, the negative present consequences will call for regulatory solutions
in coming years.46 The primary example that he cites in his TED talk is the
2008 terrorist attack on a hotel in Mumbai.47 What marked a shift from
previous such attacks was that, while these terrorists attacked with the
expected weapons of hand grenades, explosives and machine guns, they also
came armed with mobile phones, night vision goggles, access to satellite
imagery, and most importantly, access to an operations center in Pakistan.48
The terrorist operations center allowed the people working there to
monitor mainstream media coverage of the attack on television channels like
CNN, the BBC, Al-Jazeera, and local Indian television stations, as well as
the internet, and most importantly, social media.49 It was these latter sources
that made the Mumbai attack so different from previous terrorist attacks; as
the terrorists were able to call the war room as they moved through the hotel
to have their operatives google the hostages and search social media to find
out information about them that helped the terrorists gain advantages in their
negotiations.50 In one such instance, the terrorists were able to learn that a
hostage who claimed to be a schoolteacher was actually the secondwealthiest businessman in India, and after this information was revealed, the
43.
See What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, NPR (Sept. 13, 2013,
9:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript.php?storyId=215831944.
44.
Id.
45.
Sidel, supra note 12; What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, supra
note 43.
46.
See What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, supra note 43.
47.
Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
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terrorists in the operations center gave the order to the terrorists on the
ground to kill the man.51 Goodman sums up the impact of the situation, and
the enhanced ability on the part of the terrorists to create such terror:
Think about what happened. During this [sixty]-hour
siege on Mumbai, [ten] men armed not just with weapons, but with
technology, were able to bring a city of [twenty] million people to
a standstill. Ten people brought [twenty] million people to a
standstill, and this traveled around the world. This is what radicals
can do with openness.52

The Internet is also cited as not only a means of providing
information about hostages, but also to commit massive crimes, such as the
hack of the Sony PlayStation Network, which resulted in the robbery of one
hundred million people in one fell swoop.53 Goodman notes in his talk how
every advance in technology—from drones to three-dimensional printing—
can be used not only for good, but also for evil by criminals.54 Threedimensional printing is certainly a prime example of this, for while the
technology can and has been used by doctors to create prosthetic body parts
to save lives, it has also been used to create weapons.55 While these weapons
have yet to be used by criminals to commit crimes, there has been concern on
the part of lawmakers and law enforcement that the ability to print these
weapons from non-metal materials could be used to smuggle said weapons
through security checkpoints and on to planes, or into other sensitive areas to
carry out terrorist attacks.56 Goodman has also written about the Big Brother
aspect of big data where implantable medical device data could be used as
part of an autopsy to determine a person’s cause of death.57
This concern about the potential nefarious use of new devices and
the associated data collected by them becomes even graver when one
considers the implications of a data breach of health devices.58 While
devices like cochlear implants, diabetic pumps, pacemakers, and
defibrillators have changed lives for thousands of people, it is important to
remember that these very devices are also collecting and transmitting data
51.
Id.
52.
Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See Marc Goodman, Future Crimes Inst., Who Does the Autopsy?
Criminal Implications of Implantable Medical Devices 3, Presentation at the 2nd USENIX
Workshop on Health Security and Privacy (Aug. 9, 2011); Koenig, supra note 36, at 20.
58.
Goodman, supra note 57, at 2.
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about the patients in which they have been implanted.59 Goodman uses
pacemakers as an example, noting that sixty thousand people in the United
States have a pacemaker that connects to the Internet and allows a physician
to shock the heart remotely in the event that the patient needs it.60 In the
hands of the physician, it could be a lifesaver, but in the hands of a criminal,
the ability to shock the patient remotely could be a means of committing
murder.61 While these pacemakers represent a small fraction of all the
devices that have been implanted, the connected devices are estimated to
increase in terms of adoption, hence the concern about the impact of that
increase in usage, as well as the potential need to update older models to
these newer IoT models.62
Even in the case of less crucial devices like fitness trackers such as
Fitbit® or FuelBand®, the data collected from these devices has already
been admitted as evidence in a personal injury trial in Calgary in 2014.63
This case is even more significant, as the attorneys are not just using the data
from the Fitbit®, but are instead putting it through an analytics platform that
“uses public research [data] to compare [the] person’s activity data with that
of the general [public].”64 Couple this data with information that can be
discovered from social media, and the concern that wearable technology like
fitness trackers could become like black boxes for humans, seem to be
becoming all too real.65
It is scenarios like those discussed above that led the FDA and the
Department of Homeland Security to focus their attention on finding
solutions to the potential risks presented by the IoT as it relates to
healthcare.66 In addition to proposing the regulations that will be discussed
later in this paper, the leaders of the FDA have made it widely known that
they will be keeping an eye on developers of apps and devices designed for
this market.67 Shortly before the guidelines were introduced in October of
59.
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 16; Goodman, TEDGlobal
2012, supra note 12.
60.
Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12.
61.
See id.
62.
Sue Poremba, A Movement Is Needed to Improve Cyber Security for
Medical
Devices,
SUNGARD
AVAILABILITY
SERVICES
(Jan.
23,
2015),
http://blog.sungardas.com/2015/01/a-movement-is-needed-to-improve-cyber-security-formedical-devices/#sthash.C6JIT9KN.dpbs.
63.
See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Fitbit Data Now Being Used in the Courtroom,
FORBES (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/11/16/fitbitdata-court-room-personal-injury-claim/.
64.
Id.
65.
See id.
Poremba, supra note 62.
66.
67.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4 (2015), available at http://
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2014, Suzanne Schwartz, the director of emergency preparedness at the
FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, stated that “[t]here is no
such thing as a threat-proof medical device,” and “[i]t is important for
medical device manufacturers to remain vigilant about cybersecurity and to
appropriately protect patients from those risks.”68 The FDA has been
emphatic in urging developers and manufacturers to think about security in
developing new products, and to anticipate potential solutions before
releasing them to the marketplace.69 Chief among the considerations that
developers and manufacturers should keep in mind during development are,
“[a]t a minimum, medical devices should require secure authentication for
access, use encrypted communication, and make sure that security patches
are always added.”70
While the FDA has released regulations to help with the current and
future apps and devices that will be developed as part of the healthcare IoT,
there are also unique challenges presented by the older medical devices as
technology develops around them.71 The fact of the matter is that these older
devices present their own security threat, for reasons varying from that the
software used for these devices is not able to be patched, or that they were
never tested for security flaws.72 Further, in the case of implantable medical
devices, the challenges rise to a whole new level, as updating them can
involve surgery, making it not only a conversation about improving patient
data security, but also a decision between a patient and his or her physician
as to whether such surgery is best for the patient from a medical
perspective.73 This adds another piece to an already complicated puzzle for
physicians, who must now not only consider the potential medical benefit to
the patient presented by implanting a medical device, but also the long-term
maintenance requirements presented by it.74 This is where physician
education by representatives from medical device companies will play a
crucial role in helping physicians navigate these considerations so that they
can then help patients make these decisions.75

www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/UCM263366.pdf.
68.
Weise, supra note 17.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Poremba, supra note 62.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1

98

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

i.

CARE AND FEEDING OF PRIVACY POLICIES

403

Hypothetical: Hacking an Insulin Pump

Perhaps the best deep dive into the potential ways in which a smart
medical device or application could be hacked for criminal purposes is the
2011 talk by Jerome Radcliffe at the Black Hat cyber security conference.76
Radcliffe, a diabetic man, spoke about his experiments into how one might
hack his insulin pump.77 His talk started with what would seem to be the
most obvious source of information about the communication systems that
the pump uses: The user manual.78 He noted how the appendix of the user
manual provided him with everything from the wireless frequency on which
it operated to how often information was sent, and how large the file sizes
were.79 Radcliffe also learned the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) identification number from the manual, which he then took to the
FCC website, where a simple search resulted in downloadable FCC
verification documents for the device that detailed the process by which the
pump transmits data to the continuous glucose monitor (“CGM”).80
With this information acquired, Radcliffe moved on to considering
the types of hacks that a hacker could carry out on an insulin pump user.81
He notes that perhaps the most dangerous type of attack would be a spoofing
attack that would manipulate the sensor data that could lead an unsuspecting
user to think that his or her sugar levels are higher or lower than they actually
are.82 However, Radcliffe goes on to explain that while such a hack would
be possible, there are characteristics of how the pump and its components
work that would make carrying out such a hack difficult.83 First, the range of
the CGM receiver is very limited, meaning that the transmitter would need to
be within one hundred to two hundred feet of the receiver in order to work.84
Second, if such a reading was detected by the pump, the device would
require the user to calibrate it using a blood glucose meter, the intervention
of which would be highly unlikely.85 Finally, Radcliffe explains that even if
a criminal was able to manipulate the user into administering too much
76.
Jerome Radcliffe, Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and Insulin:
Breaking the Human SCADA System at Black Hat USA 2011 (Aug. 3–4, 2011), available at
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Radcliffe/BH_US_11_Radcliffe_Hacking_Medical_
Devices_WP.pdf.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Radcliffe, supra note 76.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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insulin, it is not uncommon for diabetics to experience such levels, meaning
that the hacker would need to continue manipulating the sensor data for
hours to keep impacting the user, a fact that makes it unlikely such an attack
would be successful.86
Radcliffe goes on to examine the likelihood of the success of
carrying out such an attack using the wireless communication functions of
the insulin pump.87 He states that a particularly dangerous situation for a
diabetes insulin pump user would be when—unbeknownst to the user—the
configuration settings that are the basis for calculating the amount of insulin
that is to be dispensed have been manipulated.88 He posits that this type of
attack would likely involve using the wireless peripheral device that is
necessary to talk to the pump, a task that is made relatively simple due to the
availability of the device for sale on the Internet, and the publication of the
command codes online.89 With the device and command codes in hand,
Radcliffe estimates that a hacker could change the configuration settings in a
short amount of time, and for example, could change the setting controlling
the ratio of insulin given at meal time enough to cause a diabetic patient to
become hypoglycemic within sixty to ninety minutes after eating.90
However, as with the CGM devices, Radcliffe explains that the likelihood
that such an attack would succeed are limited by several factors.91 He starts
by noting that like the CGM devices, the wireless components in the pump
have a very limited range of only one hundred to two hundred feet.92 The
most significant limiting factor for the success of a wireless attack is the fact
that the attacker would need the serial number of the device, which could not
be obtained without physical access to the device.93
The exploration of the potential hacking of an insulin pump
concludes as Radcliffe observes that perhaps the most dangerous element of
the medication delivery process for diabetic patients is that presented by
humans in the form of the manipulation of the variables used to determine
the amount of insulin to be given.94 However, he points to the trend of trying
to remove the risk of human intervention from the equation that is currently
leading organizations like the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation to
explore computer-operated insulin delivery options through its Artificial
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Radcliffe, supra note 76.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Radcliffe, supra note 76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Pancreas Project.95 While such solutions would eliminate the risk of human
intervention, Radcliffe remarks that these new automated solutions may
reduce or eliminate one type of risk, but also present new risks that may be
greater in the attack scenarios that he had considered—as such attacks would
be on an automated system—and less human intervention would also mean
less human oversight to detect them.96
2.

Data Discrimination

In addition to concerns about actual physical harm caused by hacks
or malfunctions by smart devices, perhaps the other greatest concern is that
of discrimination on the basis of the data collected by these same devices.97
While there are many issues related to the growth of the IoT and the
data collected by the devices in its ecosystem, this Article focuses on the
legal implications of the IoT as it relates to healthcare devices.98 Much like
the potential hacking of a lifesaving device, it is not entirely unthinkable that
Uber data could be used to make determinations in relation to whether a
person is accepted for housing, or that health insurance companies could try
to access policy holders’ credit card purchase data to inspect it for alcohol or
tobacco purchases—or medical marijuana for that matter—and deny
coverage based on data showing activities by policy holders that it finds
unacceptable.99 Or, imagine if the data collected by health devices and
apps—as to whether policy holders are properly managing their health
conditions—were to be used as the basis to find the person to be noncompliant and perhaps deny coverage, or even to make employment
decisions.100
E.

Internet of Things and Health Devices

One of the fastest growing sectors of the IoT is that related to health
care devices and apps.101 The Intel’s report to the Senate Special Committee
on Aging estimates that “[i]n large part because of widespread wastefulness
in service delivery and need for virtual care models, McKinsey forecasts that
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Radcliffe, supra note 76.
See id.; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Information
Privacy:
Genetic Information, www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/
genetic/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015).
98.
See infra Part III.
99.
See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 14–17; Radcliffe, supra
note 76.
100.
See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 15–16.
101.
Id. at 3.
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[forty] percent of the global economic impact of the IoT revolution will
occur in healthcare, more than any other sector.”102 What began with simple
heart rate monitors and fitness trackers has now given way to devices that
can take photographs and videos of the inner ear and transmit them to a
remotely located physician, allowing him or her to diagnose an ear infection
using a smartphone.103 Researchers have even developed a temporary tattoo
with electrodes that use a mild electrical current to monitor the wearer’s
blood sugar levels.104
Why is there so much interest and growth in terms of IoT smart
devices and apps for healthcare? A presentation at the Senate Special
Committee on Aging cites a number of reasons for it:
 a previously unseen aging population, in which “[t]here will
be more people over age [sixty-five] than under age [five];”
 an increase in chronic diseases;
 “[g]lobal shortage of healthcare workers;”
 a dramatically inefficient healthcare sector;
 “a shift from passive to active patients;” and
 rapid growth of health apps, social networks, and
collaboration tools.105
As part of the growth of IoT in healthcare, the presentation notes
three emerging categories: (i) person to person; (ii) person to computer; and
(iii) person as computer.106
F.

Policy and Security Recommendations

As one can imagine, for as much interest as there is in developing
apps and devices for the healthcare sector, there is just as much or even more
interest in developing solutions to keep healthcare data safe.107 The recent
102.
INTEL, THE INTERNET OF THINGS AND HEALTHCARE POLICY PRINCIPLES 1
(2014),
available
at
http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Intel%20-%20IoTHealthcare%20Policy%20Principles%20FINAL%207-25-14%20%20(3).pdf.
103.
See Standen, supra note 16; Eliza Strickland, Diagnosing Ear Infections
With a New Smartphone Gadget, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 15, 2014, 14:00 GMT),
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/biomedical/devices/diagnosing-ear-infections-with-anew-smartphone-gadget-.
104.
Robert Ferris, A ‘Tattoo’ May End Fingerpricks for Diabetics, CNBC
(Jan. 15, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102337534.
105.
INTEL, supra note 102, at 1–2.
106.
Id. at 3.
107.
See Examples of MMAs the FDA Regulates, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Connected
Health/MobileMedicalApplications/ucm368743.htm (last updated July 15, 2015); INTEL,
supra note 102, at 4; Anna Wilde Matthews & Danny Yadron, Health Insurer Anthem Hit by
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data breach at Anthem Inc.—the second largest health insurer in the United
States—involved “hackers br[eaking] into a database containing [the]
personal information [of] about [eighty] million of its customers and
employees.”108 This hack is estimated “to be the largest data breach [that has
been] disclosed by a healthcare company” to date, and demonstrates the great
risk that companies handling healthcare data face in terms of data breaches
due to hacker attacks, lost computers or hard drives, and other methods.109
Even though the breach thus far seems to be limited to the names, birthdays
and addresses of customers and employees, it is still estimated that tens of
millions of records were stolen, and it still represents a massive incursion for
the company and for consumers.110
Given the very real risk of data breaches, regulatory agencies—as
well as federal and state legislatures—are keeping an eye on the situation and
are recommending security guidelines for the IoT as it relates to
healthcare.111 Intel presented to the Senate Special Committee on Aging
recommendations for policies related to the development of security
measures for healthcare data.112 The first policy principle posited by the
Committee is to require data standards for connectivity, as well as for
interoperability between smart devices.113 As the Committee’s report on the
IoT notes, “[the] IoT in healthcare has the potential to aggregate data from
patient records, wearable sensors, labs, diet, the environment, and social
networking in real time, but only if the data can be analyzed. This takes
standardized data formats.”114 The second policy principle for securing the
IoT for healthcare put forth by the Committee is to regulate smartly, and
avoid de-innovation in developing security standards.115 The report
emphasizes the need for collaboration between the relevant parties, such as

Hackers: Breach Gets Away with Names, Social Security Numbers of Customers, Employees,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 9:39 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurer-anthem-hitby-hackers-1423103720; Michelle McNickle, 6 Best Ways to Protect Against Health Data
Breaches, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/6best-ways-protect-against-health-data-breaches?single-page=true.
108.
Matthews & Yardon, supra note 107.
109.
Id.; see also Richard W. Walker, Negligent Employees Cause Most Data
Breaches; Mobile is Key Factor, BREAKING GOV’T (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://
www.breakinggov.com/2012/03/22/negligent-employees-cause-most-data-breaches-mobileis-key-fact/.
110.
Matthews & Yardon, supra note 107.
111.
See id.; INTEL, supra note 102, at 3–4.
112.
INTEL, supra note 102, at 3.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 3–4.
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has been done by the Congress, regulators, and industry to develop
regulatory frameworks like the FDA Safety Innovation Act.116
The third policy principle noted in Intel’s report to the Senate
Special Committee on Aging for the IoT for healthcare is rethinking
reimbursement.117 The discussion of this principle notes that much of the
“rich and actionable data is not being used today because our health systems
are unprepared to incorporate the data into the fee for service payments, or
shared savings models.”118 The report cites how the adoption of virtual care
for patients by physicians and healthcare systems has been delayed thus far,
not by technology, but by the fact that providers are not paid for situations
where such virtual care is substituted and enhanced over in person visits.119
The next policy principle that the Committee report emphasizes is to capture
patient generated health data as a vital part of the patient record.120 It is
stated in the report how the twenty-seven billion dollar investment made by
the U.S. Government in promoting the adoption of electronic medical
records through the HITECH Act resulted in “unparalleled adoption rates—
[seventy-eight] percent of physicians and [sixty-six] percent of our nation’s
qualifying hospitals have been certified. Yet, the real time data from sensors,
tablets, smartphones, and peripherals are not captured in the [electronic
health records].”121
The final security policy recommendation included in Intel’s report
to the Committee is that privacy and security standards be required for IoT
applications and devices that are part of the IoT.122 As the report states,
according to the Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”), “199 [personal health information] (“PHI”)
breaches were reported in 2013, affecting [seven] million patient records.”123
It urges HHS to continue its efforts to work with interested parties to find a
“universally accepted health IT security standard or [principles] that can be
enforceable and agree on criteria that deems organizations ‘HIPAA Security
Rule Compliant.’”124

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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INTEL, supra note 102, at 4.
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Id.
INTEL, supra note 102, at 4.
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS

General Data

There are a number of legal aspects in play when it comes to big
data, both in terms of more general privacy laws, as well as laws specific to
certain types of data, such as medical records.125 What has become
particularly interesting as the Internet and the IoT have developed, is the
interplay of the obligations imposed by the various privacy laws upon new
parties who likely did not initially anticipate being subject to them, such as
web developers who take on a project for a school system and find
themselves subject to the requirements of Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act or Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), or an
app developer with an idea for a healthcare application that finds himself or
herself subject to HIPAA and FDA regulation.126 As such, it has become
more important than ever that web developers and information technology
professionals working with healthcare clients are not only aware of the
requirements of these laws, but can also help their clients find effective
compliance solutions. Privacy policies for websites and software that collect
data have become a cornerstone of this process, as they not only allow the
website operator to communicate its privacy policies and processes to users,
but also to demonstrate its commitment to compliance to regulators. These
privacy policies are unique, living documents that, just like the magical
creatures that Harry Potter and his friends at Hogwarts had to learn about in
their Care and Feeding of Magical Creatures class, require proper care and
feeding to thrive.
1.

Federal Privacy Act of 1974

The Privacy Act of 1974 governs the collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of information about individuals that is stored in the
records systems of federal agencies.127 The Act defines a system of records
as “a group of any records under the control of any agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”128
It further establishes the no disclosure without consent rule, which states
“[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency,
125.
126.
127.
128.
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except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of,
the individual to whom the record pertains.”129 This rule is subject to twelve
exceptions, ranging from an agency’s need to know the information, to
responding to Freedom of Information Act requests, to responding to court
orders.130
The Privacy Act grants the following rights to people: To find out
what information was collected about them; to see and have a copy of that
information; to correct or amend that information; and to exercise limited
control of the disclosure of that information to other parties.131
The Privacy Act comes into play for healthcare organizations that
are operated by the federal government, such as the Veterans’ Health
Administration, as well as record systems operated as part of a contract with
a federal government agency.132
2.

COPPA

One privacy law that has been in the spotlight in recent years due to
enforcement actions by the FTC is the COPPA.133 Passed in 1998, this law
protects the personally identifiable information (“PII”) of children under the
age of thirteen and sets out regulations that commercial website operators
must abide by if the website is collecting such information.134 The law
defines personal information to include: “[F]irst and last name; [a] home or
other physical address, including street name and name of a city or town;
[o]nline contact information; . . . a screen or user name [that] functions . . . as
online contact information; . . . [a] telephone number; [and a] social security
number.”135
COPPA prohibits operators of commercial websites from collecting
or disclosing the personal information of minors under the age of thirteen
without verifiable parental consent.136 The law not only requires website
operators to put mechanisms in place to comply with COPPA but also to
provide notice to parents about what information is collected by the site and
how that information will be used, even if the parents consent.137 COPPA
applies even if the website is not targeted specifically at children.138 So long
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 552a(b).
Id. § 552a(b)(1)–(12).
See id. § 552a(b)–(e).
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f).
16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.12 (2014).
Id. §§ 312.1–.2.
Id. § 312.2.
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as the website is collecting PII from children, it must be in compliance with
the law.139 This is why many commercial websites that allow users to
register either require users to check a box certifying that they are over the
age of thirteen or do not permit users under the age of thirteen to register.140
The FTC announced revisions to COPPA in 2013.141 These changes
included an expansion of the definition of what was considered personal
information to include:
 A “persistent identifier[] that can be used to recognize [a]
user[] over time and across . . . websites or online services,”
such as cookies, IP addresses, and mobile device IDs;142
 A photograph, video, or audio file, where such file
“contain[s] a child’s image or voice”;143
 Geolocation information sufficient to identify street name
and name or a city or town;144 and
 Information concerning the child or the parents of that child
that the operator combines with an identifier described
above.145
The FTC’s amendments to the COPPA rules in 2013 also expanded
the definition of a commercial website operator to include not only the
operator of a website or service directed at children, but also of “outside
services, such as plug-ins or advertising networks that collect personal
information from . . . visitors.”146 The amendments also clarified that
COPPA applies to “plug-ins or ad networks that have actual knowledge that

139.
Id.
140.
See id.
141.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Strengthens Kids’ Privacy,
Gives Parents Greater Control over Their Information by Protection Rule (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/12/ftc-strengthens-kids-privacy-givesparents-greater-control-over; see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.
142.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141. Compare 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
143.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141. Compare 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
144.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141. Compare 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
145.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141. Compare 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
146.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141; see also Complying
with COPPA:
Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-askedquestions#General Questions (last updated Mar. 20, 2015). Compare 16 C.F.R. § 312.2
(2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
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they are collecting personal information through a . . . website or online
service” directed at children.147
In updating COPPA, the FTC aimed to streamline and clarify the
requirements for direct notice to parents in such a way that it ensures that the
information is provided to parents in a succinct manner that provides this
information just in time.148 The Commission also expanded the list of
acceptable methods for operators to obtain prior verifiable parental consent
from parents, created new exceptions to the rule’s notice and consent
requirements, and strengthened the data security protections.149 The
amendments also require that operators have reasonable data retention and
deletion procedures.150 As part of the new changes, the FTC strengthened its
oversight of the self-regulatory safe harbor programs, and instituted a
“voluntary pre-approval mechanism[] for new [methods of consent],” as well
as “for activities that support the internal operations of a website or online
service.”151
The FTC initially granted website operators a grace period during
which it would allow operators a chance to update their procedures to meet
the requirements of the new amendments, but in 2014, it started enforcing
the new regulations.152 Among the notable settlements was a $450,000
settlement with the online review website Yelp for not having the proper
COPPA compliance mechanisms in place as part of its mobile app.153 The
irony of the settlement—as noted by the FTC in its press release—was that
Yelp had the appropriate mechanisms in place on its full website, just not on
the mobile app.154
147.
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141; see also Complying
with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 146. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 312.2
(2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014).
148.
Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 146;
Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141; see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (2014).
149.
16 C.F.R. § 312.5–.8; Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 146; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 141.
150.
16 C.F.R. § 312.10; Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 146.
151.
Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 146;
see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.5; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 141.
152.
Lesley Fair, Updated FAQs to Help Keep Your Company COPPACompliant, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2013/04/updated-faqs-help-keep-your-company-coppa-compliant;
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Yelp, TinyCo Settle FTC Charges Their Apps Improperly
Collected Children’s Personal Information (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/09/yelp-tinyco-settle-ftc-charges-their-apps-improperly-collected.
153.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 152; see also 16 C.F.R. §§
312.3–.5.
154.
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 152.
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While COPPA is not a law that addresses health care directly, the
FTC has said in a recent report that it is among the laws that it intends to use
to police the IoT as it develops.155 Given the unprecedented use of Internetconnected devices by children in recent years, it is likely that there will need
to be further amendments made to COPPA by the FTC to include the everevolving categories of data collected by them.156
3.

California Online Privacy Protection Act (“CalOPPA”)

In addition to the federal efforts to protect Internet users online,
states have also been implementing their own laws to protect their citizens on
the Internet.157 Perhaps the most significant such state law is CalOPPA.158
This law requires all commercial operators of websites or online services to
conspicuously post privacy policies to inform consumers about: (a) the
categories of PII being collected; and (b) with which third parties the PII will
be shared.159
California introduced amendments to CalOPPA that took effect on
January 1, 2015.160 Among these amendments was a requirement that retail
website operators include a delete button on such sites and applications that
would allow minors who are registered users on the site to have the ability to
delete their content that has been posted on the site, or the ability to request
that it be deleted.161 These amendments also require that operators provide
notice that they have the ability to delete online content and instructions on
how to do so.162 Finally, the amendments prohibit retail website operators
from advertising certain categories of products or services to minors.163 It is
worth noting that the operators of the major app platforms have entered into

155.
Lesley Fair, Internet of Things: FTC Staff Report and a New Publication
for Business, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 27, 2015, 9:12 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2015/01/internet-things-ftc-staff-report-new-publicationbusinesses; see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.12.
156.
See Fair, supra note 155.
157.
See, e.g., CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (West 2014).
158.
See id.; KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR
PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC 5 (2014), available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/
all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf.
159.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a)–(b)(1).
160.
See id. §§ 22580–82.
161.
Id. § 22581(a)(1); Gregory T. Parks et al., California’s “Delete Button”
Law Re: California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 16,
2013),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-s-delete-button-law-re-californiaonline-privacy-protection-act-caloppa.
162.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581(a)(3).
163.
Id. § 22580(a), (i).
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a Joint Statement of Principles with the Attorney General of California.164
As part of this Statement of Principles, the operators voluntarily agreed to:
 “[P]rovide consumers with the opportunity to review the
app’s privacy policy before downloading”;
 “[W]ork to educate app developers about their privacy
obligations”; and
 “[D]evelop tools [for] consumers [to] report non-compliant
apps.”165
Given the creation of laws like CalOPPA and state laws prohibiting
employers from requiring employees to provide their social media
passwords, it is likely that states will continue to create laws to protect their
citizens online.166 It is also likely that there will be similar federal laws
passed in regard to how websites, apps and Internet-connected devices
operate, and to protect the data that they collect, especially when it comes to
regulated industries like healthcare.167
B.

Health Data Laws and Regulations

The care and feeding of privacy policies related to healthcare data
are a special species, and as such, there are special laws that apply to its
handling.168 From the oath that physicians take that is the basis of their
ethical obligations, to their patients and the practice of medicine, to laws
intended to promote the adoption of electronic health records, there is quite a
thicket of regulations that need to be considered when drafting a privacy
policy for an app or website that captures and handles healthcare data.169

164.
Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Mobile App Developers and App Platforms
Should Proactively Protect Users’ Privacy, INFORMATION INTERSECTION (June 3, 2013),
http://www.informationintersection.com/2013/06/mobile-app-developers-and-app-platformsshould-proactively-protect-users-privacy/; see also Joint Statement of Principles, CAL. OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Feb. 22, 2012).
165.
Troutman Sanders L.L.P., supra note 164 (emphasis added).
166.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 22575–79; Troutman Sanders L.L.P.,
supra note 164.
167.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 67, at 7; Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., New Rule Protects Patient Privacy, Secures Health Information
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/20130117b.html.
168.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
169.
See id.; Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Michael North trans.),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012).
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The Hippocratic Oath

Healthcare privacy has its most basic roots in the Hippocratic Oath,
an ancient Greek medical text which requires new physicians to swear that
they will abide by certain professional ethical standards in their practice of
medicine.170 Though not required by most medical schools, the Hippocratic
Oath has been adopted in various forms by some medical schools who have
adapted it for modern times.171 The Oath addresses the confidentiality of
patient information, as physicians taking it state that “[w]hatever I see or
hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my professional
practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as
considering all such things to be private.”172
i.

The Hippocratic Oath in the Era of the Selfie

Despite the Oath’s lengthy history and emphasis on physicians
making a serious commitment to the ethical standards of their profession, it
seems that in the era of the selfie, the desire to try to become an Internet
celebrity seems to be overcoming the commitment to ethical standards for
some physicians.173 Recent headlines have noted stories of surgeons texting
or taking photos during procedures—in some cases resulting in allegations of
malpractice and personal injury lawsuits.174 Perhaps the most high profile
such case is the wrongful death lawsuit filed by Melissa Rivers, the daughter
of the late comedienne Joan Rivers, against the surgical center and
physicians who operated on her mother.175 The chief allegation in Rivers’
lawsuit is that her mother’s private physician, Dr. Gwen Korovin, not only
performed an unauthorized biopsy procedure on Joan Rivers without the
patient’s consent but also took a selfie with the comedienne while she was
under anesthesia.176 In a statement, “Rivers’ family lawyer Jeffrey Bloom
said [that] doctors acted as groupies,” with one doctor taking pictures of
Korovin at work during the procedure and “that the [comedienne] ‘would
have been doing Fashion Police last week,’ if [the doctors] had done their
jobs.”177 The lawsuit goes on to allege that when Joan Rivers began to go
170.
Hippocratic Oath, supra note 169.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.; see also Kory Grow, Joan Rivers’ Daughter Sues Medical Clinic over
Comedian’s Death, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/tv/
news/joan-rivers-daughter-sues-medical-clinic-over-comedians-death-20150127.
174.
See, e.g., Grow, supra note 173.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
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into cardiac arrest, the doctors did not perform a tracheotomy until seventeen
minutes had elapsed, by which time Rivers had suffered irreversible brain
damage.178 It has been reported that the clinic may now “lose its federal
accreditation in March,” as an inquiry by Medicaid and Medicare
investigators found errors that were made at the clinic, including “failing to
note Rivers’ weight before administering a sedative, allowing an
unauthorized doctor in, and noting the cell phone photos” that were taken
during the procedure.179
The age of paparazzi and reality television has intersected with the
world of healthcare as part of the production of a number of healthcare
television shows.180 This interaction has brought to light new questions
about healthcare privacy when a reality show is being filmed at a hospital.181
In the case of the family of the late Mark Chanko, an eighty-three-year old
investment advisor who was struck by a garbage truck and brought to New
York Presbyterian Hospital, these questions have become all too real.182
Unbeknownst to the family, the hospital was participating in the television
show NY Med; and Chanko’s treatment and ultimate death from his injuries
had all been filmed; and the physician treating Chanko was wearing a hidden
microphone.183 His widow, Anita, did not realize this until she was watching
the show one night and recognized her husband’s voice calling for her on the
show.184 Even though his image had been blurred, and his voice changed to
protect his identity, his wife recognized her husband’s voice and was
horrified to watch his treatment and death on television.185 Adding to her
horror was the fact that not only had she and her family not know that—
according to their lawsuit—they were being filmed for the show, but also
that they did not consent to said filming.186 In 2013, the hospital was cited
by the state for violating Mr. Chanko’s rights, finding that “[t]he patient was
unaware and uninformed that he was being filmed and viewed by a camera
crew while receiving medical treatment thus his privacy in receiving medical
treatment was not ensured.”187 The family has also sued the hospital, as well
178.
Id.
179.
Grow, supra note 173.
180.
See Charles Ornstein, Dying in the E.R., and on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2015, at MB.1.
181.
See id.
182.
Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?, HERE & NOW (Feb. 4, 2015),
www.hereandnow.wbur.org/2015/02/04/reality-tv-compatible-er (audio file).
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
See Ornstein, supra, note 180; Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?,
supra note 182.
186.
Ornstein, supra note 180.
187.
Id.
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as the physician.188 While a state supreme court judge narrowed the lawsuit
and allowed some of the family’s claims to proceed, an appellate court
dismissed the case, finding that “the doctor and hospital . . . did not breach
their duty to avoid disclosing personal information since no . . . information
was disclosed.”189 The family is now appealing and has reported the
violation to the HHS Office for Civil Rights, which is investigating the
report.190
The Chanko’s called the hospital and spoke to one of its lawyers
about who was responsible for the placement of the microphones to which
the lawyer responded that ABC was responsible for placing the microphones
on the physician treating Mr. Chanko.191 According to Chanko’s daughterin-law, Barbara, who also happens to be a medical ethicist, the members of
the television crew were all wearing scrubs, and—to the family—were not
distinguishable from the nurses and physicians working on her father.192 In
an interview with National Public Radio (“NPR”), she questioned whether
the hospital had a responsibility to inquire with its patient population as to
whether it should allow such a show to film in the hospital.193 Barbara
Chanko also explained that the family has reported the incident to the Office
for Civil Rights at the HHS, which investigates reports of HIPAA violations,
though she noted that the HIPAA law concerns protecting information from
being released to unauthorized parties, not patient privacy.194
She also questioned at what point is privacy violated in such a
situation, is it if the camera crew is filming before the client gives consent?195
Further, if the patient has been a victim of trauma, can he or she really
understand the situation, let alone give informed consent?196 Her inquiry
continued, as she wondered how having a reality television show filmed in
an emergency department impacts the patients and their treatment.197 In this
instance, the promotions for the episode of NY Med described the doctor who
treated Chanko as Dr. McDreamy-like, and Barbara Chanko pointed out that
the doctor treating her father-in-law seemed more interested in talking to the

188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.; Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?, supra note 182.
191.
Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?, supra note 182.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.; see also Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936.
195.
Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?, supra note 182.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
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camera during filming than treating his patient.198 “The American College of
Emergency Physicians opposes ‘the filming for public viewing of emergency
department patients or staff members except when they can give full
informed consent prior to their participation’ . . . .”199
The resulting debate among those in the medical community
produced an ironic twist: Jeffrey Flier, the Dean of the Harvard Medical
School, after reading about the Chanko case tweeted, “[h]ow could this be
allowed to happen?”200 Just four minutes later, the Chief of Surgery at
Boston Medical Center, Dr. Gerard Doherty, replied via tweet that, “The
same group is filming a trauma series at your place [Massachusetts General
Hospital] and ours [Boston Medical Center] right now.”201 Unbeknownst to
Flier, ABC News had been in Boston since October, filming at
Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s Hospitals for a
documentary-style series called Golden Hour that would chronicle the care
of patients in the hospitals’ emergency rooms.202 While he recalls watching
similar shows and enjoying them, Flier said that after reading about the
Chanko case, he is giving more thought to patient privacy and ethical
concerns.203 The Boston Globe reported that all three Boston hospitals
signed contracts that “require consent from patients before their stories could
be aired,” and also “allow patients to change their minds and withdraw
consent during filming, [as well as] within [thirty] days after the last filming
of a patient.”204 The story also noted that this has already happened in at
least three cases, and that the contract also allows the staff to ask the crew to
stop filming at any time.205
ABC News has thus far defended itself in the Chanko case using a
First Amendment defense, claiming that the show is protected because it is
produced by the company’s news division.206 While it does not dispute that
the crew did not obtain the family’s consent, it also further moved that the
claim should be dismissed because New York does not recognize a common
law right to privacy, and that the Chanko family themselves were responsible

198.

Ornstein, supra note 180; Is Reality TV Compatible with the ER?, supra

note 182.
199.
Ornstein, supra note 180.
200.
Kay Lazar, Patient Impact a Worry with TV Crews in ERs: Filming of
Series in Boston Hospitals Stirs Debate on Balancing Privacy Concerns, Public Benefit,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2015, at B1.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Lazar, supra note 200.
206.
Ornstein, supra note 180.
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for their loss of privacy.207 ABC News has released a statement about the
case:
We are very sorry about Mark Chanko’s tragic and
untimely death. We sympathize with his family over their loss.
We worked hard in our N.Y. Med broadcast to obscure his image
and identity and the identity of his family.
We are very proud of our acclaimed series of medical
programs showing up close the work and humanity of doctors,
nurses, residents and other health care professionals at the top
medical academic centers in the country, including Johns Hopkins,
New York Presbyterian, Mass General, Brigham and Women’s,
Boston Children’s Hospital, Boston Medical Center and other
great medical institutions.
We strive always to be highly respectful of the patients,
their families and the hospital caregivers. We have heard many
stories of people inspired after seeing our programs to pursue
medical professions, to seek treatment they wouldn’t have known
about or been too frightened to pursue or to become organ donors
after seeing depictions of successful transplants.208

The Chanko case is hardly the first lawsuit resulting from the filming
of a reality show in a hospital and will probably not be the last as devices
capable of recording patient identity and date creep into more and more
aspects of our lives.209 In the early 2000s, the New York Times Co. was
sued for invasion of privacy by a group of patients who were featured in the
show Trauma: Life in the E.R.210 Many of the plaintiffs settled, but in one
case an appeals court ruled in favor of the production company, finding that
the show qualified as news, and was protected under the law.211 The
intersection of reality television, the IoT, and healthcare will be likely to
produce more interesting questions as to what is news and what is an
invasion of privacy in coming years; it will be interesting to see what results.
It remains to be seen how the case law will develop in regard to the
filming of patients in medical facilities during treatment, particularly in the
age of smartphones and the IoT. Where there are failures on the part of
health care professionals to respect their duty to keep patient information and
data confidential, the task of regulating and disciplining them falls to state
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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professional licensing boards, as well as hospital credentialing committees.212
These bodies are often the epicenter of disciplinary trends in health care, and
they will be a crucial part of the adoption and regulation of IoT devices.213 It
will be important that these entities stay on top of developments in terms of
new applications and devices, and their impact on patient data, so that they
can draft and implement policies to appropriately address them.214
In the case of hospitals, data and public image are more important
than ever. The implementation of section 3025 of the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) added section 1886(q) to the Social Security Act, which established
the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program.215 The establishment of this
program brought with it a new reality: That hospitals would lose Medicare
reimbursement dollars in instances where patients over the age of sixty-five
are readmitted to the hospital for heart failure, pneumonia, or acute
myocardial infarction.216 Section 3008 of the ACA also resulted in the
creation of the Hospital-Acquired Condition (“HAC”) Reduction Program,
which aims to reduce the occurrence of preventable conditions that patients
did not have upon admission to a hospital, but developed during a hospital
stay.217 In addition, the data about these readmission and infection rates has
been made available to the public as never before, and thus giving consumers
the ability to shop between hospitals based on their patient data for
conditions like pneumonia and urinary tract infections.218 This increased
pressure on hospitals to improve readmission rates and reduce hospital
acquired infections will likely result in these facilities keeping a keen eye on
the implementation of new, Internet connected devices and how they impact
patient outcomes, as well as hospitals’ public images.219 As hospitals collect
more and more patient data, the protection of that data will be paramount to
not only complying with the related healthcare privacy laws, but also
maintaining consumer trust in their ability to do so.

212.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7e (2012); Koenig, supra note 36, at 17.
213.
See INTEL, supra note 102, at 3.
214.
See id.
215.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1).
216.
See id.; Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Feefor-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/HAC-Reduction-Program.html (last modified Dec.
18, 2014); INTEL, supra note 102, at 1.
217.
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p)(1); see also Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC)
Reduction Program, supra note 216.
218.
See Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program, supra note
216.
219.
See id.; INTEL, supra note 102, at 4.
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Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records

Another aspect of the web of medical privacy laws can be found at
42 C.F.R. § 2, which sets out privacy provisions for the records of the
identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of patients that are maintained as
part of a federally assisted drug or alcohol abuse program.220
3.

Medicare Conditions of Participation

A significant requirement in terms of privacy for most healthcare
providers and facilities comes in the form of the Medicare Conditions of
Participation, codified 42 C.F.R §§ 482 to 486.221 The Conditions for
Participation for hospitals, home health agencies, states, long-term care
facilities, and suppliers all require these entities to safeguard patient records
from disclosure, and not to release them without the patient’s consent.222
4.

HIPAA

The most prominent privacy law when it comes to healthcare is
HIPAA.223 Passed in 1996, this law protects the privacy of individually
identifiable health information, which it defines as information that
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition
of an individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual,
and (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the
individual.224

HIPAA applies only to certain entities, which it refers to as covered
entities, and includes “health plan[s], . . . healthcare clearinghouse[s], [and] a
healthcare provider who transmits any health information in electronic
form.”225 It is the latter category where it is likely that change will be needed
as the IoT devices, particularly those related to healthcare mature, and
regulatory solutions to protect healthcare data become apparent.226 As it
currently stands, HIPAA does provide covered entities with an exemption
220.
42 C.F.R. § 2 (2014).
221.
Id. §§ 482.1–486.348.
222.
Id. § 2.3; see also 42. C.F.R. §§ 482.1–486.348.
223.
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936.
224.
Id. § 1320d(B).
225.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (Covered entity).
226.
See INTEL, supra note 102, at 3–4.
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that allows them to use or disclose protected health information in order to
provide treatment, obtain payment, or carry out other healthcare operations
as set forth in the statute.227
5.

HITECH Act

A major factor in the growth of healthcare data and related issues is
the implementation of the HITECH Act of 2009.228 This law was intended to
provide a monetary incentive for hospitals and healthcare providers to
convert to electronic medical records systems, and it covers medical records
and patient information in oral, paper, or electronic form.229 The passage of
the HITECH Act also made significant changes to both the enforcement and
sanctions as they relate to the healthcare privacy and security requirements
enacted as part of HIPAA.230 One of these changes was the shift of the
enforcement authority of the provisions of HITECH to the HHS from the
Office for Civil Rights and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”).231 While some agencies retain certain interests in the enforcement
of HITECH, the primary enforcement after the implementation of the law
lies with HHS.232 In addition, state attorney generals can bring an action in
federal court on behalf of their respective state residents.233
The HITECH Act places privacy obligations on not only covered
entities, but also on the business associates who provide services to those
covered entities, and may handle personal health information.234 This means
that these business associates are subject to the same physical, technical, and
administrative security requirements as those that covered entities must
follow under HIPAA.235 These business associates can include lawyers, IT
personnel, benefits consultants, and accountants.236
Typically, the
compliance requirements imposed upon business associates are addressed in
the terms of a business associate contract.237 Under the Omnibus Rule that
227.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a), (c).
228.
42 U.S.C. § 300jj (2012).
229.
Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical Health Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 115, 175 (2009); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103
(Covered entity and Health Information), 160.402(a), 162.923(a), 164.103 (Required by law).
230.
Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical Health Act §§
13401, 13410; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.402(a)–(c), .404(a)–(b), 164.306(a)–(e).
231.
42 U.S.C. § 17939.
232.
See id.
233.
42 U.S.C. §1320d-5(d)(1) (2012).
234.
Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical Health Act §
13401; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (Business associate) (3)(i)–(iii).
235.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (3)(i)–(iii).
236.
See id.; 160.103 (Business associate) (i)–(ii).
237.
42 U.S.C. §17938 (2012).
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made modifications to the HIPAA and HITECH laws, business associates are
now directly subject to some of the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, including providing a notice of privacy practices or designating a
privacy officer in the event that the business associate delegates that
obligation to a third party.238 In addition, the Omnibus Rule allows business
associates of covered entities to disclose protected health information to a
business associate who is a subcontractor.239 As part of this change, the
business associate can allow the subcontractor to create or receive that PHI
on its behalf, so long as the business associate obtains adequate assurances
from the subcontractor that it will safeguard the information.240 This change
passes the responsibility of obtaining such assurances from being that of the
covered entity to being the responsibility of the business associate, but is still
done through a business associate agreement, which lays out the
responsibilities and obligations of the respective parties.241
Other important aspects of the HITECH Act are the requirements
that it imposes upon covered entities and business associates in terms of
security breach notifications.242
The Act defines a breach as “the
unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health
information which compromises the security or privacy of such information,
except where an unauthorized person to whom such information is disclosed
would not . . . have been able to retain such information.”243 The Act further
defines unsecured personal health information as information that is not
protected “through the use of a technology or methodology specified by the
Secretary in . . . guidance . . . that renders the [PHI] unusable, unreadable, or
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals.”244
6.

ACA

Yet another significant law when it comes to healthcare privacy is
ACA.245 This law created the Health Insurance Marketplace, as well as the
website HealthCare.gov, where consumers can shop for insurance policies

238.
See id.; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b), .502(e)(2).
239.
See 42 U.S.C. §17938; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3)(iii).
240.
42 U.S.C. § 17938; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3)(iii).
241.
See 42 U.S.C. §17938; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3)(iii).
242.
See 42 U.S.C. § 17921(1)(A), (2).
243.
Id. § 17921(1)(A).
244.
42 U.S.C. § 17932(h)(1)(a)–(b).
245.
See Patient Protection & Care Affordable Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 18001
(2012); see also Anna North, Op-Ed, Is Your Obamacare Data Safe?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2015 (Late Edition), at SR. 10.
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available through the federal marketplace.246 The law also requires insurance
companies to cover people with pre-existing health conditions, allows
coverage to continue for young adults up to age twenty-six under their
parents’ policies, and makes it illegal for health insurance companies to
cancel coverage just because an insured person gets sick.247
As with many new healthcare laws, the implementation of ACA has
not been without bumps in the road.248 In addition to challenges by
politicians who are not fans of the new law, there have been privacy
concerns that have emerged as the HealthCare.gov website has rolled out.249
This website serves as the hub for consumers to sign up for health insurance,
as well as the marketplace for them to shop for policies.250 As one can
imagine, this process involves a lot of sensitive data, which consumers and
regulators are very concerned about keeping safe.251 However, as recent
headlines have detailed, an Associated Press report said that the site has been
sharing user data, including users’ ages, income levels, and whether they are
pregnant or not, with third parties like Facebook, Twitter, and Google.252
These reports highlighted new privacy concerns that have arisen as the IoT
expands: First, that of broken promises of anonymization; and second, “‘the
spillage of data from one context into others.’”253 The concerns in the first
instance focus on situations where the organization collecting the data
assured users that the data would be made anonymous, but it is then either
not made anonymous, or the process is not carried out well.254 The second
concern relates to situations where health data is collected in one context, but
then used by a third party in ways that consumers are not aware of and may
not have necessarily consented to under the terms of the first context.255
Officials from CMS have emphasized that they do not and will not
sell visitor information from HealthCare.gov, and that they remain vigilant
about working to make sure that consumer data is protected.256 Aaron
Albright, director of the media relations group at CMS, explained that

246.
Rights & Protections, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/
health-care-law-protections/.
247.
Id.
248.
See North, supra note 245.
249.
Id.
250.
Rights & Protections, supra note 246.
251.
See North, supra note 245.
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Id.
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“Private sector tools . . . play a critical role in the
operation of a consumer focused website. Without these tools,
HealthCare.gov would be unable to effectively respond to system
errors, issues that result in a poor or slow web experience, or
provide metrics to the public on site visits [or] mobile usage. In
addition, consumers would have to continuously resubmit
information throughout the process making signing up for
insurance more difficult.”257

This explanation highlights the tension between consumer demands
for user-friendly websites, as well as for sites that protect consumer data to
the greatest extent possible.258 As with many types of software projects, this
tension must be weighed against the business decision that often must be
made between using a third party tool or taking the extra time and money to
build such a tool internally.259
7.

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”)

An important privacy law that has been enacted to protect patient
health information is GINA.260 This law states that genetic information is
PHI, and is protected under HIPAA.261 It further prohibits health insurance
companies from using genetic information for underwriting purposes and
prohibits employers from discriminating against people based on such
information.262
The passage of the GINA law, as well as the updates to it as the
HIPAA and HITECH laws have evolved, represent an important line of
defense to protect patients against discrimination on the basis of genetic
information.263 This defense will only continue to grow in importance as
personalized medicine based on genetic information is used more widely and
as more is discovered about the impact of genetics on human health.264 It is
also likely that as other categories of health data are discovered that laws will

257.
Id.
258.
Id.
259.
See id.
260.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
122 Stat. 881 (2008); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
261.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 1180(a)(1); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
262.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 1180(a)(2); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
263.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 1180(a); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
264.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 167.
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be passed to protect against discrimination based on what can be gleaned
from that data.265
C.

Impact of Internet of Things on Health Laws
1.

Hesitancy of Healthcare Providers

Despite the great potential of the use of big data in healthcare, there
is also evidence of hesitancy on the part of providers to implement some
tools until they are fully baked.266 A recent NPR story noted how a doctor at
Stanford’s Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital searched patient record data to
examine treatment of pediatric lupus patients, and eventually find a way to
save the life of such a patient, but that ultimately the hospital opted not to
continue doing so, as the doctors felt that the system for mining such patient
data was not yet ready for prime time.267 While it is noted in the story that
the ability to search such data can fill the gap in situations where there is not
sufficient published literature to help doctors navigate difficult cases, there
does seem to be a consensus among some hospitals and physicians that these
systems need to be better developed before they are widely adopted.268 This
applies not only to systems to mine patient data to find solutions, but also to
electronic medical records systems.269 In some instances, hospitals have
begun to mine the data present in their records, but found that they are not
yet ready to do this in all of their cases, as was discovered by Dr. Jenny
Frankovich, an attending physician at the Stanford Lucile Packard Children’s
Hospital.270 As Dr. Frankovich explained in her NPR interview, while her
analysis of the treatment of other pediatric lupus patients from the data from
their respective charts in the database helped her find a solution to treat her
patient in that instance, the physicians have not yet instituted this practice on
a widespread basis, as they feel that the system is not yet ready in terms of
accuracy and reliability to be used in every case.271

265.
See id.
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See, e.g., Big Data Not a Cure-All in Medicine, NPR (Jan. 5, 2015, 4:22
PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/375201444/big-data-not-a-cure-all-in-medicine.
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Imposition of Health Privacy Laws on New Categories of People
i.

Web Developers, App Developers, Tech Companies

An interesting aspect of the issues that develop at the intersection of
the growth of the Internet of Things and healthcare are those faced by the
parties that support the entities that are bound by HIPAA and other medical
data protection laws, including web developers.272
Development of
healthcare websites has grown exponentially, especially given the fact that,
according to a 2013 study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project,
“[o]ne in three American adults have gone online [to try] to figure out [what]
medical condition” that they or another individual might have.273 Of those
individuals who searched for a medical condition online, forty-six percent
said that the information led them to think that they needed the attention of a
medical professional, and thirty-eight percent said that they used it to
determine if the condition was something that they could take care of at
home, and eleven percent said it was both reasons or somewhere in
between.274 The increased use of online medical information has made the
online presence of medical device manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies,
physicians, hospitals, and other related entities have a presence on the
web.275 As such, they are increasingly reaching out to web and app
developers to help them create such a presence, and in instances where such
developers have to interact with patient data, to ensure HIPAA
compliance.276
The changes to the HIPAA and HITECH laws as a result of the
implementation of the Omnibus Rule have made taking on the obligations of
abiding by these healthcare data privacy laws a bit clearer for developers, as
it better lays out the obligations of business associates handling PHI, as well
as the circumstances under which a developer could opt to use a
subcontractor who is more familiar with the obligations and procedures for
handling sensitive data rather than taking on all of the obligations
themselves.277 The developers remain responsible for oversight in such a
situation, but they also can make sure that both parties are clear as to their
roles through the use of a well-drafted business associate agreement.278
272.
273.

Wang, supra note 21.
Susannah Fox & Maeve Duggan, Health Online 2013,
PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Jan. 15, 2013), www.pewinternet.org/2013/01/15/health-online-2013/.
274.
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275.
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See id.; Wang, supra note 21.
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See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3)(iii); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., supra note 167.
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Further, as healthcare companies have become more experienced in dealing
with developers, they are in some instances becoming more adept at training
them as to how to comply with relevant data privacy laws.279 In other words,
regulatory agencies seem to be picking up the slack, and will likely get the
message across through enforcement actions for those who do not ensure
their apps and devices comply, as the FTC has done with recent COPPA
actions.280
3.

FDA Regulation of Health Apps and Devices

At the time of this writing, there were more than 43,000 healthcare
apps available in the Apple iTunes App Store.281 However, of these apps, an
October 2013 survey by the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics found
that most of these apps had only been downloaded fewer than 500 times, and
very few offered any type of robust functionality.282 In the worst cases, the
apps provided inaccurate or unproven information, some even in apps
designed for clinical use by physicians!283 This new reality of healthcare
apps has caught the attention of the FDA, as it seeks to protect people from
inaccurate or unsafe information that may be provided in healthcare apps or
devices.284 In September of 2013, the FDA announced that it would start
regulating healthcare apps, focusing on those apps that “meet the regulatory
definition of device, and that (i) are intended to be used as an accessory to a
regulated medical device, or (ii) transform a mobile platform into a regulated
medical device.”285 The FDA noted that the agency has extensive resources
available to help app developers determine the level of regulation that applies
to their particular product, such as the Product Classification Database and
the 510(k) Premarket Notification Database, and to stay up-to-date on new
information about changes to these regulations.286
The FDA has provided examples of specific apps that have been
approved under its new regulations, as well as examples of the types of apps
and devices that would be subject to these regulations.287 The first category
of apps the FDA will be regulating are “[m]obile apps that transform a
279.
See id.
280.
See Fair, supra note 152.
281.
Litt, supra note 16.
282.
Id.
283.
Id.
284.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 67, at 4; Litt, supra note 16.
285.
Mobile Medical Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ConnectedHealth/Mobil
eMedicalApplications/ucm255978.htm (last updated June 4, 2014).
286.
Examples of MMAs the FDA Regulates, supra note 107.
287.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 67, at 13−15, 20–22.
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mobile platform into a regulated medical device and therefore are mobile
medical apps.”288 The FDA’s guidance states that this category would
include apps that use sensors attached to the mobile platform or tools within
the mobile platform to diagnose a condition, as well as those that “present
donor history questions to a potential blood donor and . . . transmit the
[answers to] . . . a blood collection facility” to determine the donor’s
eligibility to donate blood.289 The second category of apps that the FDA will
now regulate are those “apps that connect to an existing device type for
purposes of controlling its operation, function or energy source, and
therefore are mobile medical apps.”290 The guidance states that this category
would include apps that control or monitor devices such as infusion pumps,
neuromuscular stimulators, or blood pressure cuffs.291 The third category of
apps that are now covered by FDA regulation are “mobile apps that display,
transfer, store, or convert patient-specific medical device data from a
connected device and therefore are mobile medical apps.”292 Included in the
examples for this category are
apps that connect to a nursing central station and display medical
device data to a physician’s mobile platform for review, . . . apps
that connect to bedside—or cardiac—monitors [that] transfer the
data to a . . . viewing station for . . . patient monitoring, . . . [as well
as] apps that connect to a perinatal monitoring system and transfer
. . . contraction and fetal heart rate . . . to another display to allow
for . . . monitoring [the] progress [of a patient’s labor].293

The announcement of these new regulations for healthcare apps
caused plenty of grumbling in fast-paced Silicon Valley, where the focus is
often on being the first to market, and there is typically lower tolerance for
lengthy regulatory processes.294 However, the FDA has made it clear that
going forward, device and app developers looking to create IoT products and
services for the healthcare industry will need to play by their rules in order to
operate in this space.295 There will likely be some growing pains, but one
hopes that as developers learn the ropes of the FDA procedures, and take
advantage of the huge potential market for smart healthcare devices and
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apps, that the process of complying with the regulations will become less
painful.
4.

Conflicts in Terms of Service and Privacy Policy

Among the legal challenges presented by the growth of the IoT as it
relates to healthcare is how developers can not only write privacy policies for
their devices or services that comply with applicable privacy laws, but also
ensure that they work with the policies of other products in that ecosystem.296
As the universe of apps has exploded in recent years, conflicts between the
terms of use and privacy policies of different apps and platforms have
become more common.297 Such conflicts became apparent to this author
when she installed an app on her tablet called SnapHack, which allows users
to save their SnapChat messages, which typically only last between one to
ten seconds.298 The SnapHack app interfaces with SnapChat through its
applied programming interface, or API, and more interestingly, the app
features a disclaimer in its terms of service that states that the developers of
SnapHack are not responsible if the use of its app violates the terms of use
for SnapChat and results in the user’s SnapChat account being deleted.299 As
the IoT ecosystem matures, it will be important for developers to work to
ensure that their apps do not violate the terms of use for another app or
platform in such a way that might result in users’ accounts being deleted.
While it may be upsetting in the short term for a user to lose his or her
SnapChat messages, one can imagine how devastated a user of a healthcare
app would be to lose months or years of health data that he or she has been
using to track a serious medical condition.
As well as conflicts between the terms of use and privacy policies of
apps, there are also real world legal consequences of developers creating
apps using pieces of software that are not in compliance with privacy laws.300
The FTC recently took the unprecedented step of warning app developer
296.
See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at viii.
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See, e.g., id. at vii−viii.
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Following 4chan Hack, ZDNET (Nov. 17, 2014, 12:30 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/snapchat-issues-outright-ban-on-third-party-apps-following-4chan-hack/.
300.
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2012); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
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BabyBus that its apps were not in compliance with COPPA, and that it could
face fines if it did not take steps to bring them into compliance.301 It turned
out that the problem was not with BabyBus’ software code in the app, but
with a third party API that was collecting data subject to COPPA from
minors and did not have the applicable compliance and parental consent
mechanisms in place.302 As a result of the warning, Google pulled all of the
BabyBus apps from the PlayStore until they were in compliance with the
law.303 Situations like this illustrate the importance for developers to not
only work to ensure that they have policies and procedures in place so that
their products are in compliance with applicable privacy laws, but also do
their due diligence in terms of third party software to make sure it does as
well.304 Given the growing thicket of regulations and laws governing the
protection of healthcare data, taking these steps will be more important than
ever for developers in the IoT healthcare space.305 As much as the FTC is
stepping up its COPPA enforcement actions, it is likely that the Commission,
as well as the FDA, will do the same as it relates to apps and devices in the
IoT in healthcare, and not being in compliance could result in expensive
lessons in terms of fines, as well as negative publicity.306
5.

Interoperability issues

In addition to the myriad legal considerations that come with the era
of the IoT for healthcare, there are also an equal number of practical
considerations that must be addressed as part of the implementation
process.307 One such consideration is the interoperability of all of these
devices and applications.308 As mentioned above, there is hesitancy among
some physicians and hospitals in the midst of the implementation of so much
technology at this time, and interoperability is a big part of that concern.309
Developers and manufacturers of IoT devices and apps will have to tread
301.
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carefully, and involve doctors and hospitals in the development of their
products to make sure these products can become part of the IoT ecosystem
and work with other products in it if they want to succeed.310 As Dr. Michael
Blum, a cardiologist at the University of California, San Francisco, noted on
a recent NPR story, doctors are getting pitches from entrepreneurs on a near
daily basis, and while “[t]heir perspective is, ‘[y]ou old doctors have kept
things the same as they are for [fifty] years. [We have] got [sic] new
technology, and [it is] going to disrupt healthcare’ . . . . [But] [t]he
[p]roblem is just because a device looks shiny and new [does not] mean [it
is] useful.”311 Blum said that in many instances, validation studies are
needed, and the task of carrying out these studies often falls to doctors and
hospitals, so developers will also need to allow time in their product
planning.312 The implementation of the new FDA guidelines for medical
devices and apps should help with this process, whether developers like it or
not.313
6.

BYOD

A practical reality related to interoperability is bring your own
device (“BYOD”) to hospitals and healthcare facilities.314 Where in the past
corporations had certain standard devices that all employees used, the
proliferation of smart phones and devices in society now means that
physicians and nurses all have a variety of personal and professional devices,
and that any platform a hospital or healthcare system adopts must work with
a broad spectrum of devices.315 The same goes for patients, so developers
must consider what platforms patients are using, and make sure that their
products work well with those platforms to help with their widespread
adoption.316
This BYOD reality makes the concerns about interoperability, both
in terms of policies and operation, even more important for new IoT devices
and applications.317 The challenge will be how to find products that allow
medical professionals easy and fast access to patient data detected by IoT
devices, while also building in security measures to protect that same data.
310.
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Recalls

Ultimately, given the legal and practical considerations of the IoT as
it relates to healthcare, there will need to be solutions on both fronts to
protect healthcare data.318 One such solution is that of recalls of medical
devices.319 To date, there have not been any such recalls for cybersecurity
reasons, but it is foreseeable that this could change in the future with the
explosion of medical devices that are part of the IoT.320 The challenges
could be said to be twofold: First, those presented by the rise of threedimensional printing, and, second, the related—but in many instances
separate—challenges presented by the rise of crowdfunding as a means of
funding medical device challenges.321 In the first instance, while threedimensional printing has allowed physicians to print prostheses to create
lifesaving solutions for patients, these prostheses were not subject to the
same rigors that traditional solutions undergo as part of research and
development, and their long-term consequences remain to be seen.322
However, the same can be said of devices that go the traditional development
route.323 In the instance of some metal hip replacements, this oversight did
not prevent problems with the implants that caused devastating injuries to
patients when they began to lock up and shed metal shavings into their
bloodstreams.324
The challenge that both three-dimensional printing and
crowdfunding present is that in some instances, unlike traditional
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, these products are starting
to be developed by small or independent companies that may not have the
same corporate legacy in terms of incorporation and continued corporate
existence.325 This legacy is important, as in the case of device recalls,
government agencies, as well as consumers, would need to be able to contact
the company and its customers to inform them of said recall.326 Though this
318.
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concern is less likely for the companies creating devices and apps subject to
the FDA regulations, there is still a concern for those companies or inventors
that are not covered by them.327
As the IoT for healthcare develops, the Agency may have to help fill
the gap between established companies and startups, or other parties may
have to step up.328 This has already started to happen on the crowdfunding
front, as popular crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter and game platform
Steam Early Access changed their terms of service in September to require
that creators actually deliver the products and rewards described in their
campaign.329 This move was motivated by the backlash from backers in
response to several game campaigns that never delivered as promised, or else
delivered low quality games.330 State attorneys general are monitoring the
crowdfunding space from a consumer protection law standpoint as well, as
the Attorney General for the State of Washington filed what is believed to be
the first consumer protection lawsuit concerning crowdfunding against
Kickstarter game creator Edward J. Polchlepek III—also known as Ed
Nash—and his company Altius Management, in May of 2014.331
IV.

CONCLUSION

Much as it did in the time of Justices Brandeis and Warren in the age
of snapshot photography, concerns about privacy remain just as paramount
among consumers and regulators today in the age of the IoT.332 Given the
importance of keeping consumers and their data safe in this fast-paced age of
rapid technological development, it will be crucial for regulators to keep an
eye on how these technologies are developing, as well as collect and analyze
data, so that they can develop solutions to the problems that may crop up
along the way. Lawyers will also play an important role in this process, as
they defend victims of data breaches and hold retailers and data aggregators
accountable for the protection of consumer data. Lawyers will also play an
327.
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16; Sullivan, supra note 17.
328.
See INTEL, supra note 102, at 2–4; Poremba supra note 62; Sullivan, supra
note 17.
329.
Jeff Grubb, Valve Expands Its Rules for Early Access Games on Steam,
VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/11/20/valve-expandsits-rules-for-early-access-games-on-steam/; Christian Nutt, Kickstarter Updates Terms: ‘The
(Sept.
19,
2014),
Creator
Must
Complete
the
Project’,
GAMASUTRA
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/226071/Kickstarter_updates_terms_The_creator_must
_complete_the_project.php.
330.
Wawro, supra note 321; see also Nutt, supra note 329.
331.
Wawro, supra note 321.
332.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195; Greenough, supra note 6.
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integral role in the care and feeding of privacy policies as they relate to the
IoT and healthcare, as well as other industries, advising companies as to how
best to develop their policies and procedures, as well as how to communicate
them to patients and regulators.
There is perhaps no other industry that this process will be more
important than in healthcare. As such, the solutions developed by entities,
from hospitals to state and federal healthcare agencies to app developers, will
shape the role of the IoT in the future of healthcare.
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INTRODUCTION

Iconic film critic, Roger Ebert, proclaimed that a scene from the hit
movie Raging Bull showcased “acting as good as any ever put on the
screen.”1 In addition to cracking Ebert’s list of top ten movies, the American
Film Institute declared Raging Bull the fourth greatest American movie of all
time.2 Despite the critical acclaim, Raging Bull is not receiving headlines for
the knockout performance delivered by Robert De Niro.3 Instead, Raging
Bull is in the spotlight because of the impact a recent Supreme Court of the
United States’ decision will have on copyright and patent law.4 On May 19,
2014, in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court held
that the equitable doctrine of laches does not apply to copyright infringement
claims.6
Legal scholars are of the belief that the Supreme Court’s ruling will
have a significant impact on copyright law.7 Specifically, they predict that
the Supreme Court’s bar on the defense of laches will result in a substantial
increase in copyright claims.8 This presumption was immediately evidenced
by a lawsuit filed against Led Zeppelin claiming that their legendary song,
Stairway to Heaven, was created as a result of copyright infringement.9
This Comment will focus on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Petrella, its far-reaching implications, and the pending lawsuit against Led
Zeppelin.10 Specifically, Part II of this Comment will explain, in detail, the
doctrine of laches and the relevant copyright law necessary to appreciate the
1.
Roger Ebert, Ten Greatest Films of All Time, ROGER EBERT’S J. (Apr. 1,
1991), http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-journal/ten-greatest-films-of-all-time.
2.
AFI’s 100 Years . . . 100 Movies—10th Anniversary Edition, AM. FILM
INST. (2007), http://www.afi.com/Docs/100Years/100Movies.pdf; Ebert, supra note 1.
3.
See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Ruling Revives Copyright Suit;
Justices Say Heirs of Composers and Writers Can Wait Decades to Seek Royalties from
Rereleases, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at B1; Ebert, supra note 1.
4.
Bill Donahue, With ‘Raging Bull’ Ruling, Copyright Cases Could Spike,
LAW360 (May 19, 2014, 7:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/539438/with-ragingbull-ruling-copyright-cases-could-spike; see also Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No.
12-1315, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 19, 2014).
5.
No. 12-1315, slip op. (U.S. May 19, 2014).
6.
Id. at 1.
7.
Donahue, supra note 4; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1.
8.
Donahue, supra note 4; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1.
9.
Todd McCormick & Jason M. Joyal, How ‘Raging Bull’ Case Could
Impact Entertainment Industry, LAW360 (July 2, 2014, 10:08 AM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/552689/how-raging-bull-case-could-impact-entertainment-industry;
see
also
Complaint at 22–23, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:14-cv-03089-JS (E.D. Pa. filed May 31,
2014).
10.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; Complaint, supra note 9, at 22–
27; infra Parts II–IV.
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significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella. 11 Part III will
thoroughly analyze Petrella by providing a background of the case and a
detailed explanation of the Supreme Court’s holding.12 Then, Part IV of this
Comment will transition into an extensive discussion of the lawsuit filed
against Led Zeppelin and its acclaimed song, Stairway to Heaven.13
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW

The origins of United States copyright law can be found in Article 1,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which provides that Congress
has the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 14 Today, the United States
Copyright Act (“the Act”) promulgates the founding fathers’ desire to
promote innovation, while providing authors and inventors with exclusive
rights to their works.15 Section 102(a) of the Act grants copyright protection
for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”16 Under the Act, a copyright “vests initially in the author or
authors of the work.”17 Pursuant to section 106 of the Act, a copyright owner
is conferred “certain exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce and
[re]distribute the work and to develop and market derivative works.” 18
However, these exclusive rights are protected for only a fixed period of
time.19 Copyrighted works published before 1978—as were Raging Bull and
Stairway to Heaven—“are protected for an initial period of [twenty-eight]
years, which may be—and in [these] case[s] [were]—extended for a renewal
period of up to [sixty-seven] years.”20

11.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; infra Part II.
12.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; infra Part III.
13.
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; infra Part IV.
14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Toni Lester, Blurred Lines—Where
Copyright Ends and Cultural Appropriation Begins—The Case of Robin Thicke Versus
Bridgeport Music and the Estate of Marvin Gaye, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 217, 222–
23 (2014).
15.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
16.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (limiting works of authorship to the following
categories: “(1) [L]iterary works; (2) musical works . . . ; (3) dramatic works . . . ; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”).
17.
Id. § 201.
18.
Id. § 106; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc, 12-1315, slip op. at 2
(U.S. May 19, 2014).
19.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
20.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 2 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)).
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Statute of Limitations

Despite lengthy periods of protection, copyright owners’ ability to
recover from infringement is hindered by a three-year statute of limitations
period.21 Section 507(b) of the Act provides that, “[n]o civil action shall be
maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.”22 “A claim ordinarily accrues ‘when [a]
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’” 23 For a copyright
claim, this three-year period will begin to accrue at the moment an act of
infringement occurs. 24 The Act’s statute of limitations operates under a
separate-accrual rule, which provides that “when a defendant commits
successive violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each
violation.”25 Essentially, each act of infringement, by the same person or
entity, will result in a new three-year limitations period. 26 Although the
courts have implemented a recurring statute of limitations, “[u]nder the Act’s
three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within three years, and
only three years, of its occurrence.”27 Ultimately, this means that a plaintiff
is only entitled to recover for infringing acts that took place within the three
years prior to the date the complaint was filed.28
B.

Doctrine of Laches Applied to Copyright Law

The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense that is typically raised
when a plaintiff delayed filing their lawsuit without good reason. 29 The
ability to invoke a defense of laches is dependent upon the reason the
plaintiff delayed bringing the particular claim and the effect that this lapse of
time had on the defendant. 30 In other words, to prevail on a defense of
laches, the defendant must show that the plaintiff’s delay was both
unreasonable and caused them to be prejudiced.31
21.
17 U.S.C. § 507(b).
22.
Id.
23.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting Bay
Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201
(1997)).
24.
Id. (explaining that a complete cause of action arises when an infringing
act occurs); see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).
25.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 5.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 5–6.
29.
Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 1 (2014).
30.
Id. at 2.
31.
Id.
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Due to some of the complexities involved with the application of a
laches defense, the circuit courts have been divided as to whether this
defense is available in copyright infringement actions.32 The circuits’ split
revolves around two primary concerns: Whether the application of laches
should be allowed, despite a codified statute of limitations period, and
whether the defense of laches is available for all claims or only equitable
ones.33
1.

Laches Within a Prescribed Limitations Period

The courts’ split is derived primarily from the ability of a laches
defense to cut short a statute of limitations period that was prescribed
specifically by Congress. 34 The circuit courts have adopted three distinct
ways of dealing with a defense of laches, while still within the Act’s threeyear limitations period. 35 The courts have either completely barred the
application of laches, allowed the application, or have permitted the defense
of laches only in rare cases.36
In Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc.,37 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that laches could never bar a copyright infringement
claim, so long as the claim is within the statute of limitations period.38 The
Lyons Partnership court suggested that if it were to allow a laches defense to
cut short the statute of limitations period, enacted by the legislature, it would
raise significant separation of powers concerns.39
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit is of the opinion that a defense of
laches may be available, regardless of a statute of limitations.40 In Martin v.
Consultants & Administrators, Inc.,41 the court noted that “there is plenty of
authority for applying laches in cases governed by a statute of limitations.”42
Meanwhile, the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have consistently
held that a laches defense may be applied before a statute of limitations has
32.
Vikas K. Didwania, Comment, The Defense of Laches in Copyright
Infringement Claims, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2008).
33.
See id. at 1236.
34.
Id. at 1239 (explaining that “[t]he major concern[] among courts . . . [has]
been separation of powers and judicial deference to Congress seemingly raised by the
application of laches within the copyright infringement context”).
35.
See id. at 1239–44.
36.
See id.
37.
243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001).
38.
Id. at 798.
39.
Id.
40.
Didwania, supra note 32, at 1240.
41.
966 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1992).
42.
Id. at 1100.
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run, only if rare and compelling circumstances exist.43 The Sixth Circuit has
held that in copyright litigation, laches applies only to the most compelling of
cases.44 Additionally, in Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. World Institute
of Scientology Enterprises,45 the Eleventh Circuit noted that “there is a strong
presumption [in copyright cases] that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if it is filed
before the statute of limitations has run [and] [o]nly in the most
extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a defense.”46
2.

Laches: Equitable, Legal, or Both?

Having been developed by courts of equity, there is also constant
debate as to whether a laches defense applies to all claims or merely
equitable ones.47 In Lyons Partnership, the Fourth Circuit proclaimed that
laches “applies only in equity to bar equitable actions, not at law to bar legal
actions.” 48 However, some circuit courts have held that “significant
precedent exists for applying laches to bar [copyright] claims, even within
the copyright context.”49
The Seventh Circuit has observed that “although laches is an
equitable doctrine, courts increasingly apply it in cases at law in
which plaintiffs seek damages.” The Sixth Circuit has held that
laches can be argued “regardless of whether the suit is at law or in
equity, because, as with many equitable defenses, the defense of
laches is equally available in suits at law.”50

Most important to note, however, is the stance taken by the Ninth
Circuit.51 In the Raging Bull lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s decision that the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim was barred
by laches, despite the claim being within the three-year limitations period.52
43.
Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l,
533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Didwania, supra note 32, at 1242–43.
44.
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007).
45.
533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008).
46.
Id. at 1320.
47.
Bray, supra note 29, at 1–3.
48.
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc, 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir.
2001).
49.
Didwania, supra note 32, at 1238.
50.
Didwania, supra note 32, at 1238–39 (quoting Chirco v. Crosswinds
Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax Inc., 191 F.3d
813, 822 (7th Cir. 1999)).
51.
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.
2012), rev’d, No. 12-1315 (U.S. May 19, 2014).
52.
Id. at 951, 955–56.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on this case to
once and for all “resolve [the] conflict among[st] the [c]ircuits on the
application of the equitable defense of laches to copyright infringement
claims brought within the three-year [statute of limitations] period prescribed
by Congress.”53
III.
A.

PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER GOES THE DISTANCE
Background

In 1963, Frank Petrella authored a screenplay, which depicted the
life of former middleweight champion, Jake LaMotta. 54 That very same
year, Petrella and LaMotta registered a copyright for the work.55 In 1976,
thirteen years after collaborating to create the screenplay, Petrella and
LaMotta assigned their rights in the work to Chartoff–Winkler Productions,
Inc.56 Two years later, United Artists Corporation, a subsidiary of MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (“MGM”), acquired the rights to Petrella’s screenplay,
which became the inspiration behind the Martin Scorcese film, Raging
Bull.57 MGM released the iconic film and registered a copyright for it in
1980.58 Just a year later, in 1981, Frank Petrella died while still within the
initial terms of the copyright.59
Although Petrella and LaMotta assigned their rights to the
screenplay, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart v. Abend60 declared that
a copyright holder’s heirs could renew copyrights unburdened by previous
assignments made by the author.61 In Stewart, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that when an author who has assigned their rights away
dies before the renewal period, “the assignee may continue to use the original
work only if the author’s successor transfers the renewal rights to the
assignee.”62 As a result of the Court’s decision in Stewart, the renewal rights
for the screenplay, unburdened by the previous assignment, reverted to Frank
53.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at 10 (U.S.
May 19, 2014).
54.
Savage, supra note 3; see Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7 (explaining
that although Frank Petrella was listed as the sole author, the registration stated that the
screenplay was written in collaboration with LaMotta).
55.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
495 U.S. 207 (1990).
61.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7; see also Stewart, 495 U.S. at 221–22.
62.
Stewart, 495 U.S. at 221.
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Petrella’s heirs upon his death.63 Subsequently, Paula Petrella, the daughter
of the late Frank Petrella, renewed the copyright to the 1963 screenplay in
1991, and became the “sole owner of the copyright in that work.”64
Paula Petrella filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California on January 6, 2009, eighteen years after
renewing the copyright. 65 Her copyright infringement suit “alleged that
MGM violated . . . her copyright in the 1963 screenplay by using, producing,
and distributing Raging Bull, a work she described as derivative of the 1963
screenplay.” 66 Petrella sought both legal and equitable remedies. 67
Additionally, pursuant to section 507(b) of the Act, she could only seek relief
for acts of infringement that occurred between January 6, 2006 and January
6, 2009.68
Subsequently, MGM moved for summary judgment, claiming that
the suit should be barred based upon the doctrine of laches.69 MGM asserted
that Petrella’s eighteen-year delay in filing the suit was both unreasonable
and prejudicial towards MGM. 70 Ultimately, the district court granted
MGM’s motion for summary judgment, holding that laches barred the
lawsuit because MGM was indeed prejudiced by Petrella’s unreasonable
delay in filing the suit.71
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
to dismiss the lawsuit based upon the doctrine of laches.72 The Ninth Circuit
ruled in favor of MGM, despite Petrella being within the three-year statute of
limitations period, because “Petrella was aware of her potential claims many
years earlier.”73 On October 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to hear the case and resolve the laches conflict.74

63.
Id. at 220–21; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7.
64.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(A)–(B)
(2012) (providing that a copyrighted work published before 1978 is set to expire twenty-eight
years after the creation of the work, unless the copyright is extended for a renewal period of
up to sixty-seven years).
65.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 8.
66.
Id.
67.
See id. (explaining that Petrella’s complaint requested both monetary and
injunctive relief).
68.
Id. at 8–9; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b); supra Part II.A.
69.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 9.
70.
Id.
71.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir.
2012), rev’d, No. 12-1315 (U.S. May 19, 2014).
72.
Id. at 951, 957.
73.
Id. at 952.
74.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2013 WL 5430494,
at *1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013).
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Petrella Wins in Split-Decision
1.

SCOTUS Delivers Knockout Punch to Laches

In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, finding that in the face of a
statute of limitations, the equitable defense of laches cannot be invoked to
bar legal relief. 75 This decision resolved the long-standing debate as to
whether laches can be applied within a prescribed statute of limitations
period and its application to legal claims.76
Section 507(b), it is undisputed, bars relief of any kind for conduct
occurring prior to the three-year limitations period. To the extent
that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring
within the limitations period, however, courts are not at liberty to
jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit. Laches, we
hold, cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a claim for
damages brought within the three-year window. As to equitable
relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar at the very
threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff.77

In order to reach this holding, the Supreme Court first noted that the
Ninth Circuit erred by neglecting to recognize that section 507(b) of the Act
already accounts for the delay of filing the suit.78 Led by Justice Ginsberg,
the majority explained that because a plaintiff cannot recover retrospectively
beyond the prescribed three-year window, any profits made outside that
window remain the defendant’s to keep.79
Second, the Supreme Court explained that the Act already allows
defendants to offset against profits made within the three-year look-back
period.80 Section 504(b) of the Act allows infringers to prove “deductible
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work.” 81 Although laches cannot be invoked within the
limitations period, the Supreme Court suggested that a delay in filing the suit
could be a factor in determining the appropriate relief to be awarded.82

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 11; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 11–12.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)).
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 19.
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Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed the significance of the
defense’s origins.83 The Supreme Court explained that “laches’ . . . principal
application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the
Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.”84 Before the 1938 merger
of law and equity, laches was used to account for delay in the absence of a
statute of limitations.85 Using this logic, the Supreme Court determined that
if within the statute of limitations period, laches ought to be limited to
extraordinary cases in which the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief.86
In the opinion, Justice Ginsburg references the Sixth Circuit case,
Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities Inc.,87 to demonstrate the extraordinary
circumstances that would justify a curtailment of equitable relief at the outset
of litigation. 88 In Chirco, plaintiff Michael Chirco filed an infringement
lawsuit alleging that Crosswinds Communities built its housing development
by using his copyrighted architectural design without his permission. 89
Chirco, however, had knowledge of Crosswinds’ plans to use his design well
before the construction process began.90 In fact, Chirco waited to file his
complaint until Crosswinds completed 168 of the 252 proposed units.91 The
Supreme Court explained that even though the infringing act was within the
three-year look-back period, this would be an instance where a laches
defense ought to prevail, assuming the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief.92
2.

The Significance of Petrella’s Victory

The Supreme Court’s decision that laches could not be invoked as a
bar to Petrella’s infringement claim is expected to have far-reaching
implications on both copyright law and the entertainment industry as a
whole.93 The general consensus among parties on both sides of the aisle is
that this ruling will lead to a significant rise in copyright claims.94 Dylan
Ruga—an intellectual property attorney at Steptoe and Johnson, LLC—
described the decision as a “boon for plaintiffs and a defeat for
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 12.
Id.
Id.; see also Bray, supra note 29, at 6.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20.
474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007).
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229.
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 22; McCormick & Joyal, supra note

94.

See McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.

9.
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defendants.”95 Ruga went on to explain that it will lead to “a flood of new
lawsuits based on purported infringement of films, television programs,
music, and other copyrighted material that were created decades ago but are
still exploited today.”96
Many within the entertainment industry have suggested that Petrella
will have unintended consequences that go beyond the scope of litigation.97
In an amicus brief jointly filed by DirecTV, Dish Network, Tivo, and others,
these powerful corporations argued that a decision in favor of Petrella would
chill innovation.98 In its brief, these industry leaders explained that creators
of dual use technology products—such as iPods, DVRs, and DVD players—
are often sued for copyright infringement under theories of secondary
liability.99 Having abolished the defense of laches, these companies suggest
that they will be subject to endless liability, which will ultimately
disincentivize the creators of these items from investing the money necessary
to create these types of products.100
The entertainment industry’s prime concern, however, is the degree
of vulnerability that the Petrella decision has imposed upon them.101 In the
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressly rejected the defendant’s
argument that a laches defense is necessary to prevent a copyright owner
from sitting and waiting until an alleged infringers return on investment is
substantial enough to file a lawsuit. 102 Intellectual property lawyer, Brad
Newberg, took issue with the Supreme Court’s stance suggesting that Justice
Ginsburg is “saying that no matter how long it takes you, you should game
the system.”103 Newberg went on to proclaim, “[she is] inviting plaintiffs to
game the system, to wait until something like a key witness for the defense
dies.” 104 Mark Haddard, a partner with Sidley Austin LLP, shared
Newberg’s sentiment.105 Haddard explained:
Writers “can now wait for decades to see if a film or a
song that they think incorporates their work becomes a hit and a
money-maker before suing to get their share of the profits . . . The
decision is likely to put pressure on studios to negotiate a license
95.
96.
97.

Donahue, supra note 4.
Id.
McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 22.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 16.
Donahue, supra note 4.
Id.
See id.

at 22.
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early on with someone they think has a valid claim, to avoid
having to pay more expensive claims later.”106

On the other hand, many have argued that the Supreme Court’s
decision will have an alternative effect.107 Some contend that eliminating a
laches based defense is fair and just because it allows copyright owners with
limited resources time to establish the means necessary to enter into a lawsuit
against a large corporation.108 Proponents of the Supreme Court’s decision
also argue that copyright owners finally find themselves on an even playing
field with these big-time entertainment studios.109 In their amicus brief, the
California Society of Entertainment Lawyers revealed that, in the Ninth
Circuit, studios and networks have won every single copyright infringement
case since 1990.110 The Supreme Court’s decision on May 19, 2014, will
likely put an end to these types of disproportionate outcomes.111
Ultimately, there is one thing that parties on both sides of the issue
can agree upon, and that is the subsequent increase in lawsuits that will stem
from this ruling.112 Agreeing with Mr. Ruga, Brad Newberg predicted that
“[t]his will open the floodgates for copyright lawsuits going forward as
masses of litigants from the ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s will likely come out of the
woodwork.”113 Although legal scholars—like Ruga and Newberg—expected
a significant rise in copyright lawsuits, nobody could have expected the
immediate impact it would have.114 On May 31, 2014, a mere twelve days
after the Petrella ruling, a complaint was filed against Led Zeppelin, alleging
that the band stole the intro to its timeless classic, Stairway to Heaven.115

106.
107.

Id.
Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21–22; McCormick & Joyal, supra note

108.
109.
110.
111.

Donahue, supra note 4.
McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
Id.
See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21–22; McCormick & Joyal, supra

112.
113.
114.
115.

Donahue, supra note 4; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
Donahue, supra note 4.
See Donahue, supra note 4; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
Complaint, supra note 9, at 7; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at

9.

note 9.

21–22.
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RANDY CRAIG WOLFE TRUST V. LED ZEPPELIN

Background
1.

Led Zeppelin

Requiring little introduction, Led Zeppelin is known around the
world for transforming rock ‘n’ roll music.116 Comparing their influence to
the Beatles, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame proclaims that their combination
of power and intensity mixed with the delicacy of British folk rock
“redefined rock in the Seventies and for all time.”117 Led by vocalist, Robert
Plant, and guitarist, Jimmy Page, Led Zeppelin provided the world with
timeless classics such as, Black Dog, D’yer Mak’er, and Whole Lotta
Love.118 As many incredible songs as Led Zeppelin has released, no song
has received quite the recognition and acclaim that Stairway to Heaven
has.119 Despite never having been released as a single, the epic eight-minute
song “remains [the] radio’s all-time most requested rock song.”120
2.

Randy “California” Wolfe

Despite a fantastic nickname, Randy Wolfe is not very renowned
within the classic rock community.121 At only fifteen years old, however,
Randy Wolfe received the nickname Randy California from legendary
guitarist and rock ‘n’ roll icon, Jimi Hendrix.122 As a matter of fact, before
the Jimi Hendrix Experience came to fruition, Randy California played guitar
alongside Hendrix in the band Jimmy James and the Blue Flames.123 After
going their separate ways, Randy California moved to the West Coast and
formed the psychedelic rock group, Spirit. 124 California’s exposure to

116.
Led Zeppelin Biography, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME, http://
rockhall.com/inductees/led-zeppelin/bio/ (last visited May 12, 2015).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
See Sean Michaels, Led Zeppelin Accused of Stealing Stairway to Heaven
Opening, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2014, 7:13 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/music/
2014/may/19/led-zeppelin-accused-stealing-stairway-to-heaven-opening.
122.
Id.
123.
Pierre Perrone, Obituary: Randy California, THE INDEP., Jan. 17, 1997, at
18.
124.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

145

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

450

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

famous musicians continued while touring with his band.125 In 1968 and
1969, Spirit played four shows with Led Zeppelin in Detroit, Atlanta, and
Seattle.126 In addition to those four shows, Led Zeppelin actually opened up
for Spirit in a 1968 concert at the Denver Auditorium Arena. 127
Unfortunately, Spirit ended up being relatively unsuccessful, releasing only a
few minor hits.128 Spirit’s less than moderate success in conjunction with a
poor record deal, left Randy California bartering songs in exchange for food
in the latter portion of his life.129 Before California’s untimely death in 1997,
he reportedly told Listener Magazine that Zeppelin’s Stairway to Heaven
was ripped off from a Spirit song.130
3.

Stairway to Heaven

Legend has it, Jimmy Page created the masterpiece while doing what
every other up-and-coming rock ‘n’ roll mogul would do, retreating to a
secluded cottage in Wales without power or running water. 131 After an
arduous tour, Page decided to stay in the stone cottage known as Bron-YrAur. 132 “At Bron-Yr-Aur, by candlelight, Page constructed the bones of
what may well be the most popular, and valuable, rock ‘n’ roll song of all
time, Stairway to Heaven.”133 Upon his return to England that winter, Page
showcased the instrumental foundation of the song to the rest of the band.134
“As Page plucked, singer Robert Plant seemed to channel another world as
he wrote the lyrics” to what would eventually become Stairway to Heaven.135
Stairway to Heaven was released to the public in November 1971 on
Led Zeppelin’s fourth studio album, commonly referred to as Led Zeppelin
IV. 136 In 2008, Conde Nast Portfolio magazine published an article that
125.
See id.; Jeff Perlah, Led Zeppelin Accused of Stealing ‘Stairway to
Heaven’ Opening, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 20, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ledzeppelin-accused-stealing-stairway-heaven-opening-1587312.
126.
Perlah, supra note 125.
127.
Id.
128.
Vernon Silver, Stairway to Heaven: The Song Remains Pretty Similar,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-0515/led-zeppelins-stairway-to-heaven-vs-dot-spirits-taurus-a-reckoning.
129.
Id.
130.
Perlah, supra note 125; see also Perrone, supra note 123 (explaining that
Randy California drowned after saving his twelve-year-old son who was caught in a riptide
off the coast of Molokai, Hawaii).
131.
Silver, supra note 128.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Silver, supra note 128.
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estimated the song had earned over $562 million from royalties and record
sales.137 While, the royalties are likely attributable to the radio demand of
the song, the record’s success is reflective of the band’s refusal to release
Stairway to Heaven as a single. 138 More than 23 million copies of Led
Zeppelin IV have been sold in the United States alone.139
4.

Taurus

In 1968, three years prior to the release of Stairway to Heaven, Spirit
released its self-titled debut album. 140 This album shares something in
common with Led Zeppelin IV, but unfortunately for Spirit it is not the
global success. 141 Instead, it is the music that sounds eerily similar. 142
Spirit’s album boasts Taurus, a two minute and thirty-seven second
instrumental piece that features an incredibly catchy plucked guitar line.143
A guitar line that sounds awfully similar to the opening of Stairway to
Heaven.144
5.

The Lawsuit

Declaring it a long time coming, Philadelphia lawyer, Francis
Malofiy, filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Led Zeppelin on
behalf of the estate of Randy California.145 In this case, a long time coming
may be a bit of an understatement.146 The suit alleges that the nearly fortythree-year-old song, Stairway to Heaven, was in part copied from Spirit’s
1968 song Taurus.147 In addition to the songs at issue being over forty years
old, it is clear that California was aware of the alleged infringement for a
significant amount of time.148 In his 1997 interview with Listener Magazine,
California was quoted,
I [would] say it was a ripoff, . . . [a]nd the guys made millions of
bucks on it and never said [t]hank you, never said, ‘[c]an we pay
you some money for it?’ It [is] kind of a sore point with me.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Maybe someday their conscience will make them do something
about it.149

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella, it is likely that the
estate of Randy California could not have imagined that it would have a
viable claim, forty-three years after the alleged infringement. 150 Under
Petrella, the estate can potentially recover up to three years worth of profit,
dating back from May 31, 2014, as well as, attribution rights or injunctive
relief.151
Although this lawsuit may come as a surprise to fans, this is familiar
territory for Led Zeppelin.152 Since the band’s debut, Led Zeppelin has dealt
with several lawsuits that have required them to redistribute portions of
royalties and alter credits to their songs. 153 In the early 1970s, Zeppelin
settled a dispute with music publisher Chester “Howlin’ Wolf” Burnett over
The Lemon Song by extending a writing credit to Mr. Burnett.154 Around
1979, Led Zeppelin’s chart-topping hit, Whole Lotta Love came under quite a
bit of scrutiny when Shirley Dixon-Wilson, daughter of blues musician
Willie Dixon, informed her father of the vast similarities between Whole
Lotta Love and her father’s song You Need Love.155 Ultimately, Dixon filed
suit and after an undisclosed settlement in 1987 the song now attributes
credit to the members of Led Zeppelin as well as Willie Dixon.156 Another
song that has been subject to infringement claims was Babe I’m Gonna
Leave You.157 Babe I’m Gonna Leave You is a cover of a Joan Baez song
that appeared on Led Zeppelin’s debut album.158 In 1960, Anne Bredon, a
University of California-Berkeley student, wrote the song Babe, which
became the song that both Joan Baez and Led Zeppelin covered.159 Upon
discovering her song was enshrined in classic rock history, Bredon hired an
attorney and the dispute was quickly resolved by a settlement agreement of a
50-50 split in authorship.160 Lastly, the hit song Dazed and Confused was
149.
Id.
150.
See id.; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at
22 (U.S. May 19, 2014).
151.
See McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9; Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at
5, 21.
152.
Michaels, supra note 121; Silver, supra note 128.
153.
Michaels, supra note 121; Silver, supra note 128.
154.
Silver, supra note 128.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Silver, supra note 128.
160.
Id. (explaining that Bredon was not a hard rock fan and did not learn of
the infringement until the 1980s when her twelve year old son broke the news).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1

148

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER

453

also in the spotlight recently when folk singer, Jake Holmes sued Jimmy
Page and his record and publishing companies alleging copyright
infringement of his 1967 song by the same name.161 Although both parties
stipulated for a dismissal of the action in 2011, the credit for Dazed and
Confused was changed to “Jimmy Page; inspired by Jake Holmes” the very
next year.162
Even though this most recent action brought against Led Zeppelin
will likely result in a settlement, much like the above instances, the following
sections of this Comment will analyze the merit of the infringement claim
involving Stairway to Heaven.163
B.

Copyright Infringement of Music

In order to prove a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff is
required to show that he or she is the owner of a valid copyright and that the
defendant copied protected elements of the copyrighted work. 164 This
Comment will not examine the ownership element because the complaint
filed against Led Zeppelin claims that a copyright for the song Taurus, which
lists Randy California as the author, was filed in 1968 and later renewed in
1996. 165 Instead, it will focus on the complexities of proving that a
defendant copied a plaintiff’s copyrighted work.166 The copying element of a
musical infringement claim can be established through either direct or
circumstantial evidence.167 Although direct evidence would on its face prove
the copying element, it is rarely ever available because it requires some sort
of admission by the defendant or a key witness.168 Since direct evidence is
so unlikely, most musical copyright infringement cases have to be proved via
circumstantial evidence of copying.169 To prove copying with circumstantial
evidence, the estate of Randy Wolfe will be required to demonstrate that: (1)

161.
Id.
162.
Id. (suggesting that details of the settlement were private).
163.
See Oliver Herzfeld, Spirit v. Led Zeppelin: Analysis of the “Stairway to
Heaven” Infringement Lawsuit, FORBES (May 21, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/oliverherzfeld/2014/05/21/spirit-v-led-zeppelin-analysis-of-the-stairway-to-heaveninfringement-lawsuit/; infra Part IV.B.
164.
Emily Miao & Nicole E. Grimm, The Blurred Lines of What Constitutes
Copyright Infringement of Music: Robin Thicke v. Marvin Gaye’s Estate, WESTLAW J.
INTELL. PROP., Nov. 13, 2013, at 3, 4.
165.
Complaint, supra note 9, at 7.
166.
See infra Part IV.B–C.
167.
Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
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Led Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s song Taurus; and (2) Led Zeppelin’s
Stairway to Heaven is substantially similar to Taurus.170
1.

Access

The courts are varied in their approach to determining whether the
defendant had access to a plaintiff’s copyrighted work.171 The general rule,
however, is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing “significant,
affirmative and probative evidence” that the defendant had access to their
work. 172 In Selle v. Gibb, 173 the Seventh Circuit explained that the
“plaintiff’s work need only be available with some reasonable possibility of
access.”174 Courts have proved access by circumstantial evidence through
various different methods, including: Widespread dissemination, a chain of
events, or in the absence of the previous, courts may even infer access from
striking similarity of the works.175
A plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden of proving access if he or she
can show that the allegedly infringed work was widely disseminated to the
public.176 In Cholvin v. B & F Music Company,177 the plaintiff’s musical
composition, When the Sun Bids the Sky Goodnight, was reproduced on two
thousand copies of sheet music and released through four separate
recordings, which resulted in more than two hundred thousand records
sold.178 The Seventh Circuit held that in light of the evidence, an inference
of access was proper because the widespread dissemination of the song
allowed for it to be heard on the radio from coast to coast.179 However, in
order for the court to make this type of inference, the dissemination must be
significant.180 For example, in Jewel Music Publication Co. v. Leo Feist,

170.
See id.
171.
Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access
Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 322 (1999).
172.
Id. (quoting Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)).
173.
741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
174.
Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Musical Copyright Infringement Suit:
The Impossible Dream, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 234 (1990) (quoting Selle,
741 F.2d at 901)).
175.
See id. at 234–38.
176.
Id. at 234; see also Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 103–04
(7th Cir. 1958).
177.
253 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1958).
178.
Id. at 103.
179.
See id. at 103–04.
180.
See Jewel Music Publ’g. Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 598
(S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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Inc., 181 the court refused to infer access despite the fact that the plaintiff
distributed four thousand copies of the song to broadcasting stations and
artists, and sold 5626 copies of the song.182
Evidence of widespread dissemination “may also support a theory of
subconscious infringement.” 183 The theory of subconscious infringement
was first postured by Judge Learned Hand in the case Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham. 184 In Fred Fisher, Inc., Judge Hand inferred copying by
implementing the following principal:
Everything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can
tell what may evoke it.
....
Once it appears that another has in fact used the copyright as the
source of [their] production, [they have] invaded the author’s
rights. It is no excuse that in so doing [their] memory has played .
. . a trick [on them].185

In ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 186 the Second
Circuit held that the district court’s finding of subconscious infringement
was proper. 187 In ABKCO Music, Beatles superstar George Harrison was
sued for copyright infringement by Ronald Mack based on allegations that
My Sweet Lord was copied from Mack’s He’s So Fine.188 Although the court
genuinely believed that Harrison was unaware of the infringement, it held
that there was sufficient evidence to support that Harrison had access to He’s
So Fine due to its widespread distribution.189 The court further explained
that this ruling, predicated upon subconscious copying, was proper because
the courts are not concerned with a defendant’s intent; instead, its focus is
whether the defendant had access to the infringed work.190
Another means by which a plaintiff may establish access through
circumstantial evidence is by showing a chain of events that allowed the
defendant to have direct access to the copyrighted work.191 A prime example
of this type of access can be found in the infringement suit against hip-hop

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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mogul Kanye West. 192 In this action, Vincent Peters, an aspiring rapper,
“recorded and distributed a song entitled Stronger.”193 Peters’ search for an
executive producer came to an end when Kanye West’s long-time friend and
business manager, John Monopoly, expressed interest. 194 In addition to
sending Monopoly a copy of the recording, Peters also attended a meeting
with Monopoly, during which he played the song Stronger. 195 Despite
having agreed to be Peters’ executive producer, Monopoly did not end up
producing any music for Peters due to a funding issue.196 Less than a year
after that meeting, Kanye West coincidentally released the hit song
Stronger.197 Although there is no direct evidence that West had access to
Vincent Peters’ song, the court used a chain of events theory to support the
inference that West did indeed have access to the copyrighted work.198
Although the general rule is that there must be a reasonable
possibility of access and that access may not be conferred through
speculation and conjecture, the Second Circuit has inferred access from an
attenuated chain of events.199 In Gaste v. Kaiserman,200 the court held that
the plaintiff’s theory, based on an attenuated chain of events, was sufficient
to show access because a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant
had access to the song.201
In this case, [the plaintiff’s] principal theory of access
was that [the] owner [of the defendant’s publishing company],
Lebendiger, received a copy of Pour Toi in the 1950s, when [the
plaintiff] was trying to market the song to subpublishers, and that
[the defendant] obtained it from Lebendiger in 1973. Georges
Henon, a former employee of [the plaintiff] who had been
responsible for distributing materials to foreign subpublishers,
testified that he gave a recording of Pour Toi to Lebendiger in
France in the 1950s and that he sent copies of the sheet music and
record to Lebendiger in Brazil.202

192.
See Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2012).
193.
Id. at 631.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Peters, 692 F.3d at 631.
198.
Id. at 634.
199.
E. Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions: A
Systematic Approach, 26 AKRON L. REV. 15, 21 (1992).
200.
863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988).
201.
Id. at 1067.
202.
Id. at 1066.
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The Second Circuit’s liberal finding of access, under what it
acknowledged as an attenuated chain of facts, sets a relatively low burden for
proving access.203
2.

Substantial Similarity

Once a plaintiff makes a showing that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the two works are
substantially similar. 204 The seminal case with regard to musical
infringement claims is Arnstein v. Porter.205 In Arnstein, the court created a
two-prong test in its approach to determining whether the works are
substantially similar.206 The first prong provides that “[i]f there is evidence
of access . . . then the trier of the facts must determine whether the
similarities are sufficient to prove copying, [and in this] analysis, dissection
is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of
the facts.”207 Once copying is established by the above method, the court
will employ the second prong of the test to determine if the similarity is
substantial enough to constitute an improper appropriation.208 The court will
make this determination by applying the lay-listener standard, which allows
the jury to make a determination on the similarity of the songs without taking
into account dissection or expert testimony.209 The Arnstein court justified
the second prong of the test by explaining:
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s
approbation of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing
to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.210

Dissatisfied with the Second Circuit’s two-prong test, the Ninth
Circuit created its own formula to determine the legitimacy of a musical
203.
Fruehwald, supra note 199, at 21.
204.
Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the
Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 111
(1995).
205.
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
206.
Id. at 468.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 468–69.
210.
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
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infringement claim.211 In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 212 the court determined whether two works were
substantially similar by employing a two-part analysis: An extrinsic test and
an intrinsic test.213 Under the extrinsic test, the trier of fact will compare the
similarity of the ideas behind the two works. 214 A determination will be
made by comparing the similarity of elements, between the two works,
through expert testimony and analytical dissection of those works.215 If the
trier of fact determines that there is a substantial similarity of ideas, then the
court will apply the intrinsic test, which examines the work through the ears
of an ordinary listener, without analytic dissection or expert testimony.216
Although, the Ninth Circuit created this two-part analysis to distinguish itself
from the two-prong test developed in Arnstein, in practice, the two methods
became very similar.217
3.

Access and Substantial Similarity

Although a plaintiff typically needs to prove both access and
substantial similarity, it is important to note how courts interpret these
elements in conjunction with one another. 218 Some courts will “apply an
inverse-ratio rule . . . between access” and substantial similarity, which
suggests that “the more access the defendant had to the copyrighted work,
the less similarity” the plaintiff will have to show to prove copying. 219
Additionally, some courts have gone as far to waive the access requirement if
“the two works are strikingly similar.” 220 These courts will make an
inference that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s copyrighted work if
the plaintiff’s showing of similarity is so strong that it could only have been
achieved “through copying and not by coincidence,” accident, or
independent creation.221

211.
Kim, supra note 204, at 113–14.
212.
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
213.
Id. at 1164.
214.
Id. (explaining that ideas include specific criteria that can be listed).
215.
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
216.
See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
217.
Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music:
Determining Whether What Sounds Alike is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 227, 260–61
(2013); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
218.
See Livington & Urbinato, supra note 217, at 264.
219.
Id.; Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
220.
Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
221.
Id.
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Did Led Zeppelin Steal Its Stairway to Greatness?

In an interview for Light and Shade: Conversations, Jimmy Page
stated that “‘I always tried to bring something fresh to anything that I used.’ .
. . ‘I always made sure to come up with some variation. In fact, I think in
most cases, you would never know what the original source could be.’”222
Page likely hopes the trier of fact will share his sentiment.223
In order to prevail on its copyright infringement claim, the estate of
Randy California will first be tasked with the burden of showing that Led
Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s song, Taurus. 224 Since an admission of
copying is highly unlikely, the estate of Randy California will almost
certainly have to prove access by means of circumstantial evidence.225 The
plaintiff’s counsel will likely be able to make a strong showing of access by
implementing both a theory of widespread dissemination and by
demonstrating direct evidence of access through a chain of events. 226
Although, Spirit’s fame and notoriety pales in comparison to that of Led
Zeppelin, the estate of Randy California will likely assert a widespread
dissemination argument based upon the relative success of Spirit’s self-titled
album that contained the song Taurus.227 Spirit’s album rose to thirty-one on
Billboard’s Top 200 list in 1968.228 Randy California’s strongest theory of
access, however, will be shown through a chain of events.229 The argument
that Led Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s Taurus will center around the five
concerts the two bands played together prior to the creation of Stairway to
Heaven, but subsequent to Spirit’s release of Taurus.230 Like in Peters v.
West,231 where the court inferred access based upon the plaintiff’s interaction
with the defendant’s close friend and manager, an inference of access will
certainly be present in this case because Led Zeppelin likely heard Taurus
while being physically present at a minimum of five Spirit concerts.232
After making a showing of access, the parties will move onto the
much more litigious element, substantial similarity.233 In order to make a
222.
Silver, supra note 128.
223.
See id.
224.
See supra Part IV.B.
225.
See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
226.
Brent, supra note 174, at 234–38.
227.
See Spirit: Awards, ALL MUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/album/spiritmw0000653465/awards (last visited May 12, 2015).
228.
Id.
229.
See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
230.
See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
231.
692 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2012).
232.
Id. at 633–34; Herzfeld, supra note 163.
233.
See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
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determination on this element, an expert will be brought in to break down the
works into elements and compare those elements to determine if the works
are indeed substantially similar.234 If the experts make a convincing showing
that protectable elements of Taurus are substantially similar to Stairway to
Heaven, the trier of fact will then be required to determine if the guitar
arpeggio opening of Stairway to Heaven and the instrumental track, Taurus,
are similar enough to rise to the level of improper appropriation.235 The jury
will be required to make this determination of improper appropriation based
upon its untrained ears, without taking into account the experts’ dissection or
testimony. 236 As a consequence of the ambiguity behind the substantial
similarity test and the lack of case law, due to pre-trial settlements, this
Comment will not attempt to infer what the jury’s ultimate determination
will be.237 However, it is important to note that if the Pennsylvania court
chooses to adopt the inverse-ratio rule, Randy California’s estate would have
a significantly reduced burden of proving substantial similarity because its
evidence that Led Zeppelin had access to Taurus is very strong.238
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Comment was to demonstrate the immediate and
long-term impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer will have on copyright and patent law.239 Had it not been
for this landmark decision, Led Zeppelin likely would not be facing a lawsuit
for a song the band released almost forty-three years ago. 240 Even if the
estate of Randy California did file the lawsuit, absent the Supreme Court’s
decision in Petrella, Led Zeppelin would have been confident in their
likelihood to prevail based upon California’s unreasonable delay in filing the
lawsuit. 241 However, this decision in Petrella has drastically changed the
landscape of copyright law. 242 As intellectual property attorney Brad
234.
Id. (explaining that these elements can include pitch, melody, lyrics,
cadence, etc.).
235.
See Herzfeld, supra note 163.
236.
Id.; see also Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4.
237.
See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 5 (explaining that very few
copyright case actually go to trial).
238.
See Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 217, at 264; Miao & Grim, supra
note 164, at 4; Herzfeld, supra note 163.
239.
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21
(U.S. May 19, 2014).
240.
McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
241.
Id. (explaining that the lawsuit “would likely have been time-barred prior
to Petrella”); see also Petrella, No. 12-1215, slip op. at 21–22.
242.
Petrella, No. 12-1215, slip op. at 21; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9.
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Newberg suggested, litigants from decades past will continue to come out of
the woodwork to pursue lawsuits that all parties involved likely thought
dead.243

243.
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